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chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Auction theory represents an important branch of economic research and
over the last decades structured procurement processes became more and
more important in procurement practice. Beall et al. (2003) report that
advances in information technology make it possible for buyers and sup-
pliers to directly communicate independent of their location. Electronic
procurement platforms allow buyers to easily set up structured procure-
ment mechanisms and to attract offers from potential suppliers from all
around the world. Jap (2002) reports that the introduction of electronic
reverse auctions resulted in substantial cost savings.
At least part of this observation might be explained by Bulow and Klem-
perer (1996). They show that attracting additional suppliers in a reverse
auction is more profitable for the buyer than any increase in bargaining
power. According to Subramanian (2010) reverse auctions have – compared
to negotiations – also the advantage that they are more transparent. This
transparency becomes especially important when the buyer cannot conduct
the procurement on his own and delegates its execution to an agent, because
it reduces opportunities for favoritism and corruption.
Procurement mechanisms, which are used in practice, are often similar
to those auction mechanisms that are analyzed in the academic literature.
However, they often differ in details. These small differences can have
strong influence on outcomes as I will show in the following chapters. For
example, Jap (2002) reports that in practice most procurement auctions
are non-binding. Such a buyer-determined reverse auction looks exactly
like a standard procurement auction with the only exception that the buyer
reserves the right to select the supplier after observing the offers. One reason
to do so is that the agent who is in charge of organizing the procurement
is not in the position to make the final decision. Furthermore, it can be
1
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demanding to set up a binding scoring rule that makes suppliers’ non-price
attributes comparable, especially if there are many heterogeneous suppliers.
In chapter 2 with the title Collusion in dynamic buyer-determined re-
verse auctions1, which is joint work with Elena Katok and AchimWambach,
we will show that dynamic buyer-determined reverse auctions are likely to
result in non-competitive outcomes, if suppliers have uncertainty about the
buyer’s final selection decision. The reason is that the uncertainty about
the buyer’s award decision allows suppliers to share their profits in expec-
tation by submitting similar offers. This possibility exists independent of
the size of the uncertainty. Furthermore, the uncertainty makes it more
costly for a supplier to compete by trying to outbid competitors, because it
is not sufficient to marginally underbid them to be sure to win. In contrast
to that, standard reverse auctions yield low prices. We complement our
theoretical findings with evidence from laboratory experiments.
Chapter 3 entitled Trust in procurement interactions2, which is joint
work with Elena Katok and Achim Wambach, compares buyer-determined
reverse auctions to binding price-based procurement auctions in a setting
in which quality cannot be contracted upon. In a laboratory experiment
we observe that buyer-determined reverse auctions result in higher prices
but also lead to provision of higher quality and more trust between buyer
and supplier. We rationalize our experimental findings with a theory based
1This chapter is published as Fugger et al. (2016). I presented the project at the
Meeting of the European Economic Association 2013 in Gothenburg and the conference of
the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics 2013 in Evora. Financial
support from the German Research Foundation (DFG) through the research unit Design
& Behavior and from the U.S. National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
We also want to thank the Center for Social and Economic Behavior (C-SEB) at the
University of Cologne.
2I presented the project at the European Conference of the Economic Science Asso-
ciation 2012 in Cologne, at a workshop of the research unit Design & Behavior, at the
26th European Conference on Operational Research 2013 in Rome, at the young schol-
ars workshop at the 9th Annual Behavioral Operations Conference 2014 in Cologne, at
the 8th RGS Doctoral Conference in Economics 2015 in Essen, at the Conference on
Economic Design 2015 in Istanbul, and at the Annual Conference of the Verein für So-
cialpolitik 2015 in M”unster. Financial support from the German Research Foundation
(DFG) through the research unit Design & Behavior is gratefully acknowledged. We also
want to thank the Center for Social and Economic Behavior (C-SEB) at the University
of Cologne.
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on other-regarding preferences. The theory predicts that the same subjects
who coordinate on high prices and high quality provision in the buyer-
determined reverse auction will compete to low prices and provide lowest
quality in the standard reverse auction.
In chapter 4 entitled Preferences and decision support in competitive
bidding3, which is joint work with Philippe Gillen, Alexander Rasch, and
Christopher Zeppenfeld, we examine bidding behavior in static first-price
sealed-bid auctions and dynamic Dutch auctions. These two auction for-
mats are strategically equivalent, but empirical studies report a breakdown
of the equivalence. In a laboratory experiment we investigate whether the
breakdown is due to bidders’ non-standard preferences or due to different
complexity of the two auction formats. To do so, we elicit participants’ pref-
erences and manipulate the degree of complexity by offering various levels
of decision support in the auction. Our results show that the equivalence
only breaks down in absence of decision support. This indicates that the
non-equivalence is caused by differing complexity rather than non-standard
preferences.
Chapter 5 with the title Exploiting uncertainty about the number of com-
petitors in procurement auctions4, which is joint work with Elena Katok and
Achim Wambach, we examine whether the buyer can extract additional sur-
plus from suppliers by conditioning the auction format choice on her private
information about the actual number of suppliers. This study is motivated
by the observation that in procurement practice a first-price auction is used
if the number of suppliers is small and a second-price auction if the number
is large. This cannot easily be explained since suppliers should anticipate
3Financial support from the German Research Foundation (DFG) through the re-
search unit Design & Behavior is gratefully acknowledged. We also want to thank the
Center for Social and Economic Behavior (C-SEB) at the University of Cologne. An
earlier version of this work is published in Zeppenfeld (2015).
4I presented the project at the brown bag seminar at the University of Cologne, at the
Spring Meeting of Young Economists 2015 in Ghent, at a workshop of the research unit
Design & Behavior, and at the yound scholars workshop at the 10th Annual Behavioral
Operations Conference 2015 in Ithaca. Financial support from the German Research
Foundation (DFG) through the research unit Design & Behavior is gratefully acknowl-
edged. We also want to thank the Center for Social and Economic Behavior (C-SEB) at
the University of Cologne.
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little competition whenever they participate in a first-price auction, which
in turn makes the first-price auction unattractive for the buyer. In a labo-
ratory experiment we find that most suppliers are not able to interpret the
buyer’s format choice correctly and hence overestimate the level of compe-
tition in first-price auctions. The resulting biased beliefs of suppliers make
it profitable for the buyer to conduct first-price auctions if the number of
suppliers is small and second-price auctions if it is large. However, we also
observe in our experiment that the buyer is even better off if she can commit
to run a first-price reverse auction independent of the number of suppliers,
this is due to suppliers underbidding.
Finally, in chapter 6 with the title Bonuses and handicaps in procure-
ment auctions5, which is joint work with Christian Paul and AchimWambach,
we investigate how the framing of quality scores as bonuses or handicaps
affects suppliers’ bidding behavior. Quality scores play an important role
in almost every procurement auction and assign a monetary value to the
non-price attributes of a supplier’s offer. In contrast to the assumptions
of most of the academic literature, suppliers only learn their own quality
score in practice and interpret it to update their beliefs about their own
relative position. In a laboratory experiment we observe that suppliers who
receive a handicap overestimate the strength of their competitor and hence
bid more aggressive. As a consequence, the buyer can increase her profits
by framing quality scores as handicaps instead of bonuses.
5I presented the project at the World Meeting of the Economic Science Association
2013 in Zurich. Financial support from theGerman Research Foundation (DFG) through
the research unit Design & Behavior is gratefully acknowledged. We also want to thank
the Center for Social and Economic Behavior (C-SEB) at the University of Cologne.
chapter 2
COLLUSION IN DYNAMIC BUYER-DETERMINED
REVERSE AUCTIONS
Abstract
While binding reverse auctions have attracted a good deal of in-
terest in the academic literature, in practice dynamic non-binding
reverse auctions are the norm in procurement. In those, suppliers
submit price quotes and can respond to quotes of their competitors
during a live auction event. However, the lowest quote does not
necessarily determine the winner. The buyer decides after the con-
test, taking further supplier information into account, on who will be
awarded the contract. We show, both theoretically and empirically,
that this bidding format enables suppliers to collude, thus leading to
non-competitive prices.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In non-binding reverse auctions, bidders compete against each other like in
a standard reverse auction, but the winner is not necessarily the supplier
with the lowest bid. Rather, buyers decide, based on the final quotes and
further information about the suppliers, who will be awarded the contract.
These buyer-determined reverse auctions (BDRA) are virtually the norm
in competitive procurement today. Ariba, a major commercial provider
of online reverse auctions and other sourcing solutions, uses non-binding
reverse auctions almost exclusively. In a recent survey, Elmaghraby (2007,
p. 411) notes that “The exact manner in which the buyer makes her final
5
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selection still remains unclear. With either an online auction or a RFP, the
buyer may still leave some terms of trade unspecified.”1
In the context of multi-attribute auction events, the advantage of a non-
binding format from the buyer’s perspective seems evident. The winner
should not be the supplier with the lowest quote, but further attributes,
such as quality, reliability, capacity, reputation, incumbent status, and other
suppliers’ capabilities, should be taken into account. However, we show
in this paper that there is a serious disadvantage to such dynamic non-
binding reverse auctions: If bidders are uncertain about the exact way
different criteria affect the final decision by the buyer, then in equilibrium,
a non-binding reverse auction enables them to implicitly coordinate on high
prices.
The collusive arrangement in the non-binding reverse auction works as
follows: The suppliers begin the contest with a relatively high quote. These
offers are such that if the process were to stop at this point, all have a
positive probability of winning, given the uncertain criteria of the buyer’s
award decision. In equilibrium, no supplier makes an improvement on his
offer, so the bidding stops at a high price. If one supplier were to lower
the offer, it would trigger a response by the other suppliers, who would also
lower their quotes. Thus, the deviating supplier has to reduce his price even
further, which makes it unattractive to lower the price in the first place.
Note that the stabilizing element in this collusion is that suppliers do not
know how the buyer will ultimately determine the winner. Thus, with their
initial offers, all suppliers have a positive chance of winning.
Binding reverse auctions, where the final decision rule is known in ad-
vance, do not allow for this form of collusion. In a (reverse) English auction,
for example, at any moment during the auction firms do not have any uncer-
tainty about whether they would receive the contract or not if the auction
were to stop at this point. Thus, suppliers who know that they will not be
awarded the contract at the current price, have to improve their offer, which
1SAP (2006, p. 9) notes in a document on best practice in reverse auctions: ”Often,
you may find that the lowest bidder is not meeting quality and service grades and thus
may select the second-lowest bidder.”
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in turn puts pressure on their competitors. Therefore collusion cannot be
sustainable in binding reverse auctions.
Buyer-determined reverse auction mechanisms have not been widely
studied and are not well-understood, especially theoretically. Jap (2002)
was the first to point out that most reverse auctions that are conducted in
industry do not determine winners - i.e. they are non-binding. Jap (2003)
and Jap (2007) show that dynamic non-binding reverse auctions often have
a more detrimental effect on buyer-supplier relationships than do sealed-
bid reverse auctions. In another study, Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2007)
examine sealed-bid first price reverse auctions. They compare price-based
and buyer-determined mechanisms, both theoretically and using laboratory
experiments, and find that buyer-determined mechanisms generate higher
buyer surplus only as long as there are enough suppliers competing for
the contract. Haruvy and Katok (2013) investigate the effect of informa-
tion transparency on sealed-bid and dynamic non-binding auctions and find
that sealed-bid formats are generally better for buyers, especially when sup-
pliers are aware of their competitors’ non-price attributes. In both of these
studies, suppliers know the value the buyer attaches to their own non-price
attributes.2,3
In contrast, in the present paper we investigate the effect of having this
information on the performance of dynamic non-binding reverse auctions.
We show that it is precisely the combination of the dynamic nature of the
bidding process, which allows bidders to react to their competitors’ bids,
and the lack of knowledge about the valuation of the non-price attributes by
the buyer, which ensures that each bidder has some probability of winning
even at a high price, that enables bidders to collude.
The way collusion works in our model has some similarity to the collusive
behavior in the context of strategic demand reduction (Brusco and Lopomo,
2Thomas and Wilson (2005) compare experimentally multilateral negotiations and
auctions. They explicitly assume that during the negotiations offers are observable, so
that this case resembles our buyer determined bidding mechanism. However, everyone
knew preferences of the parties in advance. So the effect we analyze here could not occur.
3Stoll and Zo¨ttl (2014) use field data to make a counterfactual analysis that estimates
the consequences of a reduction of non-price information available to bidders.
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2002; Ausubel et al., 2014) and to the industrial organization literature on
price clauses (see e.g. Salop, 1986; Schnitzer, 1994, and references therein).
Strategic demand reduction describes the phenomenon that, in a multi-unit
reverse auction, bidders might prefer to win a smaller number of units at
a higher price than a larger number of units at a lower price. Our paper
analyses a single unit situation in which bidders are content with a small
probability of winning at a higher price.
Price clauses such as ”meet-the-competition” clause or a price-matching
clause might be used to sustain collusion in a market similarly to the present
analysis, where suppliers refrain from lowering their quotes, as this will trig-
ger a lower price by their competitors. The literature on price clauses differs
from this paper in two respects, however. First, in the pricing literature it
is either assumed that trade takes place in several periods (e.g. Schnitzer,
1994) or that contingent contracts can be written in which the price depends
on the prices of the competitors (e.g Doyle, 1988; Logan and Lutter, 1989).
In the present case, trade only takes place once and contingent bidding is
not possible. Second, the main argument why collusion is feasible, namely
the remaining uncertainty about the final decision the buyer will take, has
to our knowledge not been investigated so far.
Several authors have analyzed collusion in the context of auctions (see
e.g. Robinson, 1985; Graham and Marshall, 1987 , for an overview see
Klemperer, 1999; Kwasnica and Sherstyuk, 2013). Sherstyuk (1999) and
Sherstyuk (2002) show in an experimental study that the bid improvement
rule has an influence on the bidders’ ability to collude in repeated auctions.
Usually this literature assumes that before the auction takes place, a desig-
nated winner is selected. In addition, there must be some means to divide
the gains of collusion between the participating bidders. This is different
from the form of collusion described here. First, all participating firms have
a chance of winning the contract, thus there is no predetermined winner and
no pre-play communication required. Second, during the contest, all firms
have a positive expected profit, even if after the decision by the buyer only
one firm receives the contract. This makes it unnecessary to divide the
gains of collusion after the contest.
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The paper is structured as follows: In the next section we develop the
model and analyze the collusive behavior in a dynamic buyer-determined
reverse auction. In Section 2.3 we describe our experimental setting and
present the results. In section 2.4 we conclude the paper with a discussion
of ways for overcoming the problem of collusion.
2.2 ANALYTICAL RESULTS
2.2.1 MODEL SETUP
The auction format we consider is one in which suppliers bid on price, but
different suppliers may provide different value to the buyer. This value can
be viewed as exogenous attributes of suppliers themselves, rather than a
part of their bids, and we will refer to it as quality. Our modeling approach
is similar to that of Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2007) and Haruvy and
Katok (2013). There are n potential suppliers, competing to provide a
single unit to a buyer. Suppliers are heterogeneous in costs and quality.
In particular, supplier i has cost ci, which is only known to the supplier
i. Each ci is taken from a common distribution F (c) on [c, c]. The quality
component does not enter the profit function of the supplier, so the profit
of supplier i if he wins the contract at price p is given by
πi(p, ci) = p− ci.
There are different ways to model quality differences among suppliers. For
example, it may be reasonable to assume that there is some commonly
known (vertical) quality component for each supplier. For example in the
procurement of a customer designed application specific circuit, all suppli-
ers satisfy the necessary technical requirements, but some suppliers might
have a superior technology which is commonly known and which provides
additional value to the buyer. But there may also be a quality component
that is only known to the buyer - a horizontal quality component. This
horizontal quality is the focus of our model, so we will assume in the re-
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mainder of the analysis that there are no vertical quality differences among
suppliers.4
Let αi be buyer’s incremental cost of dealing with supplier i relative to
dealing with her most preferred supplier, and let all the αis be the private
information of the buyer. Then the vector α containing all αis represents
the buyer’s preferences and is distributed independent of the costs of the
suppliers according to a commonly known distribution with finite support
[0, α]n. The utility of the buyer, if she awards the contract at price p to
supplier i, is
u(p, αi) = v − p− αi
where v is the value to the buyer from the object, and the parameter αi
measures the extent to which the private preferences of the buyer about
dealing with supplier i enter her surplus. Parameter α can be quite small:
Consider for example the sourcing of a display for a new mobile phone. The
overall value of the contract might be several hundreds of millions in US
dollars, which is captured by the term v. There may be some individual
observable differences between the suppliers – e.g. one firm is known to be
the technology leader – that are in the range of ten million US dollar (that
we omit from the model). Unobservable preferences by the buyer, i.e. a
preference for a particular provider, whose engineers speak English fluently,
might differ in the size of several hundred thousand US dollars. These are
captured by the term α.
But α might also be large relative to the overall project value: Consider
a company recruiting a marketing agency. An optimal marketing campaign
would provide value v for the company. The decision, which agency to
hire, will be strongly influenced by the specific preference parameter - the
extent to which the board of the firm prefers one marketing agency over
the others, which includes preferences about their people, their ideas, and
their creativity. This is expressed by α which might be similar in size to v.
We are assuming that the bidders do not know the buyer’s preferences
α. If the buyer already knows her preferences α before the auction, then
4Extending the model to include commonly known vertical quality is relatively
straightforward and does not change our results qualitatively.
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she can simply announce them and conduct a binding auction in which the
lowest αi-adjusted bid wins.
5
The main focus of our paper is what we believe to be a more realistic
setting, in which the buyer does not know α before the auction. This may be
because bidders have not been fully vetted prior to the auction, or because
determining the αis is a group decision that cannot be done in the abstract.
In this case, announcing α before the auction and adjusting bids by αi is
not feasible, and the buyer has to choose between two formats. The buyer
can conduct a binding price-based reverse auction (PB), which we analyze
in section 2.2.2. In this auction the bidder who submits the lowest bid is
guaranteed to win, but the buyer may incur additional cost due to misfit,
from dealing with this bidder. The buyer can also conduct a non-binding,
or dynamic, buyer-determined reverse auction (BDRA), which we analyze
in section 2.2.3. In this auction, bidders submit bids and the buyer selects
the bidder when all final bids are on the table. The buyer will then choose
the bidder with the lowest quality-adjusted bid, which we also call total
cost. Thus, the lowest bid in the BDRA is not guaranteed to win.
2.2.2 BINDING PRICE-BASED REVERSE AUCTION
The rules of the binding price-based reverse auction are standard. Each
bidder i submits a price bid bi. The highest allowable bid is the reservation
price R. During the auction, bidders observe full price feedback – they see
all bis that have been submitted. They can place new bids that must be
lower than the lowest current standing bid by some pre-determined mini-
mum bid decrement in order to become the leading bid. The bidder with
5If the buyer communicates the horizontal qualities αi to all bidders and monetizes
the horizontal quality differences, she can conduct a binding auction in which the bidder
with the lowest quality-adjusted bid wins and is paid the amount of the second lowest
quality-adjusted cost, (ci + αi)
(n−1). A commonly used way to monetize αi is to set up
a bonus/handicap system, which quantifies differences between suppliers with respect to
the different dimensions, e.g. quality, payment terms, technical criteria, and so on. It
is important to note that whether revealing private preferences α (if that is possible at
all) is beneficial to the buyer is an interesting question that is beyond the scope of our
paper. We refer the reader to Che (1993) who finds that the optimal revenue maximizing
mechanism discriminates against non-price attributes in order to make price competition
tougher.
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the lowest bid is the leading bidder in the auction and would win the auc-
tion if it were to stop at this point. The auction ends when there are no
new bids placed for a certain amount of time. The price the buyer pays is
equal to the lowest price bid bi.
Under this rule, it is a dominant strategy for each supplier to keep
lowering his bid as long as he is not currently winning the auction, until
bi = ci.
6 Thus the auction ends when the bidder with the second lowest
cost exits the auction. The bidder with the lowest cost wins the auction.
If bidder i with horizontal quality αi wins, and bidder j, with the second
lowest bid exited at cj, then the price the buyer pays is equal to cj. The
utility of the buyer is then:
u = v − cj − αi,
where cj is the second lowest bid, which we denote by (ci)
(n−1). As the
distribution of αi is independent of costs and quality realization (by as-
sumption), the expected buyer surplus is
v − E
[
(ci)
(n−1)
]
− E [αi] .
The buyer pays, in expectation, the second lowest cost, and the expected
value of the horizontal quality parameter.
2.2.3 DYNAMIC BUYER-DETERMINED REVERSE AUCTION
General framework
Now consider a non-binding reverse auction, which, as we noted in the
introduction is commonly used in procurement practice. The auction works
exactly the same way as the binding price-based reverse auction in terms of
the bids that bidders observe during the auction, and the ending rule. The
main difference is that after the auction ends, the buyer is not obligated to
award the contract to the bidder with the lowest bid bi, but may instead
6The binding price-based reverse auction has also several other equilibria, however,
these are ruled out if one eliminates weakly dominated strategies or requires subgame
perfection.
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award the contract to a different bidder, taking her preferences αi into
account.
The fundamental difference between the non-binding auction and its
binding counterpart is that bidders might not know if at current bids they
would win or lose in the non-binding auction. A bidder j only knows for
certain that he is losing when his bid bj is more than α above the current
lowest bid. On the other hand a bidder i only knows for certain that he is
winning when his bid bi is more than α below the next lowest bid. While
it is optimal for a bidder who knows that he is winning not to lower his
bid further, it is optimal to lower his bid for a bidder who knows that he is
losing as long as the bid is still larger than his costs.
Let us call the lowest standing bid B = min{b1, b2, · · · , bn} and the
lowest bid of the competitors B−i. A bidder i whose bid is within α of B−i,
B−i − α ≤ bi ≤ B−i + α, does not know his winning status, and thus there
is no obvious best action for him. In general, his strategy will depend on
his beliefs about the other suppliers’ future actions. A bidder who believes
that lowering the bid would lead to an outright bidding war is less likely to
lower his bid than a bidder who merely expects competitors to lower their
bids by a small amount.
In the collusive equilibrium we analyze, all suppliers initially bid very
high in a way such that the probability of winning for every supplier is
the same. When one supplier lowers his bid to increase his probability
of winning, those suppliers whose probability of winning is decreased will
follow suit and lower their bids as well. This makes the initial deviation
unattractive and thus collusion can be sustained.
In the most general formulation, the bidding behavior off the equilibrium
path, i.e. if bidders deviate from colluding on high prices, is complex. In
order to facilitate the analysis, we set the information structure such that if
someone lowers his bid in order to increase his probability of winning, the
probability of winning for at least one other supplier falls to zero.7 Thus,
7This can be achieved by assuming that the horizontal quality of each buyer is taken
from a discrete set, i.e. αi ∈ {0, α}, which is the approach we take in the remainder of
this paper.
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it is dominant for this supplier to lower his bid as well as long as he bids
above costs.
Specific bidding model
We now consider a special case in which we can characterize the conditions
for a collusive equilibrium to exist. The buyer has one preferred supplier,
but the suppliers do not know the identity of this supplier. Let α > 0
be the additional cost the buyer incurs when she has to deal with a non-
preferred supplier. Let αi = 0 if i is the buyer’s preferred supplier, and
αi = α otherwise. As before, the αis are not known by the suppliers. Since
suppliers are ex ante symmetric, each supplier i believes that the probability
that αi = 0 is 1/n.
8 We assume that bids must be in multiples of the
minimum bid decrement ǫ, where ǫ is sufficiently small. Discreteness of
prices is used to ensure that there are no ties. This is achieved by assuming
that α is not a multiple of ǫ.
Before specifying the equilibrium formally, one definition is necessary.
Let b−i be a vector of bids of all suppliers apart from supplier i. If supplier i
were to bid bi and the bidding would stop at this point, then the probability
for supplier i of obtaining the contract is given by
Pi(b
t
i, b
t
−i) = Pr(αi + bi < αj + bj ∀j 6= i).
Note that form the point of view of supplier i, both αi and all αj are random
variables. We now describe the following collusive bidding strategy βc:
• b1i = R: All bidders start bidding at the reservation price R.
• For bidder i, if Pi(b
t
i, b
t
−i) ≥ 1/n then b
t+1
i = b
t
i.
• If Pi(b
t
i, b
t
−i) < 1/n then b
t+1
i = max{ci, b
∗(bt−i)}, where b
∗(bt−i) is the
maximum bid b which satisfies Pi(b, b
t
−i) ≥ 1/n.
9
8The situation is thus like in the spokes model of horizontal product differentiation
Chen and Riordan (2007). All suppliers are located at the end of different spokes of a
wheel. The buyer is located at the end of one spoke. Thus the ”distance” to one supplier
is zero, while the distance to all other suppliers is the same given by twice the length of
a spoke, here modeled by α.
9b∗(bt
−i
) exists, as the optimization is done over a finite set of possible bids.
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If bidding starts at t = 1 with all bidders bidding R, then all bidders have
the same winning probability 1/n and bidders would stop bidding. However,
if (out of equilibrium) bids differ, and for some bidder i, the probability of
winning is below 1/n, then in the next round bidder i sets his bid b∗(bt−1−i )
so as to barely outbid the bidder with the lowest current bid in the event
that i turns out to be the preferred supplier. Since the bidding is done in
increments of ǫ, this implies for the bid of bidder i (recalling that Bt−1 is
defined as the lowest standing bid):
b∗(bt−1−i ) ∈ (B
t−1 + α− ǫ, Bt−1 + α)
Equilibrium analysis
We claim that the bidding strategy βc as defined above constitutes an equi-
librium, depending on the reservation price R, the size of the buyer prefer-
ence term α, and the distribution of costs F (ci).
We start the formal analysis by considering two bidders. Proposition 1
develops a sufficient condition for collusion to occur.
Proposition 1. Assume there are two bidders and R ≥ c. The bidding
strategy βc describes a collusive equilibrium if
R− c
2
≥ max
p∈[0,c−α]
{∫ c−α
p
(x− c) · f(x+ α)dx+
p− c
2
· F (p+ α)
}
(2.2.1)
The proof is relegated to the Appendix. In the following, we provide
the intuition. First, note that a supplier with lowest costs has the strongest
incentive to deviate, i.e. we need to check whether he prefers to collude or
not. If both suppliers follow the collusive bidding strategy βc, they both
bid R and win with a probability of 1/2 each. The resulting profit for a
supplier with lowest costs is displayed in the left hand side of inequality
(2.2.1). If one supplier deviates by placing a bid of bi the other will respond
by bidding bi + α as long as this bid is above his costs. If the deviator
succeeds in outbidding his competitor he wins and he is paid a price equal
to the costs of his competitor minus α. However, it might also be that at
some point p he stops trying to underbid the competitor, if he has not been
2. COLLUSION IN DYNAMIC BUYER-DETERMINED REVERSE
AUCTIONS 16
successful so far. In that case, both suppliers still have a winning probability
of one half. The right hand side of inequality (2.2.1) describes the profit of
a deviator with costs c = c who attempts to undercut his competitor and
stops lowering the price at some level p.
Corollary 1. A sufficient condition for a collusive perfect Bayesian equi-
librium to exist is that the cost distribution function is concave.
As we show in the Appendix, a concave cost distribution function guar-
antees that the right hand side of inequality (2.2.1) is maximized at p =
c− α, thus a deviator would stop lowering the price immediately. Sticking
to the collusive outcome is then preferred. Furthermore, with a concave
cost distribution function bidders always prefer collusion at current prices
to lowering their bid even outside the equilibrium path. This ensures that
the collusive bidding strategy βc is sequentially rational.
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 have interesting implications for the ex-
istence of a collusive equilibrium. Collusion is more likely if:
• The reservation price R is large, as this makes collusion profitable.10
• The probability of facing a high cost competitor is low (which is im-
plied by a concave cost distribution function), as this makes deviation
unattractive.
• The individual preference component α is not too small, as this implies
that anyone trying to undercut his competitor in order to gain a higher
probability of winning must lower the price sufficiently, which makes
this behavior unattractive. Additionally, if α is very small, the buyer
has little reason not to simply run a PB auction.
Next, consider a buyer-determined reverse auction with n > 2 bidders.
Increasing the number of bidders has two opposing implications for the
stability of collusion. On the one hand, having more bidders decreases
the gain from sticking to high prices, as the probability of winning (which
10While a large reserve price R makes collusion more likely, collusion can also occur
if R is small, depending on the distribution of costs.
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is equal to 1/n) is lowered. On the other hand, more bidders make it
less likely that by lowering the price one will succeed in pricing the others
out of the market. The analysis becomes difficult as the dynamics outside
the equilibrium path can become very complex. If one of the bidders is
’outbid’, i.e. if his cost is more than α larger than the minimum bid, then
an active bidder, who according to his collusive strategy βc, stays within
α of the minimum bid, has still a chance of winning of 1/n. However, by
lowering his bid just below the minimum bid, he can increase his chance
of winning to 2/n. The probability 2/n can be obtained by conditioning
on whether the bidder who was outbid was the preferred supplier: If that
is the case (with probability 1/n), the supplier who placed the lowest bid
wins the auction with probability 1; otherwise (with probability 1− 1/n),
the deviating supplier wins the auction if he is the preferred supplier (with
probability 1/(n− 1)).
We will provide two examples where we determine the equilibrium ex-
plicitly. Example 1 has an interesting dynamic and shows some complexi-
ties, which arise in the general case. Example 2 deals with the parameteri-
zations we used in our experiment.
EXAMPLE 1: In this example some bidders will, in equilibrium, lower
their bids somewhat below the reservation price, and then start to collude.
Suppose all bidders have costs of either 0 or 10, each with probability 1/2,
the reserve price R is equal to 10 and α = 0.5. The minimum bid decrement
is ǫ = 1. Then a bidder with costs 0 might lower the price to 9 and stop
there.11 By doing this, he will avoid the competition of those bidders with
costs of 10, but he will still collude with those with costs of 0. For example
in the case of four bidders, collusion at 10 would give a profit of 10/4 = 2.5.
If a bidder with costs of 0 lowers the price to 9, his expected profit is given
by
(
1
2
)3
·
9
4
+ 3 ·
(
1
2
)3
·
9
3
+ 3 ·
(
1
2
)3
·
9
2
+
(
1
2
)3
· 9 =
135
32
≥ 2.5.
11If the reserve price were set at 9 or lower (i.e. R < c, collusion would start imme-
diately without further bidding.
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EXAMPLE 2: : Table 2.1 lists six combinations for the number of bid-
der (n), the size of individual buyer preference (α), and the reserve price
(R). These six combinations correspond to the six BDRA experimental
treatments we conducted (see section 2.3.1 for more details).
Table 2.1: Parameters for BDRA experimental treatments.
Treatment Number of Individual buyer Reserve price
number bidders (n) preference (α) (R)
1 2 10 100
2 2 30 100
3 2 10 150
4 4 30 100
5 4 10 150
6 4 30 150
In all treatments costs are uniformly distributed on [0, 100]. The n = 2
cases (treatments 1, 2 and 3) are dealt with in Proposition 1. (Note that
the uniform distribution is (weakly) concave, thus Corollary 1 applies.) The
n = 4 cases (treatments 4, 5 and 6) are analyzed in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Assume there are more than two bidders, costs are uni-
formly distributed on [0, 100] and R ≥ 100. The bidding strategy βc de-
scribes a collusive equilibrium if α ≥ 100 · (n− 4)/(n− 2) and
R
n
≥
∫ 100−α
α
n−2
x ·
2
n
·
n− 1
100
·
(
x+ α
100
)n−2
dx+
α
n− 2
·
1
n
·
(
α · (n− 1)
100 · (n− 2)
)n−1
(2.2.2)
The proof is relegated to the Appendix. Proposition 2 implies that
collusion is an equilibrium for treatments 4, 5 and 6.
2.2.4 REVENUE COMPARISON
In cases where a BDRA leads to collusion and the buyer cannot fully reveal
her preferences prior to the auction, there is a trade-off between using a PB
auction or a BDRA. In the former case, price competition will be stronger,
while in the latter case, the preferences can be better accommodated in the
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selection of the supplier. Formally, the total expected cost, including the
horizontal quality component, of the buyer in a PB auction is given by:
E
[
(ci)
(n−1)
]
+ E [αi] = E
[
(ci)
(n−1)
]
+
n− 1
n
· α. (2.2.3)
In the PB auction, bidders follow their dominant strategy. Conse-
quently, the bidder with the lowest cost wins and is paid the second lowest
cost. Due to the quality mismatch, the buyer looses on average (n−1)/n·α.
In the BDRA, all bidders bid R and the bidder for whom αi = 0 wins. Thus
the expected cost for the buyer in a BDRA is R. Therefore, the expected
difference between the two mechanisms is given by:
n− 1
n
· α−
(
R− E
[
(ci)
(n−1)
])
. (2.2.4)
A BDRA has the negative effect of higher prices that amounts to an av-
erage R−E
[
(ci)
(n−1)
]
, but at the same time leads to better accommodating
buyers’ preferences, worth (n− 1)/n · α.
2.3 EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
2.3.1 DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT
Like in the previous section, we work with binary individual buyer prefer-
ences, i.e. αi ∈ {0, α}, such that in each auction exactly one of the bidders is
preferred. We vary α so that in some treatments α = 10 and in other treat-
ments α = 30. This variation captures the idea that the supplier specific
buyer preferences can differ in importance compared to the overall project
size. We also vary the reserve price at R = 100 and R = 150 as well as the
number of bidders at n = 2 and n = 4. In all treatments ci ∼ U [0, 100] for
all suppliers i.
The focus of our design is on the influence of the buyer preferences,
the reserve price, and the number of bidders on the performance of the
BDRA. The six BDRA treatments we conducted are listed in Table 2.1.
Additionally we conducted price-based auctions (PB) with 2 and 4 bidders
(n = 2 and n = 4), which we use to calculate the buyer’s total cost if the
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buyer does not take her supplier-specific preferences (αi) into account. If
bidders follow their dominant strategy the reserve price does not matter in
PB auctions, so we used the reserve price of R = 150.
Comparing treatments 1 and 3 as well as treatments 4 and 6 allows us
to test the prediction of the theory that collusion exists regardless of the
reserve price. Comparing treatments 3 and 5 as well as treatments 2 and 4
allows us to test the prediction that collusion exists regardless of the number
of bidders. Finally, comparing treatments 1 and 2 as well as treatments 5
and 6 tests the prediction of the theory that collusion is independent of α.
Expression (2.2.4) implies that in all six treatments, the expected buyer
cost from the BDRA will be higher than the expected buyer cost in the PB
auction. We will test this prediction by comparing the total expected cost
of the buyer in each of our BDRA treatments to a corresponding expected
total cost of the buyer in the PB treatment with the same number of bidders.
For each number of bidders (n = 2 and n = 4), we conducted each
treatment with the same realizations of ci and the same matching protocol,
which we pregenerated prior to the start of the experiments.12 This ensures
that any differences in behavior we observe between the treatments with the
same number of bidders are due to the factor we vary and not to different
realizations of the parameters.
We used the between subjects design. Each BDRA treatment included 5
or 6 independent cohorts and both PB treatments had three cohorts. Each
cohort included 6 participants in the n = 2 treatments and 12 participants
in the n = 4 treatments. In total, 372 participants, all in the role of suppli-
ers, were included in our study. We randomly assigned participants to one
of the treatments. Each person participated only one time. We conducted
all experimental sessions at a major university in the European Union. We
recruited participants using the on-line recruitment system ORSEE Greiner
(2015). Earning cash was the only incentive offered.
12Inadvertently, cost realizations in treatment 4 were also pregenerated but differed
slightly from cost realizations in other four-bidder treatment. This had no effect on any
of the analysis.
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Upon arrival at the laboratory the participants were seated at com-
puter terminals. We handed out written instructions to them and they
read the instructions on their own. When all participants finished reading
the instructions, we read the instructions to them aloud, to ensure public
knowledge about the rules of the game.
After we finished reading the instructions, we started the game. In each
session each participant bid in a sequence of 28 auctions; the first three
auctions were practice periods to help participants better understand the
setting. We used random matching, that we kept the same with-in each
cohort. At the beginning of each round, the participants in a cohort were
divided into three groups of bidders according to the prespecified profile
matching protocol. Each group of bidders competed for the right to sell a
single unit to a computerized buyer.
We programmed the experimental interface using the z-Tree system Fis-
chbacher (2007a). The screen included information about the subject’s cost
ci, the horizontal quality α, and the reserve price R. Bidders could also
observe all bids placed in real time.
At the end of each round we revealed the same information in all treat-
ments. This information included the bids of all bidders, the αis, and the
winner in that period’s auction. The history of past winning prices and
quality adjustment αi in the session was also provided.
For each auction in each period the auction winners earned the difference
between their price bids and their costs ci, while the other bidders earned
zero. We computed cash earnings for each participant by multiplying the
total earnings from all rounds by a pre-determined exchange rate and adding
it to a 2.50 Euro participation fee. Participants were paid their earnings
from the auctions they won, in private and in cash, at the end of the session.
2.3.2 RESULTS: AVERAGE BUYER’S COST
Table 2.2 displays the buyer’s average total cost and standard errors for
the six conditions in our study under the BDRA and the PB auction. We
also provide three theoretical benchmarks – collusive, price-based, and the
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binding auction with α included;13 all statistics are based on cohort aver-
ages. In the PB auction this cost is given by the lowest price bid plus the
average misfit cost of supplier specific misfit (n− 1)/n · α.
Table 2.2: Summary of average buyer’s total cost compared to theoretical
predictions.
Buyer’s total
cost (observed)
Theroretical prediction
Treatment Description BDRA PB
BDRA
(collusive
benchmark)
PB
Binding
auction with α
included
1
n = 2,
α = 10,
R = 100
74.05∗∗
(1.08)
68.52++
(3.75)
100 68.19 68.13
2
n = 2,
α = 30,
R = 100
89.30∗∗
(1.16)
78.52+++
(3.75)
100 78.19 81.98
3
n = 2,
α = 10,
R = 150
126.85∗∗
(5.68)
68.52+++
(3.75)
150 68.19 68.56
4
n = 4,
α = 30,
R = 100
71.49∗∗
(3.96)
57.34++
(2.13)
100 59.71 59.86
5
n = 4,
α = 10,
R = 150
56.38∗∗
(5.10)
42.34+
(2.13)
150 44.70 45.43
6
n = 4,
α = 30,
R = 150
100.63∗∗
(6.50)
57.34+++
(2.13)
150 59.71 59.86
Notes: Comparison between observed and theoretical: ∗∗ p ≤ 0.01 (for the PB format
none of the differences are significant). Comparisons between BDRA and PB: +
p ≤ 0.1, ++ p ≤ 0.05, +++ p ≤ 0.01.
We summarize the analysis in Table 2.2 as the following results:
13The binding auction with α included provides a benchmark for average buyer cost in
the case in which the buyer is able to communicate the α information before the auction.
It is a reasonable benchmark because we know enough about open-bid auctions to know
that in such auctions people would bid approximately as theory predicts, and we include
this for the purpose of providing a benchmark as to how much of a benefit providing α
would. Note that the revenue maximizing auction would underweight the α component
(see footnotes 5 and 18). Just including α might be worse than a price based auction
Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2007).
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Result 1. Average buyer’s total cost is significantly below the collusive
benchmark under the BDRA format (all p-values are below 0.001).
Result 2. Under the PB format, the average buyer’s total cost is not sig-
nificantly different from either the theoretical PB prediction or the binding
auction with α included (none of the p-values are below 0.1).
Result 3. Average buyer’s total cost is significantly higher under the BDRA
format than under the PB format in all six conditions.
Result 4. If bidders were able to perfectly collude, the buyer’s total cost
would not have been affected by the number of bidders, but comparing treat-
ments 3 and 5 as well as treatments 2 and 4 tells us that for α = 10, the
average cost decreases by 70.68 (over 50%) when the number of bidders in-
creased from 2 to 4 (p < 0.001). The difference (17.8 which is still nearly
20%) is smaller but still highly significant when α = 30.14
Result 5. Collusion implies that bidders should bid at the reserve, so
buyer’s total cost should decrease by 50 between treatments with R = 150
and R = 100. For the case of n = 2 we compare treatments 1 and 3, and
observe that the cost decreased by 52.66, which is not significantly different
from 50 (p = 0.586). But for the case of n = 4 we compare treatments 4 and
6, and observe that the cost decreased by only 29.14, which is significantly
below 50 (p < 0.001).
Result 6. Collusion should not be affected by the magnitude of α, however
the average buyer’s total cost increased by 15.15 with two bidders when α
increased from 10 to 30 (p < 0.001 for comparing treatments 1 and 2) and
by 45.34 with four bidders (p = 0.0002 when comparing treatments 4 and
5).
Additionally, a t-test based on cohort averages tells us that the lowest
bid increased by 14.79 with two bidders when α increased from 10 to 30
(p < 0.0001) and by 36.93 with four bidders (p = 0.0027). That is, a higher
14The fact that collusion decreases with the number of bidders has also been pointed
out in other contexts (see for example Huck et al., 2004).
2. COLLUSION IN DYNAMIC BUYER-DETERMINED REVERSE
AUCTIONS 24
Treatment 1:
n = 2, α = 10, R = 100
25#
50#
75#
100#
125#
150#
1'5# 6'10# 11'15# 16'20# 21'25#
B
u
y
e
r’
s(
T
o
ta
l(
C
o
st
((
Period(
Binding#Auc1on# BDRA#
Collusive#Benchmark# Compe1tve#Benchmark#
Treatment 2:
n = 2, α = 30, R = 100
25#
50#
75#
100#
125#
150#
1'5# 6'10# 11'15# 16'20# 21'25#
B
u
y
e
r’
s(
T
o
ta
l(
C
o
st
((
Period(
Binding#Auc1on# BDRA#
Collusive#Benchmark# Compe1tve#Benchmark#
Treatment 3:
n = 2, α = 10, R = 150
25#
50#
75#
100#
125#
150#
1'5# 6'10# 11'15# 16'20# 21'25#
B
u
y
e
r’
s(
T
o
ta
l(
C
o
st
((
Period(
Binding#Auc1on# BDRA#
Collusive#Benchmark# Compe1tve#Benchmark#
Treatment 4:
n = 4, α = 30, R = 100
25#
50#
75#
100#
125#
150#
1'5# 6'10# 11'15# 16'20# 21'25#
Q
u
a
li
ty
(A
d
ju
st
e
d
(p
ri
ce
(
Period(
Binding#Auc1on# BDA#
Collusive#Benchmark# Compe1tve#Benchmark#
Treatment 5:
n = 4, α = 10, R = 150
25#
50#
75#
100#
125#
150#
1'5# 6'10# 11'15# 16'20# 21'25#
B
u
y
e
r’
s(
T
o
ta
l(
C
o
st
((
Period(
Binding#Auc1on# BDRA#
Collusive#Benchmark# Compe1tve#Benchmark#
Treatment 6:
n = 4, α = 30, R = 150
25#
50#
75#
100#
125#
150#
1'5# 6'10# 11'15# 16'20# 21'25#
B
u
y
e
r’
s(
T
o
ta
l(
C
o
st
((
Period(
Binding#Auc1on# BDRA#
Collusive#Benchmark# Compe1tve#Benchmark#
Figure 2.1: Average buyer’s total cost over time, and theoretical bench-
marks.
α harms the buyer in two ways: it weakens competition and also sometimes
results in a larger misfit.
In Figure 2.1 we plot, for each of the six conditions, average buyer’s total
cost over time (aggregated into 5-period blocks) under the BDRA and PB
formats. Also for comparison we plot theoretical predictions: the collusive
benchmark (R) is the benchmark for the BRDA format and the competitive
benchmark is the expected buyer’s total cost when the price ends up at the
second lowest cost.
To formally analyze how the buyer’s total cost in BDRA treatments
is affected by the treatment variables (the number of bidders, the reserve
price, the size of the α parameter), as well as the bidder experience, we
estimate a regression model (with random effects) in which the dependent
variable is buyer’s total cost, and independent variables, along with esti-
mated coefficients, are listed in Table 2.3. This regression uses data from
BDRA treatments only.
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Table 2.3: Regression estimates for the effect of treatment variables and
bidder experience on the expected cost of the buyer.
Dependent
variable:
Buyer’s total
cost
Description
Coefficient
(standard
errors)
β0 Constant
74.86∗∗
(2.934)
n-Dummy
1 when n = 4, 0
otherwise
−34.19∗∗
(3.548)
R-Dummy
1 when R = 150, 0
otherwise
28.18∗∗
(3.503)
α-Dummy
1 when α = 30, 0
otherwise
26.78∗∗
(3.425)
Period
Period number
1-25
-0.21
(0.141)
Period ×
(R-Dummy)
Interaction
variables between
treatment variables
and the period
number.
0.74∗∗
(0.178)
Period ×
(n-Dummy)
−0.723∗∗
(0.177)
Period ×
(α-Dummy)
0.596∗∗
(0.173)
R2 0.289
Observations
(Groups)
2625 (318)
The coefficients for the three treatment dummy variables echo Results
4-6. Coefficients of the Period variable and of the interaction variables
between Period and the treatment variables tell us how the buyer’s total
cost is affected by bidder experience.
Result 7. When the reserve price is low (100) and α is low (10), buyer’s
cost decreases with experience (not significantly), but the decrease becomes
strongly significant when the number of bidders is large. There is some col-
lusion that is occurring even in treatments with low α (treatment 1 and treat-
ment 5) because buyer’s cost is still significantly higher under the BDRA
format than under the PB format; collusion may be decreasing over time.
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Result 8. Higher reserve price reverses this learning trend, making collu-
sion easier to sustain, as is evidenced by the positive and significant coeffi-
cient of Period×(R-Dummy).
Result 9. Higher α also makes collusion easier to sustain as is evidenced
by the positive and significant coefficient of Period×(α-Dummy).
2.3.3 RESULTS: BIDDING BEHAVIOR
In this section we focus on the individual bidding behavior. First, we briefly
describe bidding behavior in the PB auctions.
We plot bids as a function of cost (for losing bidders only) in Figure
2.2a for two bidders and in Figure 2.2b for four bidders. We also estimate a
regression model (with random effects) using losing bids in PB auctions with
the dependent variable Bid and independent variable Cost. The coefficient
of cost is 0.964 (Std. Err = 0.025), which is not different from 1 at the
5% level of significance. There is also a small but significant constant term
(9.52, Std. Err. = 1.78).15
Result 10. The bidding in PB auctions is close to behavior implied by the
dominant strategy; almost 80% of losing bidders drop out within 10 ECU of
their cost, and the cost coefficient in regression is not significantly different
from 1.
To gain insight into how participants bid in our BDRA treatments we
show distributions of bids for the six BDRA treatments in Figure 2.3. Figure
2.3 indicates that some, but not all, of the bidders in all of the BDRA
treatments attempt to collude, because in all six treatments the modal bid
is at the reserve. However, the proportion of collusive bids varies with our
treatment variables. To formally analyze how bids are affected by treatment
15As is typical with open-bid auctions, we observe jump bidding in all our treatments.
A consequence of jump bidding is that prices might drop quite fast, not giving high
cost bidders an opportunity to lower their bid. Jump bidding explains some of the
observations in the upper right corner of Figure 2(b). If we use only the second lowest
bids in the n = 4 treatments in the regressions, the constant term is significantly lower
(3.442, std. err = 0.052) and the cost coefficient remains almost unchanged.
2. COLLUSION IN DYNAMIC BUYER-DETERMINED REVERSE
AUCTIONS 27
0"
10"
20"
30"
40"
50"
60"
70"
80"
90"
100"
110"
120"
130"
140"
150"
0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"
B
id
$(
Lo
si
n
g
)$
Cost$
(a) PB Auction n = 2
0"
10"
20"
30"
40"
50"
60"
70"
80"
90"
100"
110"
120"
130"
140"
150"
0" 10" 20" 30" 40" 50" 60" 70" 80" 90" 100"
B
id
$(
Lo
si
n
g
)$
Cost$
(b) PB Auction n = 4
Figure 2.2: Losers’ bidding behavior in PB auctions.
variables, as well as by the bidders’ cost and experience, we estimate a Tobit
model (because as is clear from Figure 2.3, bids are censored by the reserve)
with random effects, with the dependent variable Bid, and independent
variables listed in Table 2.4.
To show robustness, we estimate four models, starting with Cost only
(Model 1), then adding Period to control for bidder experience (Model 2),
adding treatment variables (Model 3), and finally adding interaction effects
between the treatment variables and Cost, as well as the treatment variables
and Period (Model 4).
Result 11. Contrary to theoretical predictions, BDRA bids are affected
by cost. This relationship is weaker for high reserve and high α (positive
and significant Cost×(R-Dummy) and Cost×(α-Dummy)), and stronger for
more bidders (positive and significant Cost×(n-Dummy)).
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of bids in the BDRA treatments.
Result 12. Bids slightly increase with experience in two bidder auctions
(positive Period variable). This increase is higher for high reserve and high
α (positive and significant Period×(R-Dummy) and Period×(α-Dummy)),
and lower for four bidder auctions (negative and significant Period×(n-
Dummy)). Interestingly, this slight increase in average bids does not trans-
late into higher buyer’s total cost (Result 7).
We can also see (Models 3 and 4) that the effect of treatment variables
on bids is similar to the effect of treatment variables on the buyer’s total
cost.
Figure 2.4 displays bid-cost pairs of bidders that did not win in the
six BDRA treatments. In contrast to the PB treatments the correlations
between cost and bid are weaker which indicates less competition. We also
observe, in all six BDRA treatments, a fair number of bids at the reserve.
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Table 2.4: Estimates for the effect of treatment variables and bidders’
experience on bids in the BDRA treatments.
Dependent
variable: Bid
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
β0
65.75∗∗
(1.674)
60.47∗∗
(1.807)
50.96∗∗
(2.615)
46.61∗∗
(3.203)
Cost
0.56∗∗
(0.013)
0.56∗∗
(0.013)
0.56∗∗
(0.013)
0.61∗∗
(0.028)
Period
0.39∗∗
(0.050)
0.39∗∗
(0.050)
0.52∗∗
(0.110)
n-Dummy
−45.69∗∗
(2.867)
−42.80∗∗
(3.741)
R-Dummy
37.47∗∗
(2.712)
35.41∗∗
(3.46)
α-Dummy
35.49∗∗
(2.672)
31.38∗∗
(3.422)
Cost ×
(R-Dummy)
−0.19∗∗
(0.031)
Cost ×
(n-Dummy)
0.31∗∗
(0.034)
Cost ×
(α-Dummy)
−0.30∗∗
(0.031)
Period ×
(R-Dummy)
0.85∗∗
(0.120)
Period ×
(n-Dummy)
−1.38∗∗
(0.132)
Period ×
(α-Dummy)
0.62∗∗
(0.117)
Log
Likelihood
-30,848.699 -30,817.496 -30,706.390 -30,580.866
Observations
(Groups)
7,924 (318)
Notes: ∗ p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗ p ≤ 0.01
In Table 2.5 we show the proportion of BDRAs that ended in a collusive
outcome. We classify an outcome as collusive if all suppliers have a positive
probability of winning and all bids are above costs. Furthermore, we display
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Figure 2.4: Bid as a function of cost of losing bidders for the BDRA
treatments.
the average lowest bid given that the BDRA ended in with a collusive
outcome.
Table 2.5: Proportion and characteristics of collusive outcomes in BDRA
treatments.
Treatment
Proportion of
collusive outcomes
Average lowest bid
in collusive
auctions (standard
error)
1: n = 2,
α = 10, R = 100
44.89% 80.81 (1.46)
2: n = 2,
α = 30, R = 100
79.78% 90.89 (0.83)
3: n = 2,
α = 10, R = 150
73.60% 136.641 (1.68)
4: n = 4,
α = 30, R = 100
33.33% 80.61 (1.76)
5: n = 4,
α = 10, R = 150
10.00% 112.91 (6.68)
6: n = 4,
α = 30, R = 150
39.78% 122.80 (2.40)
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Table 2.5 shows that there are two reasons why prices in the BDRA are
lower than predicted for the collusive equilibrium. First, not all BDRAs
end in a collusive outcome, and second, even if the outcome is collusive
bids are, on average, below reserve.16
2.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that the common practice in procurement of using dynamic
buyer-determined reverse auctions allows suppliers to collude on high prices.
Collusion can be support-ed because of the uncertainty in the buyer’s final
decision taking process. Suppliers have a chance of winning at high prices,
which might be more attractive than starting a price war and winning at a
considerably lower price (with a possibly higher probability). This reasoning
can be applied to other circumstances in which the uncertainty of the final
decision allows firms to collude in the first place. For example, all private
or public tenders in which prices and conditions are negotiated and offers
are displayed are prone to the same form of collusion as described above.
The reason is that participating firms can react to their opponents’ offers
and most importantly the final decision is uncertain.
There are several ways the buyer can counteract the problem of collusive
behavior. Simple ones would be to precisely communicate α before the
reverse auction starts or to conduct a PB auction. Both solutions resolve the
uncertainty around the decision process and thus collusion would no longer
be sustainable.17 However, our practical experience showed us that the
manager in charge of the procurement has not (at least not alone by herself)
the final say on who will be awarded the contract. This is in particular true
if she is using a non-binding auction. Consequently, she has no information
16BDRAs with four bidders sometimes ended in partial collusion, meaning that at
least two of the bidders stop bidding above cost while still having a positive probability
of winning. The proportion of BDRAs with four bidders that ended in partial collusion is
85% in treatment 4, 66% in treatment 5 and 87% in treatment 6. The average differences
between the lowest bid and lowest cost in those BDRAs are 41.83 (28.36) in treatment
4, 35.11 (25.76) in treatment 5, and 73.78 (53.93) in treatment 6.
17Alternatively, the buyer could announce after each round a provisional winner, such
that the suppliers can deduce αi by themselves.
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on the exact αis and therefore cannot credibly communicate a clear decision
rule. From a practical point of view, the best alternative would be to commit
to a clear scoring rule that takes the non-price attributes of the different
suppliers into account. However, this implies that all parties involved in
the decision-making process - procurement, logistic, quality, management -
have to become involved even before the auction is designed. For example,
a supplier who offers a better quality such that the expected additional
costs for recalls are expected to be lower by 3%, should be given a price
preference of 3% in the auction. If all different dimensions are adequately
quantified ex-ante, then a price auction will lead to the efficient outcome.18
If the buyer, however, does not succeed in getting the uncertainty out of the
process, then in a dynamic buyer-determined auction collusion can prevail.19
Our experimental results confirm the prediction that dynamic buyer-
determined reverse auctions often result in high prices and are also more
expensive in terms of buyer’s total cost than binding auctions. Consistent
with intuition, but in contrast to theoretical predictions, we found that
collusion at high prices becomes less likely if the number of bidders increases,
if the reserve prices decreases, and if the uncertainty about the decision
criteria decreases.
The latter issue implies that buyers who use buyer-determined reverse
auctions could re-duce collusion by reducing the uncertainty surrounding
the decision making process. This includes providing the seller with infor-
mation on the attributes, which enter the decision, such as quality, relia-
bility, capacity, and reputation. To reduce the uncertainty further, buyers
might also communicate to the suppliers the organizational procedure of the
18There exists an extensive literature on the optimal mechanism and auction design
in a multidimensional framework (among others Che, 1993; Branco, 1997; Morand and
Thomas, 2006; Rezende, 2009), once these different dimensions are quantified. As a
general result it is advisable for the auctioneer to use a scoring rule where however the
weight on the attributes different than the price should be somewhat lower than the true
weight, as this fosters price competition between the suppliers.
19Collusion can also be prevented by the use of a static mechanism, e.g. a sealed
bid auction, or a dynamic contest with a hard ending rule. If in the latter case the
last-second bids are accepted for sure, then this mechanism becomes similar to a sealed
bid format, i.e. a static auction. If the acceptance of last second bids is uncertain, high
price equilibria can occur Ockenfels and Roth (2006).
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decision taking process, e.g. whether a committee or the top management
will take the final decision.
2.5 APPENDICES
2.5.1 THEORY
Proof of Proposition 1. If both bidders bid according to the collusive strat-
egy βc, then bidding ends after the first round and the expected profit of
supplier i is given by
πci (ci) =
R− ci
2
. (2.5.1)
Now consider a deviation from the equilibrium strategy. Undercutting
the opponent’s bid by less than α cannot be optimal as this reduces the
profit in case of winning without affecting the probability of winning. Thus,
the deviator has to lower his bid by more than α. If by doing so a deviator
increases his probability of winning, this immediately implies that the other
supplier has a zero probability of winning if the BDRA were to stop at
this point. This supplier will, according to the collusive bidding strategy
βc, lower his bid as well. Consequently, a deviator can only increase his
probability of winning if his bid is so low that the other will not follow suit
anymore. This is the case if the bid bi is smaller than cj −α. The expected
profit of a deviator that lowers his bid until his opponent dropped out or
his bid is equal to some stopping price p is given by
πdi =
∫ c−α
p
(x− ci) · f(x+ α)dx+
p− ci
2
· F (p+ α). (2.5.2)
Comparing (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) shows that the incentive to deviate is
largest for a supplier with lowest costs (ci = c). This leads to expression
(2.2.1) in Proposition 1.
Proof of Corollary 1. The first derivative of the expected deviation profit
(2.5.2) with respect to the stopping price p is given by
∂πdi
∂p
=
F (p+ α)− (p− ci) · f(p+ α)
2
(2.5.3)
2. COLLUSION IN DYNAMIC BUYER-DETERMINED REVERSE
AUCTIONS 34
Hence, the deviator wants to stop as early as possible if (2.5.3) is positive.
This requirement is always fulfilled if F is concave, as then F (x) ≥ x · f(x)
holds. Note that in this case the collusive bidding strategies βc indeed
constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Even outside the equilibrium
path, if someone is undercut, it is optimal to place the highest bid that is
still in the range of α of the other bid. Any higher bid would lead to a zero
probability of winning. Any lower bid that is still in the range of α of the
other bid would also result in a winning probability of one half if the auction
were to stop at this point but with a lower price in case of winning. Lastly,
trying to outbid the deviator cannot be optimal since (2.5.3) is positive.
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that if bidders behave according to the
collusive strategy βc then no one can make himself better off in the BDRA
by deviating. Again we concentrate on a bidder with lowest costs. The
expected profit of such a bidder from collusion is given by
πci =
R
n
(2.5.4)
If he instead tries to outbid one competitor by lowering his bid at most to
p and then colludes with the remaining n− 1 competitors his profit can be
written as
∫ 100−α
p
x ·
2
n
·
(n−1)·f(x+α)·F (x+α)n−2︷ ︸︸ ︷
n− 1
100
·
(
x+ α
100
)n−2
dx+ p ·
1
n
·
F (p+α)n−1︷ ︸︸ ︷(
p+ α
100
)n−1
. (2.5.5)
Note that by outbidding one competitor the winning probability of the
deviator increases to 2/n, as he then wins not only if he is preferred but also
if the outbid competitor is the preferred supplier. Optimizing expression
(2.5.5) with respect to the stopping price p yields p∗ = α/(n − 2) for n >
2. Hence, the profit from trying to outbid one of the n − 1 competitors
optimally is given by
πd =
∫ 100−α
α
n−2
x ·
2
n
·
n− 1
100
·
(
x+ α
100
)n−2
dx+
α
n− 2
·
1
n
·
(
α · (n− 1)
100 · (n− 2)
)n−1
.
(2.5.6)
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Now it remains to be shown that the deviating bidder has no incentive to
lower his bid further when the first competitor dropped out. To see this
suppose that m < n bidders are still active when the deviator reduced his
bid to pm, i.e. one (or more) competitors already dropped out. Then the
expected profit from trying to outbid a further competitor by reducing the
own bid at most to pm−1 can be expressed as
∫ pm
pm−1
x·
n−m+ 2
n
·
(m−1)·f(x+α)·F (x+α)m−2︷ ︸︸ ︷
m− 1
100
·
(
x+ α
100
)m−2
dx+pm−1·
n−m+ 1
n
·
F (pm−1+α)m−1︷ ︸︸ ︷(
pm−1 + α
100
)m−1
(2.5.7)
Observe that by outbidding a further competitor the winning probability
of the deviator increases to (1− (m−2)/n), as he then wins as long as none
of the surviving competitors is the preferred supplier. The first derivative
of (2.5.7) with respect to the stopping price pm−1 is given by
(pm−1 + α)
m−2
n
· [pm−1 · (n− 2m+ 2) + α · (n−m+ 1)] (2.5.8)
A bidder has no incentive to lower his bid as long as expression (2.5.8) is
positive for all pm−1. As expression (2.5.8) is decreasing in m it suffices to
show that it is positive for m = n−1 in order to prove that it is positive for
all m ≤ n − 1. At this point it is easy to see that it can never be optimal
to outbid more than half of the competitors as expression (2.5.8) is always
positive if m ≤ (n+ 2)/2.
If we plug in m = n − 1 in expression (2.5.8) we get a condition which
guarantees that no bidder has an incentive to lower his bid further once a
bidder dropped out.
(pn−2 + α)
n−3
n
· [pn−2 · (4− n) + 2 · α] ≥ 0 (2.5.9)
For n ≤ 4 this condition is always fulfilled. For n > 4 the term on the left
reaches its minimum when the price reaches its maximum. As the price is
bounded at 100− α we can state a sufficient condition as
α ≥ 100 ·
n− 4
n− 2
. (2.5.10)
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For these parameter values the collusive bidding strategies βc constitute an
equilibrium.
To prove that also in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium collusion is pos-
sible, we next show that the way bidders react to a deviating competitor
as defined in βc determines an upper bound for the deviation incentive
for any sequentially rational strategy. Not following suit if a deviator bids
more than α below the own bid cannot be optimal, as this leads to a zero
probability of winning. Hence, no bid higher than defined by our collusive
bidding strategy can be a best response to a deviation. As a consequence
the winning probability of a deviator and thereby also the expected profit
from deviating cannot be larger when competitors behave sequentially ra-
tional than when they behave according to the collusive bidding strategy βc.
Thus, in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, collusion remains to be an equi-
librium outcome if it is an equilibrium given our collusive bidding strategy
βc.
2.5.2 INSTRUCTIONS
This section provides the instructions in German (original) and English
(translated) for Treatment 1 and for our price-based auction with two bid-
ders.
Anleitung zum Experiment 
 
Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme am Experiment. Bitte sprechen Sie bis zum Ende des 
Experiments nicht mehr mit anderen Teilnehmern. 
 
Dieses Experiment besteht aus 28 Runden. In jeder dieser Runden befinden Sie sich in der 
gleichen Situation, die im Folgenden ausführlich erklärt wird. Die ersten 3 Runden des 
Experiments sind Proberunden, in denen Sie nicht um Geld spielen. In den restlichen 25 Runden 
können Sie Geld verdienen, das Ihnen am Ende des Experiments ausgezahlt wird. In jeder Runde 
spielen Sie mit einem anderen Teilnehmer aus diesem Raum. 
   
Die Situation 
  
In diesem Experiment sind Sie der Produzent eines Gutes und nehmen in jeder Runde als Bieter 
an einer Einkaufsaukion mit einem anderen Produzenten teil. In der Auktion möchte ein Käufer 
ein Gut kaufen. Um das Gut zu verkaufen, geben Sie und der andere Bieter Gebote ab, zu denen 
Sie bereit sind, das Gut zu verkaufen.  
Die Bereitstellung des Gutes ist für Sie mit Kosten verbunden. Diese Kosten, die Ihnen nur 
entstehen, wenn Sie das Gut verkaufen, werden in jeder Runde zufällig und unabhängig für jeden 
Bieter ermittelt. Alle ganzzahligen Kosten zwischen 0 und 100 sind dabei gleich wahrscheinlich. 
Wählt der Käufer Ihr Gebot aus, so ist Ihr Gewinn aus der Auktion 
 
Ihr Gewinn = Ihr Gebot – Ihre Kosten 
 
Wählt der Käufer Ihr Gebot nicht aus, so machen Sie in dieser Runde einen Gewinn von 0. 
Ob Sie die Auktion gewinnen oder nicht, hängt nicht nur von Ihrem Gebot ab, sondern auch von 
Ihrer Qualität und der Qualität des anderen Bieters. In jeder Auktion bevorzugt der Käufer 
zufällig einen der beiden Bieter und gibt diesem einen Qualitätsvorteil  von 10. Welcher Bieter 
den Qualitätsvorteil hat, ist während der Auktion nicht bekannt und wird erst veröffentlicht, 
nachdem die Bietzeit abgelaufen ist. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit bevorzugt zu werden ist für alle 
Bieter gleich. Der Käufer wählt den Bieter aus, der das niedrigste qualitätsangepasste Gebot (QA 
Gebot) abgegeben hat.  
 
Ihr QA Gebot = Ihr Gebot – Ihre Qualität 
 
Sollten beide Bieter ein qualitätsangepasstes Gebot (QA Gebot) in gleicher Höhe abgegeben 
haben, wird der Bieter mit der höheren Qualität ausgewählt.  
 
Beispiel 
 
Die Ungewissheit bezüglich des Qualitätsvorteils führt dazu, dass der Bieter, der das niedrigere 
Gebot abgegeben hat, nicht zwangsläufig die Auktion gewinnt. Betrachten Sie dazu das folgende 
Beispiel.  
 
 
 
Nehmen Sie an, das letzte Gebot von Bieter A war 91 und das von Bieter B 99. Obwohl sie es 
während der Auktion nicht wussten, stellt sich nach der Auktion heraus, dass der Käufer     
Bieter B bevorzugt und ihm folglich den Qualitätsvorteil von 10 gibt.  Daher sind die 
qualitätsangepassten Gebote  
  
Bieter A’s QA Gebot = 91 – 0 = 91 
Bieter B’s QA Gebot = 99 – 10 = 89 
 
Daher wird der Käufer das Gut zu einem Preis von 99 ECU von Bieter B kaufen. Der nicht 
ausgewählte Bieter A macht einen Gewinn von 0. Bitte beachten Sie, dass die Auswahl des 
Käufers von den QA Geboten abhängt, Ihr Gewinn im Falle Ihrer Auswahl jedoch nur von 
Ihrem Gebot. 
 
Die Auktion 
 
Unten sehen Sie wie Ihr Bildschirm während der Auktion aussehen wird. Sie erfahren, ob Sie 
Bieter A oder B sind, wobei Sie in beiden Rollen mit gleicher Wahrscheinlichkeit der bevorzugte 
Bieter sind. Außerdem sehen Sie, zu welchen Kosten Sie das Gut bereitstellen können und wie 
hoch Ihr Gewinn wäre, wenn Sie die Auktion mit Ihrem aktuellen Gebot gewinnen würden. 
Auf der rechten Seite des Bildschirms haben Sie eine Übersicht über Ihr aktuelles Gebot und das 
aktuelle Gebot des anderen Bieters. Mit dieser Information können Sie anhand der Anzeige auf 
der linken Seite bestimmen, ob Sie gegeben der aktuellen Gebote sicher gewinnen werden, sicher 
verlieren werden oder  mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50% gewinnen werden.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gebotsabgabe 
 
Um ein Gebot abzugeben, tippen Sie das gewünschte Gebot in die Box ein und klicken 
anschließend auf “Bestätigen”. Bitte beachten Sie, dass Sie kein Gebot abgeben können, das 
größer als der Reservationspreis von 100 ECU ist. Ebenso können Sie kein Gebot abgeben, das 
größer ist als Ihr aktuelles Gebot in dieser Auktion. Sie können während der Auktion beliebig 
viele Gebote abgeben.  
Die Auktionen in den 3 Proberunden werden eine Grundlaufzeit von 60 Sekunden haben. Die 
restlichen 25 Auktionen haben eine Grundlaufzeit von 40 Sekunden. Falls ein Bieter in den 
letzten 10 Sekunden einer Auktion ein Gebot abgibt, so wird die Laufzeit auf 10 Sekunden 
verlängert. Dies führt dazu, dass Sie keinen Vorteil haben, wenn Sie mit der Gebotsabgabe bis 
zur letzten Sekunde warten. Die Auktion endet, wenn der Timer bei 0 angekommen ist. 
 
Ihre Gewinnchancen 
 
Sie werden in einer Auktion nur sicher gewinnen, falls Ihr Gebot mindestens um 11 ECU kleiner 
ist als das Gebot des anderen Bieters. Andersrum bedeutet dies, dass Sie nur dann sicher 
verlieren, wenn der andere Bieter ein Gebot abgegeben hat, das um 11 oder mehr Einheiten unter 
Ihrem letzten Gebot liegt. In allen anderen Fällen haben Sie und der andere Bieter die gleiche 
Gewinnwahrscheinlichkeit von 50%. 
 
Informationen die Sie nach Ende der Auktion erhalten 
 
Am Ende jeder Auktion sehen Sie eine Liste mit den Geboten, Ihrer Qualität und der Qualität des 
anderen Bieters. Außerdem werden die qualitätsangepassten Gebote und Ihr Gewinn angezeigt. 
 
Auszahlung 
 
Am Ende des Experiments wird der Computer Ihre Auszahlung angeben und in Euro umrechnen. 
Dabei entsprechen 40 ECU einem Euro. Zusätzlich erhalten Sie ein Show Up Fee in Höhe von 
2,50€. Bitte warten Sie auch nach Ablauf des Experiments ruhig an Ihrem Platz, bis Sie der 
Experimentator für die Auszahlung aufruft. 
 
Vielen Dank für die Teilnahme an unserem Experiment. 
Anleitung zum Experiment 
 
Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme am Experiment. Bitte sprechen Sie bis zum Ende des 
Experiments nicht mehr mit anderen Teilnehmern. 
 
Dieses Experiment besteht aus 28 Runden. In jeder dieser Runden befinden Sie sich in der 
gleichen Situation, die im Folgenden ausführlich erklärt wird. Die ersten 3 Runden des 
Experiments sind Proberunden, in denen Sie nicht um Geld spielen. In den restlichen 25 Runden 
können Sie Geld verdienen, das Ihnen am Ende des Experiments ausgezahlt wird. In jeder Runde 
spielen Sie mit einem anderen Teilnehmer aus diesem Raum. 
   
Die Situation 
In diesem Experiment sind Sie der Produzent eines Gutes und nehmen in jeder Runde als Bieter 
an einer Einkaufsaukion mit einem anderen Produzenten teil. In der Auktion möchte ein Käufer 
ein Gut kaufen. Um das Gut zu verkaufen, geben Sie und der andere Bieter Gebote ab, zu denen 
Sie bereit sind, das Gut zu verkaufen.  
Die Bereitstellung des Gutes ist für Sie mit Kosten verbunden. Diese Kosten, die Ihnen nur 
entstehen, wenn Sie das Gut verkaufen, werden in jeder Runde zufällig und unabhängig für jeden 
Bieter ermittelt. Alle ganzzahligen Kosten zwischen 0 und 100 sind dabei gleich wahrscheinlich. 
Wählt der Käufer Ihr Gebot aus, so ist Ihr Gewinn aus der Auktion 
 
Ihr Gewinn = Ihr Gebot – Ihre Kosten 
 
Wählt der Käufer Ihr Gebot nicht aus, so machen Sie in dieser Runde einen Gewinn von 0. 
Ob Sie die Auktion gewinnen oder nicht, hängt nur von Ihrem Gebot ab.  
 
Beispiel 
Der Bieter, der das niedrigere Gebot abgegeben hat, gewinnt die Auktion. Betrachten Sie dazu 
das folgende Beispiel.  
 
Nehmen Sie an, das letzte Gebot von Bieter A war 141 und das von Bieter B 149. Dann wird 
der Käufer das Gut zu einem Preis von 141 ECU von Bieter A kaufen. Der nicht ausgewählte 
Bieter B macht einen Gewinn von 0. Bitte beachten Sie, dass sowohl die Auswahl des Käufers 
als auch Ihr Gewinn im Falle Ihrer Auswahl nur von Ihrem Gebot abhängen. 
 
Die Auktion 
Unten sehen Sie wie Ihr Bildschirm während der Auktion aussehen wird. Sie erfahren, ob Sie 
Bieter A oder B sind. Außerdem sehen Sie, zu welchen Kosten Sie das Gut bereitstellen können 
und wie hoch Ihr Gewinn wäre, wenn Sie die Auktion mit Ihrem aktuellen Gebot gewinnen 
würden. 
Auf der rechten Seite des Bildschirms haben Sie eine Übersicht über Ihr aktuelles Gebot und das 
aktuelle Gebot des anderen Bieters. Mit dieser Information können Sie bestimmen, ob Sie 
gegeben der aktuellen Gebote sicher gewinnen oder sicher verlieren werden.  
 
  
 
Gebotsabgabe 
Um ein Gebot abzugeben, tippen Sie das gewünschte Gebot in die Box ein und klicken 
anschließend auf “Bestätigen”. Bitte beachten Sie, dass Sie kein Gebot abgeben können, das 
größer als der Reservationspreis von 150 ECU ist. Ebenso können Sie nur Gebote abgeben, die 
kleiner als das niedrigste Gebot in dieser Auktion sind. Sie können während der Auktion beliebig 
viele Gebote abgeben.  
Die Auktionen in den 3 Proberunden werden eine Grundlaufzeit von 60 Sekunden haben. Die 
restlichen 25 Auktionen haben eine Grundlaufzeit von 40 Sekunden. Falls ein Bieter in den 
letzten 10 Sekunden einer Auktion ein Gebot abgibt, so wird die Laufzeit auf 10 Sekunden 
verlängert. Dies führt dazu, dass Sie keinen Vorteil haben, wenn Sie mit der Gebotsabgabe bis 
zur letzten Sekunde warten. Die Auktion endet, wenn der Timer bei 0 angekommen ist. 
 
Ihre Gewinnchancen 
Sie werden in einer Auktion sicher gewinnen, falls Ihr Gebot kleiner ist als das Gebot des 
anderen Bieters. Andersrum bedeutet dies, dass Sie sicher verlieren, wenn der andere Bieter ein 
Gebot abgegeben hat, das unter Ihrem letzten Gebot liegt. 
 
Informationen die Sie nach Ende der Auktion erhalten 
Am Ende jeder Auktion sehen Sie eine Liste mit den Geboten und Ihrem Gewinn. 
 
Auszahlung 
Am Ende des Experiments wird der Computer Ihre Auszahlung angeben und in Euro umrechnen. 
Dabei entsprechen 35 ECU einem Euro. Zusätzlich erhalten Sie ein Show Up Fee in Höhe von 
2,50€. Bitte warten Sie auch nach Ablauf des Experiments ruhig an Ihrem Platz, bis Sie der 
Experimentator für die Auszahlung aufruft. 
 
Vielen Dank für die Teilnahme an unserem Experiment. 
Instructions 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please do not talk to other participants until the 
end of this experiment. 
 
This experiment consists of 28 rounds. In each of this rounds you are in the same situation that 
will be explained to you in detail. The first 3 rounds of the experiment are practice rounds, in 
which you cannot earn money. In the remaining 25 rounds you can earn money that will be paid 
out at the end of the experiment. In each round you play with another participant in this room. 
   
The situation 
  
In this experiment you are the producer of a good and you participate as a bidder in a 
procurement auction with one other producer in each round. In this auction a buyer wants to 
procure one good. In order to sell the good you and the other bidder place bids for which you 
want to sell the good. 
Selling the good is costly. These costs, which only occur if you sell the good, are independently 
and randomly drawn for each bidder in each period. All integers between 0 and 100 are equally 
likely. If the buyer selects your bid your bid your profit is given by 
 
Your Profit = Your Bid – Your Costs 
 
If the buyer does not select your offer, you make a profit of 0 in that period. Whether you win the 
auction or not does not only depend on your bid, it also depends on Your Quality and the 
quality of the other bidder. In each auction the buyer randomly prefers one of the two bidders 
and assigns a Quality Advantage of 10 to this bidder. Which of the bidder has the quality 
advantage is not known during the auction and is only published when the bidding time has 
expired. The probability of being the preferred bidder is the same for all bidders. The buyer 
selects the bidder who placed the lowest quality-adjusted bid (QA Bid). 
 
Your QA Bid = Your Bid – Your Quality 
 
If both suppliers place the same quality-adjusted bid (QA Bid), the bidder with the higher quality 
will be selected. 
  
Example 
 
The uncertainty about the quality advantage implies that a bidder who placed the lowest bid will 
not win for sure. Consider the following example.  
 
Suppose the last offer of Bidder A was 91 and that of Bidder B 99. Even though they did not 
know it during the auction it is revealed after the auction that the buyer prefers Bidder B and 
hence assigns a quality advantage of 10 to Bidder B. Then the quality-adjusted bids are  
  
Bidder A’s QA Bid = 91 – 0 = 91 
Bidder B’s QA Bid = 99 – 10 = 89 
 
Hence the buyer will procure the good from Bidder B at a price of 99 ECU. The non-selected 
Bidder A makes a profit of 0. Please have in mind that the buyer’s selection decision depends on 
the QA Bids, but your profit in case of selection only depends on your bid. 
 
The auction 
 
Below you can see how your screen looks like during the auction. You see if you are Bidder A or 
B. In both roles you have the same chance of being the preferred bidder. Furthermore, you learn 
at which costs you can provide the good and how large your profit would be if you won the 
auction with your current bid. 
On the right hand side of the screen you have an overview of your current bid and the current bid 
of the other bidder. With this information you can calculate, if you win for sure, if you lose for 
sure, or if you win with a probability of 50%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bidding 
 
To place a bid you have to type it into the box and click confirm. Please have in mind that you 
cannot place a bid that is larger than the reservation price of 100 ECU. You cannot place a bid 
that is larger than your current bid in the auction. You can place as many bids in the auction as 
you want.  
The auctions in the 3 practice periods have a minimum duration of 60 seconds. The remaining 
25 auctions have a minimum duration of 40 seconds. If a bidder places a bid within the last 10 
seconds the counter is reset to 10 seconds. This implies that you have no advantage if you wait 
for the last second to place your bid. The auction ends if the timer reaches 0. 
 
Your winning probability 
 
You will only win an auction for sure if your bid is at least 11 ECU smaller than the bid of the 
other bidder. This also means that you only lose for sure if the other bidder placed a bid that is 11 
or more units smaller than your last bid. In all other cases you and the other bidder have both a 
winning probability of 50%. 
 
Information you receive at the end of the auction 
 
At the end of the auction you see a list containing the bids, your quality, and the quality of the 
other bidder. Furthermore, you the quality-adjusted bids and your profit. 
  
Payment 
 
At the end of the experiment the computer will calculate your profit and display it in Euros. 40 
ECU are equivalent to one Euro. Additionally, you get a Show Up Fee of 2,50€. Please wait at 
your seat until you are called for your payment. 
  
Thank you for participating in our experiment. 
Instructions 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please do not talk to other participants until the 
end of this experiment. 
 
This experiment consists of 28 rounds. In each of this rounds you are in the same situation that 
will be explained to you in detail. The first 3 rounds of the experiment are practice rounds, in 
which you cannot earn money. In the remaining 25 rounds you can earn money that will be paid 
out at the end of the experiment. In each round you play with another participant in this room. 
   
The situation 
 
In this experiment you are the producer of a good and you participate as a bidder in a 
procurement auction with one other producer in each round. In this auction a buyer wants to 
procure one good. In order to sell the good you and the other bidder place bids for which you 
want to sell the good.  
Selling the good is costly. These costs, which only occur if you sell the good, are independently 
and randomly drawn for each bidder in each period. All integers between 0 and 100 are equally 
likely. If the buyer selects your bid your bid your profit is given by 
 
Your Profit = Your Bid – Your Costs 
 
If the buyer does not select your offer, you make a profit of 0 in that period. Whether you win the 
auction or not does only depend on your bid. 
 
Example 
 
The bidder who placed the lower bid wins the auction. Consider the following example.  
 
Suppose the last bid of Bidder A was 141 and that of Bidder B 149. Then the buyer will procure 
the good at a price of 141 ECU from Bidder A. The non-selected Bidder A makes a profit of 0. 
Please have in mind that the buyer’s selection decision depends on the QA Bids, but your profit 
in case of selection only depends on your bid. Please have in mind that the buyer’s selection 
decision and your profit in case of selection only depend on your bid. 
 
The auction 
Below you can see how your screen looks like during the auction. You see if you are Bidder A or 
B. In both roles you have the same chance of being the preferred bidder. Furthermore, you learn 
at which costs you can provide the good and how large your profit would be if you won the 
auction with your current bid. 
On the right hand side of the screen you have an overview of your current bid and the current bid 
of the other bidder. With this information you can calculate, if you win for sure or if you lose for 
sure.  
 
  
 
Bidding 
To place a bid you have to type it into the box and click confirm. Please have in mind that you 
cannot place a bid that is larger than the reservation price of 150 ECU. You cannot place a bid 
that is larger than your current bid in the auction. You can place as many bids in the auction as 
you want. 
The auctions in the 3 practice periods have a minimum duration of 60 seconds. The remaining 
25 auctions have a minimum duration of 40 seconds. If a bidder places a bid within the last 10 
seconds the counter is reset to 10 seconds. This implies that you have no advantage if you wait 
for the last second to place your bid. The auction ends if the timer reaches 0. 
 
Your winning probability 
You will win an auction for sure if your bid is smaller than the bid of the other bidder. This also 
means that you lose for sure if the other bidder placed a bid that is smaller than your last bid. 
 
Information you receive at the end of the auction  
At the end of the auction you see a list containing the bids and your profit. 
 
 
Payment 
At the end of the experiment the computer will calculate your profit and display it in Euros. 35 
ECU are equivalent to one Euro. Additionally, you get a Show Up Fee of 2,50€. Please wait at 
your seat until you are called for your payment. 
 
Thank you for participating in our experiment. 
chapter 3
TRUST IN PROCUREMENT INTERACTIONS
Abstract
We investigate the observation that auctions in procurement can
be detrimental to the buyer-seller relationship. Poor relationship
can result in a decrease in trust by the buyer during the sourcing
and an increase in opportunistic behavior by the supplier after the
sourcing. We consider a setting in which the winning supplier decides
on the level of costly quality to provide to the buyer, and compare
a standard reverse auction and a buyer-determined reverse auction
in the laboratory. We find that buyer-determined auctions result in
higher prices but also improve cooperation between the buyer and
the selected supplier. In the buyer-determined auction it can be
optimal for the buyer to choose the supplier who submitted a higher
bid. The standard auctions, on the other hand, yield lower prices
but reduce cooperation to a minimum. The degree of trust reflected
by a larger number of trades and higher efficiency in case of trade
are significantly higher in the buyer-determined auction. Theoretical
reasoning based on other-regarding preferences helps to organize the
results.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Reverse auctions, and in particular non-binding reverse auctions are com-
monly used in procurement Elmaghraby (2007).1 However, an often-heard
1In buyer-determined reverse auctions, bidders compete against each other like in a
standard reverse auction, but the winner is not necessarily the supplier with the lowest
bid. Rather, buyers decide based on the final quotes and further information on the
suppliers, who will be awarded the contract. In a recent survey, Elmaghraby (2007)
notes that ”The exact manner in which the buyer makes her final selection still remains
unclear. With either an on-line auction or a RFP, the buyer may still leave some terms
of trade unspecified.” (p. 411).
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argument against procurement auctions is that reverse auctions can have
a negative effect on the relationship between the buyer and the supplier
(Smeltzer and Carr, 2003; Jap, 2002, 2003, 2007). This relationship is par-
ticularly important if there is some uncertainty about the exact specifica-
tions of the delivered product and the buyer has to trust the supplier.2
In this paper we investigate the observation that the mechanism used for
procurement can influence the degree of cooperation between the buyer and
the seller once trade takes place and the amount of trust that is necessary
for trade to take place. For this purpose we compare a binding first-price
reverse auction and a non-binding buyer-determined auction in a setting
in which after the sourcing the seller decides on the quality of the prod-
uct she delivers. We show that the buyer-determined auction induces a
significantly higher degree of trust and cooperation, but at the same time
leads to higher prices. Interestingly, it can be worthwhile for the buyer in
a buyer-determined auction to choose the higher offer instead of the lower
one.
To organize our results, we discuss a model based on other-regarding
preferences. While standard reasoning implies that both mechanisms should
lead to the same allocation, allowing for other-regarding preferences helps
to explain the results of the experiment.
In the experiment, both in the binding auction as well as in the buyer-
determined auction, potential suppliers place a sealed bid (or offer). In
the binding auction, the buyer can only accept the lowest offer or refuse
to trade, whereas he can also accept a higher offer in a buyer-determined
auction. Once the winning supplier and price are determined, the selected
supplier decides on the quality of the good to be delivered. A higher quality
is more valuable to the buyer, but also more costly to the seller.
Now, with standard preferences, the seller would deliver lowest quality
in all cases, as quality is not part of the contract. Since there is competition
between suppliers, both mechanisms thus lead to prices equal to costs of the
2Mayer et al. (1995) define trust as ”the willingness of a party to be vulnerable
to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform
a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or
control that other party”.
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lowest quality. With other-regarding preferences both suppliers and buyers
might care about the profit the others obtain. In this case, individuals have
two objectives. On the one hand they still want to maximize their mone-
tary payoff, but on the other hand they care about the gap between their
own and others’ monetary payoffs. Thus, when prices are high there can
be a trade-off. Increasing quality decreases supplier’s own monetary payoff
but also, depending on the price, may result in more equitable outcomes.
Therefore, quality is no longer independent of prices and high prices might
induce high quality if the supplier has other-regarding preferences and gains
from cooperation are high. As a consequence, the equilibrium outcomes of
price-based and buyer-determined auctions can differ greatly. We derive
properties of buyer’s beliefs that imply that the same subjects who coordi-
nate on a high-price high-quality equilibrium in the buyer-determined auc-
tion will compete down to their lowest costs and provide minimum quality
in price-based auctions.
This paper contributes to the literature on buyer-determined auctions.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2007) compare a price-based and a buyer-
determined mechanism in a setting in which costs and qualities are cor-
related. They show theoretically that buyer-determined auctions are more
profitable for the buyer if the correlation between costs and quality is high
and the number of bidders is not too low. They also provide experimental
evidence for their predictions. In contrast to our study, they assume that
quality is exogenously given; in our setting, the supplier decides on the
quality level after the selection. In Fugger et al. (2016) we analyze a setting
in which suppliers are uncertain about buyer’s exact preferences during the
competitive bidding and suppliers bid either in a dynamic buyer-determined
or a binding reverse auction. In such a setting, there is a trade-off for the
buyer between binding price-based auctions and buyer-determined auctions.
Price-based auctions induce low prices but might force the buyer to select
a non-preferred supplier. On the other hand, buyer-determined auctions
allow the buyer to choose the best offer but can also enable tacit collusion
that results in high prices, especially when the number of bidders is small.
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The work in the procurement literature closest to ours is Brosig-Koch
and Heinrich (2012). In an experimental study, they find that price-based
auctions are less profitable for buyers than buyer-determined mechanisms,
when buyers can base their selection on suppliers’ past performances. Like
us, they also consider a setting with incomplete contracts, in which pay-
ments cannot be conditioned on the provided quality. However their ap-
proach differs from ours in two major aspects. First, their explanation of
differences between auctions and buyer-determined auctions is based on
reputation building. In their setting reputation building can only be prof-
itable in the buyer-determined mechanism. While the buyer has to select
the lowest bid in the price-based auction, he is free to make his selection
based on bids and suppliers’ reputation in buyer-determined auctions. This
gives suppliers an incentive to provide high quality and thus results in more
efficient outcomes with higher prices but also higher profits for buyers in
buyer-determined auctions. In contrast to their set-up, we rule out reputa-
tion building as a possible explanation. As a consequence of the anonymity
in our setting, other-regarding preferences rather than reputation can ex-
plain differences between the price-based and the buyer-determined mech-
anisms. Second, all their procurement mechanisms are binding in the sense
that trade always takes place. Furthermore, trade is guaranteed to be prof-
itable for the buyer. In our approach buyers can be at risk of making losses
and are free to refuse trade. This specification gives us the opportunity to
analyze the influence of the procurement mechanism on buyers’ trust.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section we describe our
experimental setup and analyze the basic model with standard preferences.
The results of the experiments are shown in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 we
use a model with other-regarding preferences to organize the results. In
Section 3.5 we conclude the paper.
3.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND MODEL SETUP
In the laboratory experiment, we focus on a procurement interaction in
which one buyer faces two potential suppliers. The buyer’s valuation for
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the good depends on the quality qi ∈ {q
1, q2, · · · , q7} the selected supplier
i provides. While the buyer benefits from higher quality, a higher level
of quality is associated with higher costs c(qi) for the supplier, which for
simplicity we assume to be the same across suppliers. We further assume
that the provision of quality is welfare increasing, i.e. ∀q′ > q : q′− c(q′) >
q − c(q), and that suppliers’ costs of second lowest quality are higher than
buyer’s valuation for lowest quality, i.e. c(q2) > q1.
In the procurement stage, participants take part either in a buyer-
determined auction or a binding price-based auction depending on the treat-
ment. In the buyer-determined auction (BDRA) treatment, each supplier
places a sealed offer. The buyer observes both offers and decides whether
to accept one of the offers or to reject both. If he accepts one offer, the se-
lected supplier observes both offers and then chooses which quality level to
provide. The binding price-based auction treatment (Auction) is similar to
the buyer-determined auction. The only difference is that the buyer cannot
choose between the two offers. He can only decide whether to accept or
reject the lowest bid in the Auction. After the buyer decided from which
supplier to buy, this supplier chooses the quality she wants to provide.
In the experiment we had a total of 108 participants and used the
between-subjects design. There were six independent cohorts for each treat-
ment. Each cohort included nine participants. In each session two cohorts
of the same treatment were in the lab at the same time. Two thirds of
our participants were given the role of suppliers, one third the role of buy-
ers. These roles were not changed during the experiment. Each subject
participated only one time and was randomly assigned to one of the two
treatments. All experimental sessions were conducted in the Cologne Lab-
oratory for Economic Research at the University of Cologne. We recruited
participants using the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015)
and earning cash was the only incentive offered.
Upon arrival at the laboratory, the participants were seated at computer
terminals. We handed out written instructions to them and they read the
instructions on their own. When all participants finished reading, we read
the instructions to them aloud, in order to ensure public knowledge about
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the rules of the game. After we finished reading the instructions to the par-
ticipants, we started the actual game. In each session, each participant took
part in a sequence of 30 procurement interactions. We used random match-
ing and the participants had no possibility to identify each other. At the
beginning of each round, the nine participants in a cohort were divided into
three groups consisting of one buyer and two suppliers. We programmed the
experimental interface using the zTree system (Fischbacher, 2007a). The
first two lines of Table 3.1, describing the quality levels and their costs, were
displayed on every screen.
Table 3.1: Parameter values
Costs 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Quality 15 80 130 180 220 250 270
Welfare 5 60 100 140 170 190 200
For each interaction in each period, the selected supplier earned the
difference between the price and her costs and the buyer earned the dif-
ference between his valuation for the good given the quality the winning
supplier provided, and the price. The supplier who was not selected earned
zero. If no trade took place, buyer and suppliers earned zero. We computed
cash earnings for each participant by multiplying the total earnings from all
rounds by a predetermined exchange rate of 50 ECU per Euro and adding it
to an initial endowment of 7.50 Euro, the endowment was included to pre-
vent losses for the buyer. Furthermore each participant received a show-up
fee of 2.50 Euro. Participants were paid their earnings in private and cash
at the end of the session. Sessions lasted about 60 minutes and participants
made an average profit of 16.71 Euro.
BENCHMARK
In order to establish a benchmark for the further analysis, we will first
formally describe the two different procurement mechanisms and derive
predicitions in the framework of standard economic theory.
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In both mechanisms two suppliers face one buyer and each supplier
places a bid bi ∈ R
+ and decides what quality qi to provide in case of
selection. The set of possible qualities is Q = {q1, q2, · · · , q7}. The buyer
observes suppliers’ bids b = (b1, b2) and makes his selection decision. Let b
1
denote the lowest offer and b2 the second lowest offers. In the Auction the
buyer’s set of actions AAuction contains two elements, he can either refuse to
trade a0 or select the lowest bid b1 by taking action a1. In the BDRA the
buyer’s set of actions is given by ABDRA = {a0, a1, a2} as he also has the
option to accept the second lowest bid b2 by taking action a2. Finally, let
µb be the buyer’s belief about the type distribution of a supplier who places
a bid b. This belief determines buyer’s expectations about the quality he
will receive E[q|b] when he accepts a bid b and is hence important for his
selection decision.
Applying the concept of backward induction, the analysis starts in the
last stage where the selected supplier i decides what quality to provide.
At this stage, the price for the product is already decided. Given the
assumption that individuals only seek to maximize their own monetary
payoff, the selected supplier faces the following problem
max
qi∈Q
bi − c(qi). (3.2.1)
Hence, the selected supplier provides minimum quality qi = q
1 independent
of her bid bi and the procurement mechanism. In the selection stage the
buyer takes the action that maximizes his expected profit. Anticipating
suppliers’ behavior, the buyer only accepts bids that are not higher than q1.
Furthermore he always selects the lower bid as long as it is sufficiently low.
For these reasons suppliers know that they only have a positive probability
of winning the contract if their own bid is neither larger than q1 nor larger
than their competitor’s bid. As a consequence, equilibrium prices in the
BDRA and the Auction will be the same according to standard economic
theory, namely c(q1). We summarize conclusions based on the standard
theory with the following four hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. In both procurement mechanisms contract prices will be
equal to lowest cost c(q1) = 10.
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This hypothesis implies that buyers and sellers will make the same profit
under the two mechanisms, and moreover, sellers will compete away all their
profit, earning zero, while buyers will earn q1 − c(q1) = 5.
Hypothesis 2. In both procurement mechanisms suppliers will provide the
minimum quality q1 = 15 regardless of their bid.
This hypothesis implies that the quality will be q1, the same under the
two mechanisms, resulting in the same (low) efficiency. Also, the quality
provided will be uncorrelated with the auction price, and buyers will not
accept any offer bi > q
1under either procurement mechanism, because such
an offer will result in a loss.
Hypothesis 3. Under the BDRA if the buyer accepts an offer, it will be
the lowest of the submitted offers.
3.3 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Figure 3.1 provides a concise summary of our results. It shows the average
accepted prices, provided quality, and acceptance rates for each period,
aggregated across all six cohorts (we present the same information by cohort
in Figure 3.6). The dashed benchmark lines display standard theoretical
benchmarks for price (H1) and quality (H2), and it is apparent from the
figure that we can reject both H1 and H2. In both treatments observed
prices and qualities are substantially higher than predicted. The average of
accepted prices in the Auction was 35.0 ECU and in the BDRA it was 117.2
(vs. the prediction of c(q1) = 10) . The average quality in the Auction
was 43.7 ECU and in the BDRA it was 150.3 ECU (vs. the prediction
of q1 = 15). We can also see from the figure that behavior in the two
treatments evolves differently over time. While accepted prices decrease in
the Auction, they tend to increase in the BDRA. The acceptance rates also
indicate that buyers were more likely to trade in the BDRA even though
prices were higher . The acceptance rate declines over time, although more
in the Auction treatment than in the BDRA treatment. Average quality is
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Figure 3.1: Average accepted prices and provided values.
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Notes: Displayed are the average accepted price and average pro-
vided quality of all trades that took place in a period over time.
Furthermore, Figure 3.1 illustrates the price and quality bench-
marks (B) and the evolution of the proportion of successful trades.
equal to minimum quality of 15 in the last period in the Auction treatment,
but remains above 15 in the BDRA treatment (p = 0.0897).
Table 3.2 shows formally that accepted prices and provided qualities
were significantly higher in the BDRA than in the Auction. In this setting
higher quality implies higher efficiency if trade takes place, in addition the
BDRA also had a higher acceptance rate, which increases its efficiency
advantage further.
Contrary to the standard theory, that predicts that the buyer extracts
the entire surplus, the profit of the selected supplier was on average higher
than the buyer’s profit in both treatments. According to the non-parametric
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test the profit of the buyer is sig-
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Table 3.2: Averages and standard deviations based on session averages.
Quality Price Costs
Buyer’s
profit
Selected
supplier’s
profit
Acceptance
rate
Auction
43.57∗
(12.06)
35.24∗
(4.31)
14.64∗
(2.09)
4.29
(6.04)
9.98∗
(1.62)
0.49
(0.07)
BDRA
141.20∗
(60.77)
114.23∗
(29.21)
34.76∗
(13.19)
23.41
(29.39)
28.37∗
(12.07)
0.71
(0.21)
p-Value 0.0065 0.0039 0.0039 0.3367 0.0039 0.0538
Notes: Displayed are the averages of the key parameters for Auc-
tion and BDRA based on cohort averages. ∗ Indicates that the
average is significantly different from theoretical prediction at the
0.05 level Furthermore Table 3.2 provides the p-values based on
the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test comparing the
two treatments taking each cohort as one independent observation.
nificantly lower than the selected supplier’s profit (pAuction = 0.0464 and
pBDRA = 0.0277). Suppliers were significantly better off in the BDRA than
in the Auction. Also buyers earned, on average, higher profits in the BDRA.
However, this difference was not significant and accepting the high bids in
the BDRA was also a risky choice as the possible loss was substantial.3
Figure 3.2 displays price-quality combinations for each trade. Contrary
to H2, there is a significant positive correlation between the auction price
and provided quality. Each point above the dashed line is associated with a
positive profit for the buyer. In the Auction nearly all accepted prices were
smaller than 60 ECU and in more than 61.5 percent of trades the provided
quality was q1 = 15. In another 33.6 percent of trades the quality was
q2 = 80, the number of trades with even higher quality was negligible. The
share of trades that were profitable for the buyer was only 41.9 percent. The
BDRA results quite different. Only 5 percent of accepted prices were below
3The numbers reported in Table 3.2 differ slightly from those depicted in Figure 3.1.
In Figure 3.1 we display the average over all trades that took place in a period, hence
cohorts that traded more than other groups in the same treatment have more weight. In
Table 3.2 we take the average of each cohort as the unit of analysis and thereby guarantee
that each cohort has the same weight.
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Figure 3.2: Observed price-quality combinations in Auction and BDRA.
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Notes: Displayed are all price-quality pairs in the Auction and the
BDRA. Each pair above the dashed line represents a trade that
was profitable for the buyer. The size of a circle corresponds to
the number of observations of a price-quality pair.
60 ECU and most prices were between 80 and 155 ECU. Minimum quality
of 15 was provided in less than 20 percent of trades. The share of trades
that were profitable for the buyer was 75.8 percent. However, due to higher
prices, realized losses were also larger in the BDRA. Contrary to H3, 46
percent of the time the buyer selected a higher offer in the BDRA, although
selecting the higher offer did not result in higher quality. According to a
random-effects panel regression, the quality provided by suppliers that were
selected even though they placed the higher bid does not differ from the
quality provision of suppliers that placed the smaller bid (p = 0.223).
Figure 3.3 illustrates the expected profit of a buyer as a function of the
accepted price, considering all observations in the Auction and the BDRA
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Figure 3.3: Expected buyer’s profit depending on accepted price.
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Notes: Figure 3.3 displays buyer’s expected profit as a function
of the price. Circles (for the BDRA) and diamonds (for the Auc-
tion) represent buyer’s average profit given a price. The more fre-
quently a price was accepted the larger the corresponding marker.
The estimate is the result of a fractional polynomial regression of
dimension six taking into account each trade in the Auction and
BDRA.
treatment. Circles represent buyer’s average profit given a price in the
BDRA and diamonds represent the average profit given a price in the Auc-
tion. The more frequently a price was accepted the larger the corresponding
marker. To get a better idea of the form of the expected profit function
we fit a fractional polynomial of dimension six through the observed price-
profit combinations. For a detailed description of the fitting method see
Royston and Altman (1994). The figure displays a positive correlation
between accepted price and buyer’s (average) profit. This correlation was
similar in both treatments. Hence, accepting a high bid was often profitable
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because it resulted in higher quality. Interestingly the expected profit is not
monotonically increasing or decreasing in the accepted price. On the one
hand accepting prices around 80 and 160 was profitable, but on the other
hand accepting prices that were either substantially higher or lower was
unprofitable.
So far we focused our analysis on successful trades. To better understand
the buyer’s decision of which offers to accept, we conduct random-effects
ordered logit regressions with the dependent variable being the buyer’s ac-
ceptance decision, and independent variables listed in the first column of
Table 3.3. The first two regressions estimate buyer’s acceptance decision
taking the lowest offered price and the current period into account. For
both formats the coefficient of Period is negative and significant reflecting
a decreasing acceptance rate. Columns three and four of Table 3.3 present
the results of regressions that also take into account the price the buyer
paid and the quality he received in the previous period. In both treatments
the quality level that the buyer received in the previous period influences
the buyer’s acceptance decision. The price paid in the previous period has
a slightly negative effect on the likelihood of acceptance in the Auction
treatment, but has no effect in the BDRA treatment. Because buyers who
traded in the BDRA selected the higher bid 46 percent of the time, we also
ran the same regressions as in Table 3 with the higher instead of the lower
bid as an explanatory variable for the BDRA treatment and found that
none of the coefficients differ much. Results are reported in Table 3.5.
Table 3.4 shows the results of a random-effects panel regression of sup-
pliers’ bidding behavior over time. Her bid is positively influenced by the
bid her former competitor placed in the previous period. A supplier who
traded in the last period does not change her bid in the Auction but in-
creases it significantly in the BDRA. And average bid amounts go down
over time in the Auction but not in the BDRA.
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Table 3.3: Logit panel regression of acceptance probability.
Log acceptance probability
Auction BDRA Auction BDRA
Lowest bid -0.00135 -0.00113 0.0232∗ -0.00690
(0.00731) (0.00569) (0.0127) (0.00867)
Period -0.0540∗∗∗ -0.0875∗∗∗ -0.0000514 -0.0389
(0.0124) (0.0177) (0.0187) (0.0242)
Qualityt−1 0.0297
∗∗∗ 0.00788∗∗∗
(0.00535) (0.00279)
Pricet−1 -0.0241
∗ 0.00955
(0.0127) (0.00827)
Constant 0.841∗ 2.848∗∗∗ -0.827 1.102
(0.430) (0.816) (0.678) (0.882)
Observations 540 540 260 374
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Regressions reported in the first two columns estimate the influence
of the value of the lowest bid and the current period on buyer’s
acceptance probability taking all interactions into account. Re-
gressions in the last two columns take also the quality the buyer
received and the price he paid in the former period into account.
The number of observations in these regressions is smaller because
only those acceptance decisions are considered where the buyer
traded in the period before.
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Table 3.4: Panel regression of suppliers’ bidding behavior.
Bid
Auction BDRA
Competitor’s bidt−1 0.139
∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.0406) (0.0412)
Tradet−1 -0.734 6.237
∗∗
(1.611) (2.843)
Period -0.772∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗
(0.144) (0.235)
Constant 50.21∗∗∗ 81.53∗∗∗
(3.672) (6.645)
Observations 1044 1044
R2 0.0976 0.2128
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Regressions show how suppliers adjust their bidding behavior over
time in response to the competitor’s bid and the buyer’s selection
in the Auction and the BDRA. Tradet−1 is a dummy variable that
is 1 if the supplier traded in the previous period and 0 otherwise.
Its coefficient indicates how a supplier adjusts her bid if she traded
in the former period.
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3.4 BEHAVIORAL MODEL
In contrast to the assumptions of standard theory, many observations in
experimental economics suggest that many individuals are not solely moti-
vated by profit maximization but also affected by fairness considerations. In
this section we rationalize our experimental observations by applying the
model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) which incorporates inequity aversion.
The modeling approach of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) leads to similar
results. A detailed equilibrium analysis is relegated to the Appendix 3.6.1.
Inequity aversion implies that an individual’s utility is not only affected
by her own payoff but also by the payoffs of other individuals in her reference
group. In our case such a reference group consists of one buyer and two
suppliers.4 The individual’s utility is hence given by
ui =wi −
βi
2
·
∑
j 6=i
max{wi − wj, 0} −
λβi
2
·
∑
j 6=i
max{wj − wi, 0}. (3.4.1)
Here wi denotes the own payoff, the inequity aversion parameter βi ex-
presses how much the individual suffers from advantageous inequality and
λ ≥ 1 how much more individuals suffer from disadvantageous inequal-
ity compared to other members of the reference group. The own inequity
aversion is private information, which cannot be revealed.5
4One might argue that suppliers compete anonymously in the bidding stage and
that buyer’s selection initiates a fundamental transformation in the sense of Williamson
(1985). For example, Hart and Moore (2008) argue in this direction. In this case only
the buyer and the selected supplier compare their profits with each other. Under this
assumption suppliers can guarantee themselves non-negative expected utility because
they do not suffer if they are not selected. As a consequence, low-price equilibria are
affected since inequity averse suppliers prefer not to trade rather than selling at very low
prices. However, specifying the reference group differently does not change the results
for high-price equilibria qualitatively.
5Estimates for the share of inequity averse individuals and the amplitude of inequity
aversion differ. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that 30 percent of the suppliers are
not affected by inequity aversion, another 30 percent have β = 1/4, and 40 percent have
β = 3/5. Blanco et al. (2011) report that 29 percent of their subjects had β < 0.235, 15
percent between 0.235 and 0.4, and 56 percent larger than 0.5. Yang et al. (2012) ob-
served that about 70 percent of their subjects have β smaller 0.125, 20 percent between
0.125 and 0.375, and 10 percent larger than 0.375. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001)
report that 44 percent of their subjects showed completely selfish behavior in a similar
setting. The exact parameterization of λ has only little effect on the possible equi-
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3.4.1 QUALITY PROVISION
Given that individuals only seek to maximize their profit as assumed by
standard economic theory suppliers will always provide minimum quality
independent of the price they are paid. In contrast to this prediction our
experiment shows a strong positive correlation between price and quality.
Observation 1. There is a strong positive correlation between price paid
and quality provided in both the Auction and the BDRA.
Inequity averse suppliers have two goals. On the one hand, they seek
to maximize their profit and on the other hand, they try to reduce payoff
differences between them and other members of their reference group. The
weight a supplier assigns to each of these goals depends on her degree of
inequity aversion. If prices are low, suppliers can reach both goals by pro-
viding minimum quality. In this case quality provision is independent of
inequity aversion. However, if prices are high, the provision of higher qual-
ity reduces payoff inequality whereas provision of lower quality increases
profits. As a consequence, an inequity averse supplier faces a trade off and
her quality provision depends on her inequity aversion (βi, λ) and her bid bi
but not on the procurement mechanism. A high price and aversion against
advantageous inequality have a positive influence on the provided quality,
whereas stronger aversion to disadvantageous inequality decreases quality.
The relationship is illustrated in Figure 3.4.
3.4.2 ACCEPTANCE DECISION
If suppliers only seek to maximize their profit and always provide lowest
quality, the buyer should anticipate this and never accept bids that are
higher than his valuation for minimum quality. If he accepts a bid in the
BDRA, he should accept the lower bid. However, our experimental data
shows that bids larger than the valuation for minimum quality are accepted
and often result in positive profits. Furthermore, buyers select the higher
librium outcomes, because the effects are mainly driven by suppliers’ aversion towards
advantageous inequality.
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Figure 3.4: Relationship between price, quality, and inequity aversion.
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Notes: Displayed is supplier’s optimal quality decision in our ex-
periment as a function of the price and different degrees of inequity
aversion. The higher her inequity aversion βi the higher is the max-
imum quality she provides and the lower is the minimum price that
induces a certain quality.
bid in the BDRA nearly as frequently as the lower bid and some buyers
reject bids that are accepted by other buyers.
Observation 2. Buyers frequently accept bids that are higher than their
valuation for minimum quality.
Observation 3. Buyers frequently select the higher bid in the BDRA.
Observation 4. Some buyers accept bids at levels at which other buyers
reject bids.
Inequity averse suppliers provide higher than minimum quality if they
are paid a sufficiently high price. This implies a positive correlation between
price and quality and can explain why the buyer accepts bids that are
higher than his valuation for minimum quality. A strong positive correlation
between price and quality can also explain why buyers sometimes selects
the higher of the two bids in the BDRA.
In order to explain buyers’ rejection behavior we have to take into ac-
count their heterogeneity in terms of their inequity aversion. A buyer’s
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inequity aversion influences his risk attitude. Intuitively, an inequity averse
buyer suffers twice when he pays a high price but receives low quality. First,
he makes a monetary loss like a purely selfish buyer. Second, he faces disad-
vantageous inequalities compared to the suppliers, that reduces his utility
further. As a consequence, a buyer with the lowest degree of inequity aver-
sion is the one who is willing to take the greatest risk and the one who
derives the highest utility from accepting. Hence, some high bids will only
be accepted by buyers that are not too inequity averse, which can explain
positive rejection rates.
Figure 3.5 displays a buyer’s expected utility as a function of the price
under the assumptions that bids do not contain information about sup-
pliers’ types and that their inequity aversion parameters βi are uniformly
distributed between [0, 3/5]. Furthermore, it is assumed that suppliers suf-
fer twice as much from disadvantageous inequality than from advantageous
inequality, i.e. λ = 2. The solid line with βB = 0 is a counterpart to Figure
3.3 that illustrates the buyer’s expected profit in our experiment. It also
illustrates the expected utility of inequity averse buyers and shows that a
buyer who is more inequity averse prefers lower prices and has a smaller
expected utility from accepting a bid.
3.4.3 BIDDING BEHAVIOR
The analysis in Section 3.2 shows that both Auction and BDRA have the
same unique low-price equilibrium outcome if suppliers are purely selfish.
In contrast to that the experiment shows that prices remain substantially
higher than predicted in the BDRA. Even though prices in the Auction are
also higher than predicted they are substantially lower than prices in the
BDRA and decrease over time.
Observation 5. Bids are substantially higher in the BDRA than in the
Auction.
The main difference between the Auction and the BDRA is that a buyer
who wants to trade selects the most attractive bid in the BDRA but has
to choose the lowest bid in the Auction. As a consequence, suppliers in the
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Figure 3.5: Buyer’s expected utility.
-4
0
-3
0
-2
0
-1
0
0
1
0
2
0
B
u
y
e
r'
s
 e
x
p
e
c
te
d
 u
ti
lit
y
10 30 50 70 90 110 130 150 170
Price
βB=0, λ=2 βB=0.1, λ=2 βB=0.2, λ=2
Notes: Displayed is the buyer’s expected utility depending on his
inequity aversion as a function of the accepted bid. It is assumed
that suppliers’ inequity aversion parameter βS
i
are uniformly dis-
tributed between 0 and 3/5 and that all participants suffer twice
as much from disadvantageous inequality than from advantageous
inequality, i.e. λ = 2.
Auction have an incentive to marginally undercut their competitor as long
as the lower bid is still accepted by the buyer. In contrast, no supplier has an
incentive to undercut nor to overbid in the BDRA if her competitor places
the buyer’s preferred bid, because any other bid would not be selected.
Without restrictions on beliefs, however, the set of possible equilibria in
the Auction and BDRA tends to be large and contains a low-price equilib-
rium as well as high-price equilibria when individuals are inequity averse.
See Propositions 3 and 4. For example, if the buyer believes that every bid
different from some bid b′ > q1 is made by purely selfish suppliers, then
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both suppliers bidding b′ and providing quality depending on their inequity
aversion can be an equilibrium both in the BDRA and in the Auction. The
game theoretic concept of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium has the only re-
quirement for beliefs that the expectations following the equilibrium bid(s)
are correct. There is thus much leeway in specifying the beliefs off the
equilibrium path, which can stabilize many high-price equilibria in both
mechanisms. This implies that our inequity aversion model can explain our
observations but has – at least in its full generality – no predictive power
with respect to differences in bidding behavior in the two mechanisms.
In order to derive testable predictions we need to impose an additional
assumption on the buyer’s belief. The above example has the property that
his belief function has a jump at the equilibrium price and suppliers are
aware of this jump. It seems to be more realistic, and that is what we
will assume in the following, that buyer’s beliefs are continuous in the bids.
This means that his belief about a supplier’s type and consequently his
expectations about the quality do not change drastically if her bid changes
only marginally. This assumption reduces the set of possible equilibria of
the Auction strongly but has no influence on the predictions for the BDRA.
In the Auction suppliers typically have an incentive to place a bid
marginally smaller than their competitor. Only if this bid is rejected or
decreases the selection probability substantially, such a deviation incentive
does not exist. The consequences are easiest to observe when we consider
a situation in which it is commonly known that the buyer is purely self-
ish. Assume that both suppliers are supposed to place a high bid that is
connected with a strictly positive expected profit for the buyer and hence
would be accepted. Then a supplier in the Auction has an incentive to un-
dercut marginally, because due to the continuity of buyer’s expected utility
the buyer will accept the smaller bid rather than refusing to trade. This
implies that the deviating supplier increases her selection probability from
one half to one and reduces her utility in case of selection only marginally,
which makes lowering the bid attractive in the first place. This incentive to
undercut is present for all high prices that correspond to a strictly positive
expected profit for the buyer. Hence, if the buyer is known to be purely self-
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ish, the only high-price equilibrium candidates are prices that are connected
to an expected profit of zero for the buyer.
If there is uncertainty about the buyer’s inequity aversion even those
high-price equilibria cannot exist in the Auction and there is a unique low-
price equilibrium in the Auction as shown in Proposition 5. The reasoning
is as follows: Given that the competitor places a high bid that would be
accepted if the buyer’s level of inequity aversion is below some threshold,
then the supplier can almost double her own selection probability by under-
cutting in the Auction. Undercutting decreases the probability that trade
takes place marginally, but if the buyer wants to trade he has to select the
lowest bid. Furthermore, the supplier’s profit in case of selection is only
marginally smaller than without undercutting. Hence, suppliers have an
incentive to undercut each other as long as the buyer’s acceptance prob-
ability is strictly positive. At some point in this undercutting process it
will be more attractive for suppliers to place a low bid and to aim at those
buyer types who do not accept high bids, because trade probability becomes
too small. Hence, only low-price equilibria exist in the Auction when the
buyer’s beliefs are continuous and the type distribution has no mass points.6
In contrast to the Auction the set of equilibria of the BDRA does not
change if only continuous beliefs are considered. A buyer who wants to
trade selects the most attractive bid and suppliers have a clear incentive
to make their bid more attractive if this increases their expected utility in
case of selection. As a consequence, equilibrium bids in the BDRA have
the property that they are at least as high as the price that maximizes the
expected utility of the most inequity averse buyer type.
Even though different buyer types might prefer different bids, their belief
function might be such that the expected utility functions of all buyer types
have the same local maximizers. Here the term local maximizer denotes a
6A mass point in the buyer’s type distribution implies that decreasing a bid
marginally can reduce the probability of trade substantially. This can in principal sta-
bilize high-price equilibria in the Auction, because it makes undercutting less attractive
for suppliers.
Such a high-price equilibrium would have two interesting properties. First, a buyer
that cares more about inequity than the mass point type does not trade. Second, the
buyer’s expected utility from accepting is zero if he is the mass point type.
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price that corresponds to a local maximizer of a buyer’s expected utility. If
this is the case, equilibrium bids are local maximizers. The same reasoning
as above rules out that bids slightly smaller than a local maximizer can
be equilibrium bids. Bids slightly larger than a local maximizer can also
not be equilibrium bids, because a supplier would then have an incentive
to place a marginally lower bid. Such a bid would be more attractive for
all buyer types and the utility in case of selection only marginally smaller.
Summing up, the inequity aversion model predicts that high-price equi-
libria might exist in the BDRA whereas only low-price equilibria exist in
the Auction if beliefs are continuous. Even if high-price equilibria exist in
the Auction suppliers bid less than in high-price equilibria of the BDRA,
which is in line with our observation in the experiment.
3.5 CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigated the possibility that binding price-based re-
verse auctions have a negative influence on the buyer-seller relationship.
We compare them to buyer-determined reverse auctions in an incomplete
contracts procurement interaction, in which the quality of the product to
procure cannot be specified in the contract.
While standard theory predicts that both procurement mechanisms yield
the same results, our data shows substantial differences between the bind-
ing auction and the buyer-determined reverse auction. We observe that the
buyer-determined reverse auction results in high prices, high quality and
more frequent trade. In contrast to that prices, quality, and trade frequency
are significantly smaller in the binding auction, which implies clear ranking
in terms of efficiency favoring the buyer-determined reverse auction. Also
with regard to profits, the BDRA was on average more profitable for both
buyers and suppliers. However, this difference is not significant because the
BDRA was also more risky for buyers. Due to high accepted bids, some
trades result in large losses when low quality was provided whereas others
are very profitable.
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We find that our observations are in agreement with theory based on
other-regarding preferences. This theory can rationalize the price and qual-
ity differences between the two procurement formats and also explains that
the share of accepted bids is smaller in the binding auction than in the
buyer-determined reverse auction. The intuition is that buyer’s commit-
ment to only consider the lowest bid in a binding auction can hinder the
implementation of the buyer’s optimal price and decreases efficiency.
3.6 APPENDICES
3.6.1 THEORY
In this section we analyze the Auction and the BDRA under the assumption
that the buyer and suppliers are inequity averse. If no trade takes place
both suppliers and the buyer have a utility of zero. Expression (3.6.1)
corresponds to the utility of the selected supplier S and (3.6.2) to that
of her competitor ¬S who is not selected. The first lines in the utility
functions reflect the utility suppliers derive from their profits. The second
lines express how much they suffer from the inequality compared to the
buyer and the third lines express how much they suffer from the inequality
compared to the other supplier. Expression (3.6.3) gives the utility of the
buyer. The first line corresponds to his profit, the second line to the utility
he derives from the comparison to the selected supplier, and the third line
corresponds to the utility he derives from the comparison to the supplier
who is not selected. Recall that the parameters βi reflect how much an
individual suffers from advantageous inequality and λ > 1 how much more
they suffer from disadvantageous inequality.
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uS =bS − c(qS)
− 1
2
[λβS ·max{qS + c(qS)− 2bS, 0}+ βS ·max{2bS − qS − c(qS), 0}]
(3.6.1)
− 1
2
[λβS ·max{c(qS)− bS, 0}+ βS ·max{bS − c(qS), 0}] ,
u¬S =0
−
1
2
[λβ¬S ·max {qS − bS, 0}) + β¬S ·max{bS − qS, 0}] (3.6.2)
−
1
2
[λβ¬S ·max{bS − c(qS), 0}+ β¬S ·max{c(qS)− bS, 0}] ,
vB =qS − bS
−
1
2
[λβB ·max {bS − qS, 0}) + βB ·max{qS − bS, 0}] (3.6.3)
−
1
2
[λβB ·max{0− qS, 0}+ βB ·max{qS, 0}] .
To account for heterogeneity among individuals we assume that the βi are
independently and identically distributed according to a continuous dis-
tribution function F : [0, 3/5] → [0, 1] without mass points and that an
individual’s type is her private information that cannot be revealed. Let
Ui[b, (βi, λ)] = Pr{selected}·uS+Pr{not selected}·u¬S denote the expected
utility of supplier i.
The expected utility of the buyer from accepting a bid bS is given by
VB[bS, (βi, λ)] =
∑7
k=1 e(q
k|bS) · vB(bS, q
k) where e(qk|bS) corresponds to the
buyer’s expectations about the probability of receiving a quality qk when
accepting a bid bS. These expectations are determined by his belief µbS .
QUALITY PROVISION After defining the game we analyze the Auc-
tion and the BDRA via backward induction starting with the selected sup-
plier’s quality decision. The selected supplier S will provide the quality
q∗S[bS, (βS, λ)] level that maximizes her utility given her bid and her inequity
aversion, i.e.
q∗[bS, (βS, λ)] = argmax
qi∈Q
uS(qi). (3.6.4)
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Obviously, higher prices and stronger aversion against advantageous in-
equality result in weakly higher quality whereas increasing aversion against
disadvantageous inequality results in weakly lower quality.
SUPPLIER SELECTION In the second stage the buyer selects his pre-
ferred bid or refuses trade if all available bids are connected with a negative
expected utility. In the Auction the buyer can only select the lower bid
whereas he is free to select the higher bid in the BDRA. A buyer who ex-
pects to receive quality qk with probability e(qk|bS) when accepting a bid
bS has an expected profit of
VB(bS) =
7∑
k=1
e(qk|bS) · vB(bS, q
k) (3.6.5)
and makes the selection decision that maximizes his expected profit.
Given that the share of suppliers who provide high quality when receiv-
ing a high price is sufficiently large the buyer’s selection crucially depends on
his beliefs about suppliers’ type distribution associated with a certain bid.
In order to satisfy the equilibrium requirements his beliefs must correspond
to the objective probabilities for all bids that are placed in equilibrium,
however, there is substantial leeway in specifying his beliefs for bids that
are not part of the equilibrium path.
One possible belief in an equilibrium in which all suppliers bid b∗ is as
follows: The buyer’s belief given the equilibrium bid b∗ is correct. This
implies that his expectations about the quality are correct, i.e. e(qk|b∗) =
Pr{qk|b∗} for all qk ∈ Q. For all other bids bj 6= b
∗ he believes to face a
purely selfish supplier and hence expects to receive minimum quality q1, i.e.
e(q1|bj) = 1.
Equilibrium analysis
We focus on pooling strategies in which all suppliers place the same bid b∗.
The idea is that selfish suppliers mimic their inequity averse competitors,
which implies that bids do not reveal information about suppliers’ types.
Due to the mentioned leeway in specifying beliefs outside the equilibrium
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path, there can be a wide variety of perfect Bayesian equilibria in both
procurement formats. We now characterize two types of possible pooling
equilibria. The low-price equilibrium and the high-price equilibrium. In a
low-price equilibrium all suppliers bid c(q1) and provide minimum quality
q1, the buyer accepts the lowest bid. In a high-price equilibrium all suppliers
bid b∗, the buyer trades if his degree of inequity aversion is sufficiently
low and the selected supplier provides the quality level that maximizes her
utility.
Proposition 3. A low-price equilibrium in which suppliers provide mini-
mum quality and their bids are equal to their costs of providing minimum
quality exists in the Auction and the BDRA.
Proof. Consider the Auction first. Suppose that all suppliers place a low
bid equal to c(q1). Then the selected supplier maximizes her utility by
providing lowest quality q1 and the buyer optimally accepts the bid. In
this case no supplier has an incentive to deviate, because there is no offer
she can make that would positively influence the payoff distribution, which
proves the existence in the Auction.
Now turn to the BDRA and suppose that the buyer expects to receive
lowest quality whenever accepting a bid b′ 6= c(q1), i.e., e(q1|b′) = 1 for all
b′ 6= c(q1). Then the buyer will only consider the lowest bid and hence the
same considerations as for the Auction apply to the BDRA.
Given that the share of fair suppliers is sufficiently large also high-price
equilibria exist in the Auction as well as in the BDRA.
Proposition 4. In the Auction and in the BDRA a high-price equilibrium,
in which all suppliers place the same bid b∗ > q1 can exist. Some prices are
only equilibrium prices in the BDRA but not in the Auction.
Proof. Consider a situation in which a high price b∗ > q1 exists that is
connected with a positive expected profit for the buyer. Assume that all
suppliers place this bid b∗ and provide the quality that maximizes their
utility in case of selection, which implies that they make strictly positive
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profits. The buyer’s belief about supplier i’s type is given by F if bi = b
∗
and he expects to face a purely selfish supplier if bi 6= b
∗. The buyer accepts
the bid b∗ if his level of inequity aversion is low and rejects it if he has a high
level of inequity aversion. Notice that given the belief only low bids between
c(q1) and q1 as well as the bid b∗ have a positive selection probability.
In the Auction the situation described above constitutes an equilibrium
if no supplier has an incentive to place a low bid. Because the buyer can only
select the lowest bid, a supplier can increase her own selection probability
by placing a low bid. However, a low bid reduces her profit in case of
selection. Thus, equilibrum prices have to be sufficiently high such that
undercutting to a low bid between c(q1) and q1 is not profitable.
In the BDRA the conditions for the existence of a high-price equilibrium
are less demanding. The main reason is that a supplier cannot rule out her
competitor’s selection by undercutting the competitors bid, because low bid
will only be selected if it is more attractive than b∗ for the buyer.
We now provide an example to illustrate that a high-price equilibrium
as described above can exist with the parameterization of our experiment.
All suppliers bid b∗ = 50 and individuals’ βi are distributed between 0 and
1/4 such that 80 percent of the suppliers provide a quality of 80 and 20
percent a quality of 15 in case of selection.
If both the buyer and suppliers suffer twice as much from disadvanta-
geous inequality than from advantageous inequality, i.e. λ = 2, the strate-
gies constitute an equilibrium both in the Auction and the BDRA. However,
if λ = 3.1 a supplier with a high level of inequity aversion has an incentive
to place a low bid in the Auction, but prefers to bid b∗ in the BDRA.
Continuous beliefs
In this section we impose a restriction on beliefs, namely that the buyer’s
beliefs are continuous in the bids. Let Gb(x) be the distribution function of
supplier’s type that corresponds to the buyer’s belief µb when he observes
a bid b.
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Definition (Continuous beliefs). Buyer’s beliefs µb are called continuous
in b if lim
ǫ→0
|Gb(x)−Gb+ǫ(x)| = 0 for all x.
In combination with a type distribution without mass points buyer’s
continuous beliefs imply that his expectations about the quality and hence
also his expected utility are continuous in the price. This refinement has
no influence on the set of equilibria in the BDRA, but shrinks the set of
equilibria of the Auction strongly.
Proposition 5. In the Auction a high-price equilibrium, in which the buyer’s
beliefs are continuous cannot exist. There is a unique low-price equilibrium
with a price c(q1).
Proof. Consider a situation in which a high price b′ > q1 exists which would
yield a positive expected profit for the buyer if the suppliers’ type distribu-
tion is the ex-ante distribution,. Assume that all suppliers place this bid b′
and provide the quality that maximizes their utility in case of selection.
We start with a simplified setting in which it is commonly known that
the buyer is purely selfish. In this case the buyer would always accept the
bid b′ and both suppliers would have a selection probability of one half. Due
to the continuity of buyer’s beliefs the bid b′ can only be an equilibrium bid
if it has the property that buyer’s expected profit from accepting is zero for
b′ and negative for all bids marginally smaller.
To see this suppose that the buyer expects a strictly positive profit
when accepting b′, then the continuity of buyer’s beliefs implies that there
also exists a price slightly below b′ the buyer would accept, because he
still expects a strictly positive profit. Hence, a supplier could make herself
strictly better off by marginally undercutting b′. This deviating supplier
doubles her selection probability to one. Moreover, she avoids the negative
utility connected with the selection of her competitor and decreases her
utility in case of selection only marginally. Only a high-price equilibrium
with an expected profit of zero for the buyer can exist, because in that case
a marginally lower bid will not be accepted.
If there is uncertainty about the buyer’s inequity aversion, even such
a high-price equilibrium cannot exist if the continuous type distribution
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function has no mass points. Suppose a high-price equilibrium exists in
which all suppliers place a high bid b′. A bid that is only selected if the buyer
is purely selfish cannot be an equilibrium bid, because it is has a selection
probability of zero. However, a high bid that is accepted by a continuum of
buyer types cannot be an equilibrium bid neither, because suppliers have
an incentive to undercut. By slightly undercutting the deviating supplier
reduces the acceptance probability and her utility in case of selection only
marginally but decreases her competitor’s selection probability to zero.
The continuity of the buyer’s beliefs in connection with the continuous
type distribution without mass points guarantees that also the probability
of trade is continuous in the bid. For this reason there is always a deviation
incentive, which proves that a high-price equilibrium cannot exist.
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3.6.2 GRAPHS AND TABLES
Figure 3.6: Evolution of prices, values and acceptance rates by groups.
0
2
5
5
0
7
5
1
0
0
0
2
5
5
0
7
5
1
0
0
0
2
5
5
0
7
5
1
0
0
0
7
5
1
5
0
2
2
5
3
0
0
0
7
5
1
5
0
2
2
5
3
0
0
0
7
5
1
5
0
2
2
5
3
0
0
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 1 5 10 15 20 25 30 1 5 10 15 20 25 30 1 5 10 15 20 25 30
Auction, Group 1
Auction, Group 2
Auction, Group 3
Auction, Group 4
Auction, Group 5
Auction, Group 6
BDRA, Group 1
BDRA, Group 2
BDRA, Group 3
BDRA, Group 4
BDRA, Group 5
BDRA, Group 6
Value Price Acceptance Rate
Value (ST) Price (ST)
A
c
c
e
p
ta
n
c
e
 R
a
te
E
C
U
Period
Notes: Displayed are the average accepted price, average provided
quality, and the average acceptance rate in the Auction and the
BDRA over time. Additionally standard theory predictions for
price and quality are provided.
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Table 3.5: Logit panel regression of acceptance probability.
Acceptance probability
BDRA BDRA
Highest bid -0.00751 -0.00680
(0.00468) (0.00604)
Period -0.0870*** -0.0413*
(0.0175) (0.0237)
Qualityt−1 0.00784***
(0.00280)
Pricet−1 0.00893
(0.00772)
Constant 3.732*** 1.390
(0.892) (0.974)
Observations 540 374
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
The regression reported in the first column estimates the influence
of the value of the highest bid and the current period on buyer’s
acceptance probability taking all interactions into account. The
regression in the second column takes also the quality the buyer
received and the price he paid in the former period. The number
of observations in this regression is smaller because only those
acceptance decisions are considered where the buyer traded in the
period before.
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3.6.3 INSTRUCTIONS
This section provides the instructions in German (original) and English
(translated).
ANLEITUNG ZUM EXPERIMENT  
 
Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme am Experiment. Bitte sprechen Sie bis zum Ende 
des Experiments nicht mehr mit anderen Teilnehmern. 
 
Dieses Experiment besteht aus 30 Runden, die jeweils die gleiche Abfolge an 
Entscheidungen haben. Die Abfolge der Entscheidungen wird unten ausführlich 
erklärt. Es gibt im Experiment 2 Rollen: Käufer und Zulieferer. Zu Beginn des 
Experiments bekommen Sie eine dieser Rollen zufällig zugelost und behalten diese 
Rolle für das gesamte Experiment. Auf dem ersten Bildschirm des Experiments sehen 
Sie, welche Rolle Sie haben. Unabhängig von Ihrer Rolle erhalten Sie eine 
Anfangsausstattung von 250 ECU. 
 
Überblick über die Entscheidungen in einer Runde 
Zu Beginn jeder Periode werden zufällig Gruppen bestehend aus einem Käufer und 
zwei Zulieferern gebildet. Anschließend macht jeder Zulieferer ein Preisangebot, zu 
dem er bereit ist, das Gut zur Verfügung zu stellen.  
[Treatment 1: “Der Zulieferer mit dem kleinsten Preisangebot gewinnt die Auktion. 
Der Käufer sieht nun dieses Preisangebot und kann darüber entscheiden, ob er das 
Angebot annimmt oder ablehnt.“] 
[Treatment 2: “Der Käufer sieht nun diese Preisangebote und kann darüber 
entscheiden, ob er eines der Angebote annimmt oder beide ablehnt.“] 
Das angenommene Preisangebot ist der Preis. Der ausgewählte Zulieferer 
entscheidet abschließend über die Qualität des Gutes, das er dem Käufer bereitstellt.   
  
Der Gewinn des Käufers 
Der Gewinn des Käufers hängt von dessen Wertschätzung für das Gut und dem Preis 
von diesem ab. Der Wert des Gutes wird durch seine Qualität bestimmt. Je höher die 
Qualität, desto größer der Wert. Den genauen Zusammenhang zwischen Qualität und 
Wert finden Sie in der folgenden Tabelle 
 
 
 
 
 
Gewinn des Käufers = Wert des Gutes - Preis 
 
 
Der Gewinn der Zulieferer 
Nur der ausgewählte Zulieferer macht Gewinn. Der andere Zulieferer macht einen 
Gewinn von 0. Der Gewinn des ausgewählten Zulieferers wird bestimmt durch den 
Preis und die Qualitätsentscheidung des Zulieferers. Je höher die Qualität, desto 
größer die Produktionskosten. Den genauen Zusammenhang zwischen Qualität und 
Kosten finden Sie in der folgenden Tabelle 
 
Qualität 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Kosten in ECU 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
   
Gewinn des ausgewählten Zulieferers = Preis - Kosten 
Qualität 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wert in ECU 15 80 130 180 220 250 270 
 Auszahlung 
Am Ende des Experiments wird die Summe aus Ihren Gewinnen in den einzelnen 
Perioden gebildet und zu Ihrer Anfangsausstattung von 250 ECU hinzuaddiert. 
Anschließend wird dieser Gewinn in Euro umgerechnet, dabei entsprechen 50 ECU 
einem Euro. Bitte beachten Sie, dass auch negative Gewinne, also Verluste, möglich 
sind und diese bei der Auszahlung berücksichtigt werden. 
 
Sollten Sie Fragen zum Ablauf des Experiments haben, signalisieren Sie dies 
bitte dem Experimentator durch Handzeichen. 
INSTRUCTIONS  
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please do not talk to other participants 
until the end of this experiment. 
  
This experiment consists of 30 rounds. In each of this round you are in the same 
situation. The situation will be explained to you in detail. There are two roles in this 
experiment: Buyer and Supplier. At the beginning of the experiment one of these 
roles is randomly assigned to you and you keep the role during the experiment. You 
see your role on the first screen of the experiment. Independent of your role you will 
receive an initial endownment of 250 ECU. 
 
Overview of the decisions in one round 
At the beginning of each round groups consisting of one buyer and two suppliers are 
randomly determined. Then each supplier places a bid at which he is willing to 
provide the good.  
[Treatment 1: “The supplier who placed the lowest bid wins the auction. The buyer 
observes this bid and can decide whether he wants to accept or reject the offer.“] 
[Treatment 2: “The buyer observes the bids and decides whether he wants to accept 
one of the bids or to rejects both. “] 
The accepted bid determines the price. The selected supplier then decides about the 
quality of the good he provides to the buyer. 
  
Buyer’s profit 
The buyer’s profit depends on his valuation for the good and its price. The valuation 
is determined by its quality. The higher the quality the higher the valuation. The exact 
correlation between quality and valuation is given in the following table 
 
Buyer’s profit = Value - Price 
Supplier’s profit 
Only the selected supplier makes a profit. The other supplier makes a profit of 0. The 
profit of the selected supplier is determined by the price and the supplier’s quality 
decision. The higher the quality the higher the cost of production. The exact 
correlation between quality and cost is given in the following table 
 
Quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cost in ECU 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
   
Selected supplier’s profit = Price - Cost 
Payment 
At the end of the experiment the sum of your profits in each round is added to your 
initial endownment of 250 ECU. Then your profit will be displayed in Euros. 50 ECU 
are equivalent to 1 Euro. Please have in mind that negative profits, i.e. losses, are 
possible and will be considered for the payment. 
  
If you have questions, please raise your hand. 
Quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Value in ECU 15 80 130 180 220 250 270 
chapter 4
PREFERENCES AND DECISION SUPPORT IN
COMPETITIVE BIDDING
Abstract
We examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed-bid and Dutch
auctions, which are strategically equivalent under standard prefer-
ences. We investigate whether the empirical breakdown of this equiv-
alence is due to (non-standard) preferences or due to the different
complexity of the two formats (i.e., a different level of mathemat-
ical/individual sophistication needed to derive the optimal bidding
strategy). We first elicit measures of individual preferences and then
manipulate the degree of complexity by offering various levels of
decision support. Our results show that the equivalence of the two
auction formats only breaks down in the absence of decision support.
This indicates that the empirical breakdown is caused by differing
complexity between the two formats rather than non-standard pref-
erences.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The first-price sealed-bid auction (FSPBA) and the Dutch auction (DA) are
two of the most frequently used auction formats. With slight variations,
both the FPSBA and the DA generate billions of dollars in revenue each
year.1 Governments and private firms frequently use the FPSBA for pro-
curement in construction and to subcontract with suppliers. Federal banks
and firms use variants of the DA to sell securities and refinance credit. The
1In an FPSBA, bidders simultaneously submit “sealed” bids to the seller and the
highest bidder receives the object and pays his bid. In a DA, the seller starts at a high
initial ask price and gradually decreases the ask price until the first bidder stops the
auction, receives the item, and pays the stop price.
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DA is also used in initial public offerings (e.g., Google Inc.) as an alterna-
tive to classic valuation by investment banks.2 Furthermore, the DA can
be found on fish and fresh-produce markets (e.g., Cassady, 1967).
Theory suggests that the FPSBA and the DA yield the same revenue as
both formats are strategically equivalent. However, this strong theoretical
result breaks down empirically. Previous research suggests three possible
explanations: opportunity costs (Carare and Rothkopf, 2005; Katok and
Kwasnica, 2007), preferences (Weber, 1982; Nakajima, 2011; Lange and
Ratan, 2010; Belica and Ehrhart, 2013; Ehrhart and Ott, 2014), and com-
plexity of the decision (Cox et al., 1983). We analyze the role of preferences
and complexity while controlling for opportunity costs. Our results indi-
cate that the non-equivalence is driven by the difference in complexity of
competitive bidding in the two auction formats rather than by individual
(non-standard) preferences.
The empirical breakdown of this equivalence is a robust observation in
experimental settings both in the laboratory and in the field. However, the
direction of the deviation is non-conclusive. On the one hand, Coppinger
et al. (1980) and Cox et al. (1982a) find that the FPSBA yields higher
revenue than the DA in a controlled laboratory setting. On the other hand,
in a field experiment on an Internet auction platform, Lucking-Reiley (1999)
finds that the DA generates higher revenue than the FPSBA.
Differences in opportunity costs can explain these differences. In a DA,
bidders have an incentive to accept a high price and stop the auction early,
because they have to frequently monitor the price clock or even have to
physically return to the auction site to check for updates in prices as long
as the auction is running. Such costs do not occur in the (static) FPSBA
which ends immediately after the (simultaneous) submission of bids.
Carare and Rothkopf (2005) show theoretically that such increased op-
portunity costs increase the optimal bid. In a DA, Cox et al. (1983) and
Katok and Kwasnica (2007) analyze the trade-off between opportunity costs
2Note, however, that these examples typically auction off multiple units and that the
auctions are then modified such that they usually do not discriminate between different
bidders but apply a uniform-pricing rule.
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and additional utility from suspense, i.e., from a joy of gambling. Both arti-
cles provide evidence that increasing opportunity costs by increasing payoffs
or by decreasing the clock speed, respectively, increases bids in a DA. In
contrast to their approach, our goal is to assess the predictive power of differ-
ent preference-based theories for observed bidding and to analyze the effect
of complexity. Hence, we eliminate confounding differences in opportunity
costs by holding the time per auction format and thus the opportunity costs
from participation constant. In addition, we hold the action set, i.e., the
set of feasible bids, constant across the two formats which allows a direct
comparison of the two auctions.
In the absence of opportunity costs, the strategic-equivalence result rests
on the assumption that bidders have standard preferences, i.e., they derive
utility only from realized personal payoffs. In addition, the utility function
is global in the sense that the effect of wealth changes does not depend
on whether such changes occur in the gain or loss domain or whether they
are certain or generated by a lottery. With regard to the departures from
standard preferences, we study expectations-based reference-dependent and
Allais-type preferences. We focus on these two specifications because they
are frequently used to explain decision making under uncertainty.3
Under reference dependence, the bidder compares gains and losses in
wealth relative to a reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In this
comparison, the bidder is assumed to be loss averse and puts more weight
on negative deviations from this reference point (losses) than on equiva-
lent positive deviations (gains). Loss aversion contradicts the global-utility
assumption of standard preferences because the bidder considers changes
in wealth with respect to a local reference point. The specification of the
reference point is subject to debate. Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006, KR) pro-
pose expectations-based reference dependence, i.e., the reference point is
stochastic and given by the rational expectations that the individual holds
3Reference dependence as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is the most
cited theory on risky decision making (Kim et al., 2006). Allais-type preferences are an
early critique of expected utility theory (EUT) (Allais, 1953) and are empirically very
robust in explaining deviations from predictions under standard preferences (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Camerer, 1989; Weber, 2007).
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over the outcomes of a risky decision. In the following, we will denote
expectations-based reference-dependent preferences as KR preferences.
Individuals with Allais-type (AT) preferences prefer outcomes that are
generated with certainty to the same outcomes that are generated by a
risky lottery (e.g., Andreoni and Sprenger, 2010). This difference is most
prevalent in the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953). Here, subjects prefer a de-
generate lottery over a risky one with a higher expected value but reverse
their choice if both lotteries are monotonically transformed and become
both risky (the so-called common-ratio effect, CRE). This reversal is in-
consistent with standard preferences as it violates the crucial independence
axiom of EUT (Savage, 1954; Anscombe and Aumann, 1963). According to
this axiom, decisions between lotteries should not depend on consequences
that do not differ between the lotteries.
We make use of data from a two-stage experiment in which we first elicit
the preferences of all subjects that participate in our experiment. In this
first stage, we utilize the procedure of Abdellaoui et al. (2007) and elicit
individual preferences in a fully non-parametric procedure, i.e., without
imposing any assumption on the functional form of utility. Furthermore
we measure to what extent participants exhibit Allais-type preferences by
utilizing a metric version of the CRE (e.g., Beattie and Loomes, 1997; Dean
and Ortoleva, 2014; Schmidt and Seidl, 2014).
Preference theories assume Bayesian rationality in the sense that bidders
derive and process probabilities correctly. However, bidding in auctions can
be a demanding problem. In deriving the optimal bid, the bidder faces a
trade-off between increasing his winning probability by submitting a higher
bid and increasing his winning profit by submitting a lower bid. Individual
preferences determine the optimal bid that balances these diametric effects.
However, this optimization requires a certain level of mathematical sophis-
tication. It is thus possible that the observed differences between bidding
behavior is due to different levels of complexity of the two auction formats.
In other words, bidders can make mistakes, e.g., in deriving the winning
probability associated with their bid, and these mistakes might differ be-
tween the two formats.
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We design a decision support system (DSS) to reduce the complexity
and assist bidders in deriving the optimal bid that corresponds to their in-
dividual preferences. We vary the auction format within-subjects and the
level of decision support between-subjects. Subjects either have no decision
support (No DSS treatment) or they have medium (Medium DSS treat-
ment) or full support (Full DSS treatment) to assist bidding. The decision
support system is a computerized overlay displaying additional information.
Medium DSS shows the winning probability whereas Full DSS additionally
provides expected profits. Although this information is redundant for fully
rational decision makers, it is non-trivial to derive and providing such in-
formation greatly reduces the complexity of optimal bidding.
The increase in the use of auctions has led to a rise in the demand for
expert services. While our implementation of decision support is primarily
a mean to analyze the role of complexity in competitive bidding, the design
of such DSS is also of interest in itself. Several patents have been filed for
(automated) bid-advising systems that account for, e.g., the auction struc-
ture and risk attitudes of rival bidders based on historical data.4 Our DSS
implementation resembles such automated bidding advice that estimates
competitors’ bidding behavior in a given auction format. In addition, there
is an increasing number of consulting firms specializing in auctions (e.g.,
Market Design Inc.) and major economic consulting companies offer ser-
vices regarding auctions and bidding (e.g., The Brattle Group, NERA).
These services typically include all aspects relevant for setting up and par-
ticipating in auctions (e.g., bid tracking, bidding strategy, auction rules and
design, training, provision of input to regulators).
Our results highlight the role of decision support systems. In line with
the literature, we find significant differences between auction formats if bid-
ders do not receive decision support. However, differences vanish between
participants once we provide decision support. This indicates that the ob-
served differences in bidding behavior between the FPSBA and the DA
are due to different levels of complexity rather than non-standard prefer-
ences. In addition, our tests show that bidding behavior strongly depends
4See, for example, Guler et al. (2002, 2003, 2009); Zhang and Guler (2013).
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on participants’ risk aversion. The influence of individual loss aversion and
Allais-type preferences is not significant and cannot explain differences in
bidding behavior. Our results thus highlight that from a consulting per-
spective, it seems to be more important to support decision makers in the
derivation of optimal bidding strategies than to focus on the choice of the
auction format.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the model
environment and theoretically analyzes the effect of different preference
specifications on optimal bidding in the FPSBA and the DA. Section 4.3
presents our experimental design and our implementation of decision sup-
port. We report our results in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 THEORY
In this section, we first describe the two auction mechanisms. We then
characterize the equilibria in both auction formats for standard preferences
(SP), Ko¨szegi-Rabin (KR) preferences, and Allais-type (AT) preferences.
We analyze the optimal bidding behavior of one bidder given a bidding
strategy of the competitor.
In both auction formats, two bidders compete for one indivisible item
and the highest bidder wins. Let P = {p1, . . . , pn} be a discrete price grid.
In the FPSBA, each bidder places a bid b ∈ P at which he is willing to
buy the item. In the DA, each bidder decides for every ask a ∈ P whether
to accept it or not. In the FPSBA, the price corresponds to the highest
bid, whereas in the DA, it corresponds to the highest accepted ask. The
winning bidder receives the item and pays the price. If the bidder does not
win the auction, he does not receive the item and does not pay anything.5
In both auction formats bidders face a trade-off between improving their
probability of winning and increasing their profit in case of winning.
To derive the equilibrium bidding strategy in the discrete FPSBA, we
follow Cai et al. (2010). For the dynamic course of the DA, we adopt the
modeling approach of Bose and Daripa (2009). In the DA, the seller starts
5Ties are broken at random with equal probability to receive the item.
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the auction with the highest ask pn. She then approaches each bidder
sequentially asking whether or not the bidder accepts that ask. Which
bidder is asked first is randomly determined at the beginning of each offer.
Each bidder has the same chance to be asked first. In case that the bidder
who is asked first rejects the offer, the seller offers the same ask to the other
bidder.
4.2.1 STANDARD PREFERENCES
The term standard preferences covers all preferences that are purely outcome-
based and only consider the own payoff. This means an individual has stan-
dard preferences if the utility function is global and only depends on one’s
own payoff (DellaVigna, 2009).
Proposition 6 (Standard Preferences). The FPSBA and the DA are strate-
gically equivalent, which implies that they yield the same revenue (Vickrey,
1961).
The crucial observation to this result is that the information revealed
during the descending of the price clock in the DA does not change the
trade-off between a bidder’s winning probability and his profit in case of
winning. Suppose a bidder bids b = pk in an FPSBA. This bidder enters a
DA with the plan to accept the ask a = pk, because the ex-ante problem
is identical for the two formats. As the price clock is approaching pk, two
things may happen. First, the competitor accepts an ask greater than pk. In
this case, the auction ends and the bidder cannot react to this information.
Second, the price continues to fall which increases the probability to win.
However, the marginal trade-off stays the same. This is due to the fact that
a bidder derives his optimal bidding strategy under the assumption that he
has the highest valuation. Hence, the bidder sticks to his plan and waits
for the ask pk.
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4.2.2 EXPECTATIONS-BASED REFERENCE POINTS
In contrast to individuals with standard preferences, an individual with
reference-dependent preferences does not only care about his absolute pay-
off, but also compares the outcome to a reference point. Therefore, the
utility function of such a bidder consists of two parts. First, the term u(x)
corresponds to utility derived from payoff x as under standard preferences.
Second, the term n(x, r) corresponds to gain-loss utility that evaluates the
outcome x against a reference level r (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Fol-
lowing the approach of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) the gain-loss utility is
defined piece-wise as
n(x, r) = µ (u(x)− u(r)) ,
where
µ(z) :=


ηz if z > 0
ηλz if z ≤ 0.
Here η > 0 determines how important the relative component is compared
to the absolute payoff. Furthermore, λ represents the level of loss aversion
which weighs negative deviation from the reference point (losses) relative
to positive deviations (gains). If λ > 1, the bidder is loss averse, i.e., losses
hurt him more than equally sized gains please him. If λ = 1, the agent
is loss-neutral, and if λ < 1, the agent is gain-seeking. Total utility is the
sum of both parts and given by uKR(x, r) = u(x) + n(x, r). We follow the
literature and focus on the effect of loss aversion by assuming that utility
of payoff u(x) is linear. Hence, gain-loss utility n(x, r) is a two-piece linear
function.
Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) assume that the reference point is stochastic
and formed by the rational expectations of the bidder. They introduce the
concept of a personal equilibrium which requires that the bidder has ratio-
nal expectations about his own behavior and behaves consistently with his
plans. Specifically, they propose that the bidder evaluates each possible
outcome x under the winning probability Pr(x|b) against all other possi-
ble outcomes under this distribution. This modification has recently been
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successful in describing various empirical observations from laboratory en-
dowment effects to labor supply in the field (e.g., Sprenger, 2010; Ericson
and Fuster, 2011; Crawford and Meng, 2011).
Proposition 7 (Expectations-based reference point). A revenue ranking
of the FPSBA and the Dutch auction is not possible.
In the FPSBA, loss aversion implies that bidders want to reduce the
difference between the payoff in case of winning and in case of losing the
auction. As a consequence, subjects with a higher degree of loss aversion
place higher bids than less loss-averse subjects. In the FPSBA, there ex-
ists an almost everywhere unique optimal bidding strategy (Eisenhuth and
Ewers, 2012).
In contrast to the FPSBA, there might be several consistent bidding
strategies in the DA. For example, it may be optimal for a subject to ac-
cept a high offer p if it planned to do so, whereas it is optimal for the
same subject to wait for a smaller offer p′ if her initial plan was to ac-
cept only a small offer p′. Different plans induce different reference points
and thereby different optimal bidding strategies. Since several reasonable
reference points can exist in the DA, we do not get a unique bidding pre-
diction but a set of optimal bidding strategies. Applying a refinement and
identifying the bidding strategy with the highest expected utility might not
be possible as the optimality of a bidding strategy can change during the
dynamic course of the auction (Ehrhart and Ott, 2014).
As shown in the Appendix 4.6.2, it may well be the case that for a given
valuation the lowest optimal bid in the DA is lower than the optimal bid
in the FPA, whereas the highest optimal bid in the DA is higher than the
optimal bid in the FPA. As a consequence, a revenue ranking is not possible
in general.
4.2.3 ALLAIS-TYPE PREFERENCES
Allais-type preferences violate the independence (or substitution) axiom,
which is essential for EUT (Allais, 1953; Savage, 1954; Anscombe and Au-
mann, 1963). The independence axiom states that an individual who is
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indifferent between two lotteries should also be indifferent between these
lotteries if the probabilities of both lotteries are multiplied by ρ ∈ (0, 1].
That is, if one scales the probabilities of both lotteries by a common ra-
tio, the preference ordering is not affected under EUT. Grimm and Schmidt
(2000) show that this independence requirement is a necessary and sufficient
condition for strategic equivalence between the FPSBA and the DA.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) report that subjects have a preference
for certainty, i.e., outcomes in a degenerate lottery. In their experiment,
a majority of individuals reveals that they prefer a degenerate lottery over
a risky one but reverse this choice if both lotteries are scaled by ρ such
that both now become risky. Thus, participants violate the independence
requirement. This so-called “Allais paradox” (Allais, 1953) is empirically
very robust, although reverse Allais-type preferences (i.e., a preference for
risky outcomes if a certain outcome is available) have also been observed
experimentally (Camerer, 1989; Weber, 2007).
Proposition 8 (Allais-type preferences). The DA yields higher revenue
than the FPSBA if bidders have Allais-type preferences. The FPSBA gen-
erates higher revenue if bidders have reverse Allais-type preferences (Weber,
1982; Nakajima, 2011).
The intuition is that the current price in the DA is augmented by a
psychological premium for certainty for individuals with Allais-type pref-
erences. This premium makes it more attractive to accept a high price in
the DA than in the FPSBA in which all bids imply uncertainty. In other
words, the DA offers a certain payoff in the given round against a risky
lottery (prices in future rounds), whereas the FPSBA only offers a risky
lottery.6
6We note that this overbidding only works given our organization of the DA, because
we resolve the order in which the seller approaches the two bidders at the beginning of
each period. If we had broken ties at random after each round, which is frequently done
in DA implementations, the current price would actually be risky as well and Allais-type
preferences would coincide with standard preferences.
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4.3 EXPERIMENT
In this section, we first introduce our experimental design and then review
previous research that examines the equivalence of the first-price sealed-bid
auction and the Dutch auction experimentally.
4.3.1 DESIGN
Each subject participated in 18 FPSBA and 18 DA. Each auction consists
of one participant and one bidding robot as bidders. The valuations of the
participant are drawn from the set {6, 10, 14, 18, 22, 26, 30, 34, 38} EUR. In
each format, every participant is assigned each valuation twice in order
to make participants’ bidding behavior as comparable as possible. The
bidding robot draws one price from P = {0, 1, . . . , 21} EUR according to
a uniform distribution. This realization is the robot’s bid in the FPSBA
and its stopping price in the DA. We use a bidding robot as the competitor
for three reasons. First, we do not want our results to be confounded
by other-regarding preferences that are not considered in any of the models
presented in Section 4.2. Second, we effectively reduce the strategic problem
to a decision problem by fixing the strategy of the competitor. This makes
it easier for subjects to focus on their optimal strategy by breaking the
dynamics of higher-order beliefs.7 Third, we are able to precisely calculate
the winning probability and the expected profit. The provision of this
information depends on the DSS treatment status.
Auction formats
In our experiment, we analyze the following two auction formats:
• FPSBA In the FPSBA, the computer screen informs the participants
about their valuation and features a testing area. In this area, par-
ticipants can explore the consequences of a particular bid on their
7Note that most work that analyzes strategic interaction in auctions assumes that
subjects’ preferences are common knowledge and that only valuations are private infor-
mation. However, one cannot ensure common knowledge in reality.
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profit and, depending on the DSS treatment, on the winning prob-
ability and the expected profit (see below). Participants are further
informed about the remaining time of the current round. Finally, they
enter their actual bid and submit this bid by pressing a button. After
submitting their bid, participants are immediately informed whether
they have won the auction and about the remaining time the current
auction lasts. When the round has timed out, a feedback screen in-
forms the subjects about their valuations, the winning bid, whether
or not they received the item, and their profit for the this round.
• DA In the DA, the computer screen informs participants about their
valuation and displays the current price, the time until the next price,
and the next price. As in the FPSBA, participants are informed about
their profit given both the current and the next price. Depending on
the DSS treatment, participants are also informed about the probabil-
ity to be offered the current price and the next price as well as the as-
sociated expected profits (see below). Finally, participants can accept
the current price by pressing a button. After either the participant or
the computer bidder has accepted the current price, participants are
immediately informed whether they have won the auction and about
the remaining time the current auction lasts. When the round has
timed out, participants receive the same feedback as in the FPSBA.
Decision support system
The theoretical analysis on the role of preferences in Section 4.2 highlights
the fact that deriving the optimal bid depends on the following aspects: (i)
the profit from winning with the chosen bid, vi−bi, (ii) the probability to win
with the chosen bid, Pr (win|bi), and (iii) the expected utility derived from
the combination of the former two. The latter depends on the individual
preferences whereas the former two are identical across all theories. Hence,
we design a DSS that assists the bidder by providing (i) the profit from
winning, (ii) the winning probability, and (iii) the expected profit which is
the product of (i) and (ii).
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Any deviation from bidding predictions can result from two sources: an
omitted preference specification or problems in deriving the optimal bid.
Our DSS allows us to disentangle the role of preferences from the impact
of a lack of mathematical sophistication (complexity). This is because in
the experiment, we fix the bidding strategy of the competitor and hence
reduce the strategic problem of finding mutual best responses to the prob-
lem of finding a one-sided best response (i.e., an optimization or decision
problem). We can thus objectively state expected profits and winning prob-
abilities that should help participants derive the bid that maximizes the
expected utility based on their actual preference specification. In other
words, we implement the DSS to analyze whether observed bids are due to
the underlying preferences or the complexity of the auction.
Specifically, the DSS varies between participants regarding the informa-
tion a bidder receives during an auction. There are three nested levels of
DSS: No, Medium, and Full DSS. In the FPSBA, the information is given
for the current test bid. In the DA, the information is given for both the
current and the next price. We vary the information content of the DSS
between participants. The information content in each condition is as fol-
lows:
• No DSS In the FPSBA, subjects see the profit if bid is successful
which is the profit their test bid would generate given that they won
the auction. In the DA, subjects see the profit at given price which is
the profit they would make if they accept the current price or if they
now decide to accept the next price.
• Medium DSS Subjects have the same information as in No DSS.
In addition, in the FPSBA, they also see the winning probability of
their test bid which is the probability of having a higher bid than
the competitor plus the probability of having the same bid and being
selected as winner by the tie-breaking rule. In the DA, subjects receive
the probability to be offered the given price for both the current and the
next price. The probability to receive the current price pk is trivially
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given by 1. However, the probability to be offered the next ask, H ik,
is highly non-trivial to derive (see Section 4.6.2 for details).
• Full DSS Subjects have the same information as in Medium DSS.
In addition, in the FPSBA, they also see the expected profit of their
test bid. In the DA, subjects see the expected profit of the next price.
In the FPSBA, the expected profit is the product of the winning
probability and the profit if the bid is successful. In the DA, the
expected profit is the product of the probability to be offered the
given price and the profit at the given price.
We are not aware of any other work that incorporates decision support
in auctions. Armantier and Treich (2009) elicit both subjective probabilities
and risk preferences in an attempt to find an explanation for overbidding
in experimental first-price auctions. The authors report that participants
underestimate their winning probability and overbid. Furthermore, they
investigate the effect of a feedback system regarding winning probabilities.
The feedback is implemented as follows. Participants are asked to predict
their winning probability and they are given feedback regarding the preci-
sion of their prediction at the end of each round. As such, their feedback
system is designed to induce learning whereas learning is not necessary in
our setup as participants are given support before (FPSBA) or during (DA)
the auction. They show that overbidding is reduced if their feedback system
is in place.
Subjects
Table 4.1 provides an overview of participants characteristics in the different
treatments.
Risk aversion is measured as the are under the curve on the gain domain,
i.e. the integral of the estimated utility function on the gain domain. We
normalize the domain of utility to [0,1] by dividing each elicited gain by
the maximum gain. We interpolate linearly between the elicited points and
use a geometric approach to calculate the area. In case of risk aversion the
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measure is smaller 0.5. A risk seeking individual has a measure larger than
0.5 and a risk neutral subject has a measure equal to 0.5.
Loss aversion relates the slope of utility in the gain domain to its slope
in the loss domain. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) define loss aversion by
−u(−x) > u(x) for every x > 0. We measure the coefficient of loss aversion
as the mean of −u(−x)/u(x) for all elicited values x.
Allais-type preferences are measured by metric measure of the common-
ratio effect (CRE) to assess the preference reversal due to violations of the
independence axiom. Participants exhibiting the common-ratio effect show
a preference reversal such that, they have a preference for certain outcomes.
Participants with a CRE of 0 are consistent with expected utility theory, a
CRE larger zero indicates Allais-type preferences and subjects with a CRE
smaller zero have reverse Allais-type preferences.
Subjects’ numeracy is rated according to a combination of the Schwartz
et al. (1997) and the Berlin Numercy Test that assess the understanding of
fundamental concepts of probability. Subjects have to answer seven ques-
tions and the variable numeracy reflects how many of these questions were
answered correctly.
Table 4.1: Summary statistics by treatment
Treatment No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS
First format FPSBA DA FPSBA DA FPSBA DA p-value
Risk aversion 0.461 0.466 0.499 0.528 0.441 0.526 0.52
(0.167) (0.105) (0.106) (0.140) (0.143) (0.103)
Loss aversion 1.842 1.396 1.673 1.352 2.088 1.407 0.08
(0.860) (0.474) (0.713) (0.506) (0.842) (0.450)
Allais-type 2 2.714 3.857 3.667 4.333 2.267 0.90
(13.90) (2.301) (4.605) (6.199) (9.566) (18.25)
Numeracy 4.333 4.714 3.929 4.833 4.167 4.867 0.24
(1.291) (2.199) (1.141) (1.267) (1.403) (0.990)
Participants 15 14 14 12 12 15
Notes: Reported are means of each variable with standard deviation in paren-
theses. The last column presents the results of a Kruskal-Wallis tests for the
equality of populations.
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Organization
The auctions were the second stage of the experiment. In the first stage,
which was conducted one week before the second, participants’ preferences
were elicited. Detailed results are reported in Zeppenfeld (2015).8 Both
stages of the experiment were conducted in the Cologne Laboratory for
Economic Research (CLER) at the University of Cologne, Germany.9 Using
the recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), we invited a random sample
of the CLER’s subject pool via email. The whole experiment was comput-
erized using the programming environment z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007b).
In both stages, payoffs were stated in Euros (EUR). Participants were
paid out in private for the entire course of experimentation after the com-
pletion of the second stage. In the second stage, one auction of each auction
format was randomly chosen to be payoff-relevant. All 82 participants were
paid their total net earnings, i.e., their earnings from the auctions and their
earnings from first stage of the experiment. The average payoff for the en-
tire experiment was 36.63 EUR corresponding to approx. 45.54 USD at the
time of the payment.10
4.3.2 OPPORTUNITY COSTS AND ACTION SETS
Previous research argues that differences between the two mechanisms come
from the heterogeneous organization of the two auctions. The FPSBA is
faster, as it only requires to place simultaneous bids and the winner can be
announced immediately after all bids are collected. The DA, on the other
hand, requires a certain time interval for the clock to reach the desired price
level of an individual bidder. Hence, a bidder in a DA faces substantial
waiting costs. Carare and Rothkopf (2005) analyze the effect of transaction
8The first stage of the experiment was the same for all participants and participants
only learned their earnings of the first part until the very end of the entire experiment,
i.e., after they completed the second stage.
9See www.lab.uni-koeln.de.
10The first stage elicited preference parameters across gains and losses. Total net
payoffs across the entire experiment range from −3.00 EUR (−3.73 USD) to 98.45 EUR
(122.41 USD). The one subject who accumulated negative payoffs paid in cash at the
end of experiment.
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costs that accrue from the necessity to return to the auction site to check
whether the desired price level has been reached. Not surprisingly, facing
these additional costs, a bidder is willing to stop the auction at a higher
price to avoid the need to return to the auction site.
Cox et al. (1983) and Katok and Kwasnica (2007) analyze the following
trade-off experimentally. Despite the fact that bidders face transaction
and/or opportunity costs from slow DA’s, they also enjoy the “waiting
game”, as it implies a certain level of suspense. Cox et al. (1983) do not
find that tripling payoffs, and therewith increasing the opportunity costs of
playing the waiting game, significantly increases bids in a DA. Hence, they
reject the hypothesis of “suspense utility”. Katok and Kwasnica (2007) find
that increasing the clock time, i.e., the time between consecutive price ticks,
significantly increases bids in a DA. Slow clocks increase opportunity costs
which have to be paid no matter if the bidder wins the auction or not.
Katok and Kwasnica (2007) note that in the laboratory, these opportunity
costs correspond most likely to participants’ value of leaving the laboratory
earlier. Hence, a bidder is willing to accept a higher ask to reduce the time
to complete the experiment and save opportunity costs.
We account for opportunity costs in two ways. First, we hold opportu-
nity costs constant across treatments. We follow Turocy et al. (2007) and
keep the time per mechanism constant. This means that we fix the absolute
time per mechanism irrespective of how fast participants decide (FPSBA)
or how early they stop (DA). One round of bidding in the FPSBA always
lasts 60 seconds.11 One round of bidding in the DA always lasts 220 seconds,
i.e., ten seconds per price tick (see below for a motivation). If a participant
accepts a current ask, he wins the auction, but the next round does not
start before the 220 seconds are over.12 Second, all subjects play both the
FPSBA and the DA.
11If participants do not enter a valid bid by the end of this time limit, they do not
participate in the auction in that round.
12In both mechanisms, after the auction has ended, participants see a screen showing
the remaining time until the round is completed and whether or not they have won the
auction.
4. PREFERENCES AND DECISION SUPPORT IN COMPETITIVE
BIDDING 100
Katok and Kwasnica (2007) show that the clock speed has great impact
on the bids in a DA due to the implied differences in opportunity costs.
Because we hold opportunity costs constant, this is not an argument in our
experiment. Participants in the FPSBA have 60 seconds to arrive at a bid
that balances the trade-off between the winning probability and the profit
in case of winning. We determine the clock speed in the DA based on two
considerations. On the one hand, the trade-off between two consecutive
price ticks in a DA is easier to compute and participants should need less
time. On the other hand, we have to provide some time for the reference
point to form. We therefore decide on a clock speed of ten seconds. This
is the same clock speed as in the middle treatment in Katok and Kwasnica
(2007). However, in contrast to their experiment subjects cannot reduce the
duration of the DA in our experiment, as each DA lasts for 220 seconds.
In addition to controlling opportunity costs, we also hold action sets
constant across the two mechanisms. In Cox et al. (1983), participants’
bids are rounded to the next feasible bid in the DA. Participants can then
either confirm or alter this rounded bid. In Katok and Kwasnica (2007),
participants can bid integers in the FPSBA, whereas price decrements in the
DA were five tokens. In contrast, in our design, participants in the FPSBA
face the same set of possible prices as in the DA. This is a direct transfer of
our model environment to the laboratory and ensures strict comparability
between the two mechanisms.
4.4 RESULTS
In this section, we report the results of the second stage of our laboratory
experiment and focus on the comparison of the FPSBA and the DA. We
only consider winning bids, because we only observe a participant’s bid in
the DA if a participant stopped the auction and won. In order to derive a
one-dimensional measure of individual bidding behavior, we first conduct
OLS regressions without constants for each participant. Regressing without
a constant corresponds to the assumption that a bidder with a valuation
of zero behaves rational and places a bid of zero. This gives us the average
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slope of a subjects bidding function. The steeper the slope the more ag-
gressive is the subject’s bidding behavior. Each participant represents one
independent observation, because there was no interaction between partic-
ipants. We report results of non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank (SR),
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW), or Kruskal-Wallis (KW) tests.
In line with the observations by Coppinger et al. (1980) and Cox et al.
(1982a), we find that individuals place higher bids in the FPSBA than in
the DA (MWW: p = 0.0183). However, a closer look reveals that bidders
only place higher bids in the FPSBA than in the DA if they get no deci-
sion support (MWW: p = 0.0046). The No DSS treatment is comparable
to standard experimental auction designs. If bidders get (some) decision
support, the differences vanish (MWW: Medium DSS p = 0.1498 and Full
DSS p = 0.6256). Table 4.4 complements these tests controlling for bidder
characteristics. It confirms the observation that bids in the DA are substan-
tially lower than in the FPSBA in absence of decision support (p < 0.001)
and that this differences vanish once support is provided (Medium DSS
p = 0.1628, Full DSS p = 0.8044).
In the FPSBA, the provision of decision support changes the bidding
behavior significantly (KW: p = 0.0704). Bidders who receive decision
support (Medium DSS, Full DSS) place lower bids than bidders without
decision support (No DSS; MWW: p = 0.0214). In contrast, the influence
of decision support is overall not significant in the DA (KW: p = 0.1224).
However, we find some evidence that the effect of decision support works
in the opposite direction compared to the FPSBA, i.e., bidders who only
receive limited decision support (No DSS, Medium DSS) place smaller bids
than those bidders who get full decision support (Full DSS; MWW: p =
0.0424).
Figure 4.1 illustrates the bidding behavior and Table 4.2 presents the
results of Tobit panel regressions analyzing the influence of elicited prefer-
ences and of decision support in the FPSBA and the DA. Controlling for
individual characteristics, the regressions support the results of our non-
parametric tests. The provision of decision support (Medium DSS, Full
DSS) decreases bids in the FPSBA. In contrast to that, in the DA the pro-
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vision of Medium DSS does not influence bidding behavior (p = 0.679) and
the influence of Full DSS is also not significant (p = 0.106).
The regressions further show that risk-averse bidders place higher bids,
whereas loss aversion and Allais-type preferences have no or only marginal
influence on bidding behavior. Theories based on Allais-type preferences
predict higher bids in the DA than in the FPSBA, something we do not
observe. In the DA we find some indication that subjects with a higher
numeracy score place lower bids. However, the significance vanishes if we
do not control for risk aversion.
Table 4.3 complements Table 4.2 and examines if the elicited preferences
(risk aversion, loss aversion, Allais-tpye preferences) and characteristics (nu-
meracy) have different effects on bidding behavior in the two auction for-
mats. We only find weak evidence that a higher numeracy score leads ceteris
paribus to lower bids in the DA than in the FPSBA, but no indication that
any of the elicited preferences can explain differences in bidding behavior.
Cox et al. (1983) argue that differences between the two mechanisms result
from violations of Bayes’ rule and indirectly test this conjecture by tripling
individual payoffs which increases opportunity costs from miscalculations.
In contrast, our design is a direct test of the impact of cognitive limitations
and we find additional evidence for this conjecture.
Similar to the other experimental papers that compare bidding behavior
in the FPSBA to bidding behavior in the DA (Cox et al., 1983; Katok and
Kwasnica, 2007), participants in our experiment first played 18 rounds in
the DA and then another 18 rounds in the FPSBA.13 In contrast to the
findings of Cox et al. (1983); Katok and Kwasnica (2007), we find that nei-
ther subjects who first participate in the FPSBA nor subjects who start
in the DA change their bidding behavior when the auction format changes
(SR: FPSBA→ DA, p = 0.3888; DA→ FPSBA, p = 0.1973). This within-
participant consistency is in contrast to the literature and we relate this
finding to the strict comparability of the two formats in our experiment.
Hence, our bidding data indicates that a constant action set and fixed op-
13In order to control for order effects, about half of the participants played in reverse
order.
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Notes: Depicted are medians of the winning bids for each valuation and for-
mat separated by decision support. The reference line is the risk-neutral Nash
equilibrium (RNNE) given by Linear SP (L-SP). Participants in No DSS do not
receive additional information. In treatment Medium DSS, participants receive
information about the winning probability (FPSBA) or the probability to re-
ceive the next price (DA). In treatment Full DSS, participants receive the same
information as in Medium DSS and, in addition, the expected profit associated
with their bid.
Figure 4.1: Median winning bids across decision support.
portunity costs are necessary for consistency between the two formats.14
The other cited experiments that also vary the order of the two formats do
not find a similar consistency in bidding even in absence of decision support.
We think that the consistency in our data stems from the direct compa-
rability of the two formats in our design by using the same price grid and
14Opportunity costs include, e.g., monitoring costs (Carare and Rothkopf, 2005) or
costs from participating in the experiment (Katok and Kwasnica, 2007).
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Table 4.2: Tobit panel regressions of the influence of preferences on winning
bids in periods 1 to 18.
Winning bid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FPSBA DA FPSBA DA
Valuation 0.523∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0154) (0.0134) (0.0154)
Allais-type -0.0222 0.00507 -0.0156 0.00747
(0.0374) (0.0289) (0.0347) (0.0275)
Risk aversion 6.101∗∗ 10.02∗∗∗ 6.202∗∗ 9.533∗∗∗
(2.974) (2.983) (2.754) (2.928)
Loss aversion 0.488 -0.468 0.441 -0.536
(0.508) (0.745) (0.475) (0.709)
Numeracy 0.200 -0.469∗∗ 0.115 -0.472∗∗
(0.300) (0.233) (0.280) (0.222)
midDSS -2.007∗∗ -0.329
(0.786) (0.795)
fullDSS -1.670∗∗ 1.218
(0.812) (0.753)
Period 0.0865∗∗∗ 0.0336 0.0859∗∗∗ 0.0338
(0.0237) (0.0267) (0.0237) (0.0267)
Constant -2.553 -0.00274 -1.005 0.00709
(2.652) (2.199) (2.520) (2.096)
Observations 443 448 443 448
Participants 41 41 41 41
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Reported are results of tobit panel regressions with an up-
per limit at the highest possible bid of 21.
holding opportunity costs constant. Only bidders in the No DSS treatment
who start bidding in the FPSBA change their bidding behavior and place
lower bids when the auction format changes to a DA (SR: p = 0.0995).
This observation might indicate that, in absence of decision support, the
FPSBA is more complex than the DA.
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4.5 CONCLUSION
We examine the role of decision support and preferences in first-price sealed-
bid and Dutch auctions. In a laboratory experiment, we elicit participants’
preferences and vary the degree of decision support to account for the com-
plexity in deriving the optimal bid. We confirm the frequently observed
non-equivalence of the first-price and Dutch auction under the absence of
decision support. In addition, we observe that any differences in bidding
behavior between the two mechanisms vanish once we provide decision sup-
port, which indicates that differences in bidding behavior are due to differ-
ent levels of complexity. Differences between the two auction formats based
on preferences should be independent of the level of decision support. We
use the elicited individual preferences of all participants to explain bidding
behavior. We find no indication that non-standard preferences explain the
empirical differences. Our results thus indicate that the empirical break-
down of equivalence is primarily caused by the complexity of the bidding
decision rather than by bidders’ preferences. This observation should be
taken into account in real-world business interactions involving auctions.
In the experiment, the implemented DSS is perfect in the sense that
we can precisely calculate the respective probabilities and expected values
due to the fixed bidding strategy of a bidding robot. Obviously, this is
not directly implementable in real auctions. However, the availability of
historical bid data promotes the design of decision support systems similar
to our implementation. Thus, our findings on the differences in auction
formats indicate that the higher revenue in the FPSBA is less relevant in
real auctions in which bidders are likely to have such support.
4.6 APPENDICES
4.6.1 TABLES
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Table 4.3: Tobit panel regression of the influence of preferences and nu-
meracy on differences between winning bids in the FPBSA and the DA in
periods 1 to 18.
Winning Bid
Valuation 0.501∗∗∗
(0.0103)
Period 0.0577∗∗∗
(0.0181)
Constant -1.730
(2.548)
Risk aversion 6.053∗∗
(2.873)
Loss aversion 0.490
(0.490)
Allais-type -0.0225
(0.0360)
Numeracy 0.216
(0.290)
DA 0.843
(3.358)
DA × Risk aversion 3.914
(4.217)
DA × Loss aversion -0.937
(0.913)
DA × Allais 0.0280
(0.0469)
DA × Numeracy -0.672∗
(0.377)
Observations 891
Participants 82
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: The upper limit in the Tobit regression is the maximum
bid of 21. It was placed in 174 out of 891 observations. DA is a
dummy variable that is zero if the auction format is a FPSBA and
is one in case of a DA.
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Table 4.4: Tobit panel regression of the influence of decision support in the
FPSBA and the DA in periods 1 to 18.
Winning bid
Valuation 0.502∗∗∗
(0.0103)
Period 0.0581∗∗∗
(0.0181)
Constant 1.417
(1.682)
Allais-type -0.00370
(0.0220)
Risk aversion 6.498∗∗∗
(1.973)
Loss aversion 0.169
(0.388)
Numeracy -0.159
(0.172)
midDSS -2.245∗∗∗
(0.786)
fullDSS -1.729∗∗
(0.815)
DA -3.251∗∗∗
(0.794)
DA × midDSS 2.088∗
(1.131)
DA × fullDSS 3.041∗∗∗
(1.130)
Observations 891
Participants 82
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: The upper limit in the Tobit regression is the maximum
bid of 21. It was placed in 174 out of 891 observations. DA is a
dummy variable that is zero if the auction format is a FPSBA and
is one in case of a DA.
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Table 4.5: Average winning bids for periods 1 to 18.
No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS KW test
Valuation FPSBA DA p-value FPSBA DA p-value FPSBA DA p-value p-value p-value
FPSBA DA
6 4.25 7.42 0.8710 4.25 4.00 0.5541 4.25 3.67 0.4450 0.9905 0.9191
10 6.67 6.00 0.3417 7.31 5.93 0.1234 7.38 6.57 0.6310 0.5114 0.6148
14 10.20 8.35 0.0397 10.38 10.50 0.9575 8.67 8.55 0.7575 0.1396 0.1450
18 14.39 11.04 0.0042 12.57 10.91 0.1105 11.25 11.80 0.1498 0.2347 0.7103
22 15.29 12.05 0.0740 14.54 13.83 0.5108 14.67 13.42 0.2008 0.7910 0.6215
26 18.88 14.50 0.0022 15.18 15.71 0.6428 17.09 17.15 0.8142 0.0150 0.0878
30 19.71 16.14 0.0019 17.96 15.73 0.3084 18.00 18.20 0.786 0.0189 0.1328
34 20.20 17.65 0.0062 18.68 17.04 0.1268 18.83 19.17 0.6750 0.0219 0.1285
38 20.20 17.86 0.0190 19.35 18.42 0.4404 18.50 19.77 0.1287 0.0265 0.1372
Average 15.87 13.33 - 14.57 13.86 - 14.93 15.01 - - -
Notes: Reported are the average winning bids for periods 1 to 18
and the probability that bids in the different formats are drawn
from the same distribution based on the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
U-test. The Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test reports whether there is any
significant difference across decision support systems for a given
auction format.
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4.6.2 THEORY
We consider a situation in which the bidder faces one competitor either in
a FPSBA or in a DA. Let P = {p1, p2, · · · , pn} be the common price grid,
i.e. the set of possible bids in the FPSBA and the set of possible offers in
the DA. Let pk denote the kth- smallest possible price in this price grid.
Let the price grid be uniformly spaced, with pk − pk−1 = δ for all k.
The probability that the competitor places a bid smaller or equal pk in
the FPSBA is given by F (pk). F (pk) also denotes the probability that the
highest price offer the competitor is going to accept in a DA is smaller or
equal pk.
For large η and λ the utility of a bidder is mainly driven by the rela-
tive outcomes, i.e. by his gain loss utility, and not by absolute outcomes.
Consequently, it may be the case that a bidder who has a strictly posi-
tive chance of making strictly positive profits and faces no risk of a loss
prefers not to participate in the auction. In the following we assume that
bidder’s expected utility is increasing in his valuation, which rules out such
implausible predictions and guarantees monotone bidding functions This
assumption is referred to as no dominance of gain-loss utility in Herweg
et al. (2010).
First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
In the FPSBA both participants place a bid bi ∈ P and the participant who
places the higher bid wins. In case of a tie both participants have a winning
probability of one half. The expected profit of a bidder with valuation v
bidding bk is given by
Π(bk, v) =
[
F (bk−1) +
F (bk)− F (bk−1)
2
]
· (v − bk) (4.6.1)
=
F (bk) + F (bk−1)
2
· (v − bk) (4.6.2)
=: P kω · (v − bk). (4.6.3)
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When relative outcomes are evaluated as
µ(x) :=


ηx x ≥ 0
ηλx x < 0,
(4.6.4)
the expected utility of a bidder with KR preferences bidding bk is given by
U(bk, v) = P
k
ω · (v − bk)
+P kω · (1− P
k
ω ) · µ(v − bk) (4.6.5)
+P kω · (1− P
k
ω ) · µ(bk − v)
and optimal bids are given by
b∗FP (v) = argmax
b∈P
{U(b, v)} . (4.6.6)
As the price grid starts at 0, bidders can always place bids smaller their
valuation. For this reason the relevant part of the piece-wise defined utility
function is given by
U(bk, v) = P
k
ω · (v − bk)− P
k
ω · (1− P
k
ω ) · (v − bk) · η(λ− 1). (4.6.7)
Let vk be the valuation for which a bidder is indifferent between bidding
pk and pk+1. Given that these vk are increasing in k the optimal bidding
strategy βFP (v) is monotone and it is optimal for bidders to bid pk for all
bidders with a valuation between vk−1 and vk. These indifference values are
given by
U(bk, vk)
!
= U(bk+1, vk) (4.6.8)
⇔ vk = bk + δ
:=Ωk+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
P k+1ω − P
k+1
ω (1− P
k+1
ω )η(λ− 1)
P k+1ω − P
k
ω − η(λ− 1)
(
P k+1ω (1− P
k+1
ω )− P
k
ω (1− P
k
ω )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Λk=Ωk+1−Ωk
(4.6.9)
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The no dominance of gain-loss utility assumption implies a restriction
on values for η and λ:
∂U(b, v)
∂v
= P kω − P
k
ω · (1− P
k
ω )η(λ− 1)
!
≥ 0
⇔ η(λ− 1)
!
≤ min
k∈{1,...,n}
{
1
1− P kω
}
⇔ η(λ− 1)
!
≤
1
1− P 1ω
, (4.6.10)
(4.6.10) implies that Ωk ≥ 0 and Λk ≥ 0 for all k and we get
vk − vk−1 =
=δ︷ ︸︸ ︷
bk − bk−1+δ
[
Ωk+1
Λk
−
Ωk
Λk−1
]
=
δ
ΛkΛk−1
[ΛkΛk−1 + ΩkΛk − Ωk+1Λk−1]
=
δ
ΛkΛk−1
[Λk−1(λk − Ωk+1) + ΩkΛk]
=
δΩk
ΛkΛk−1
[Λk − Λk−1] > 0.
The bidding strategy is then given by
βFP (v) =


0 if v ∈ [0, v1]
bk if v ∈ (vk, vk+1],
(4.6.11)
with vn+1 = 1 if vk ≤ 1. Else if vk > 1 for any k, βFP is adjusted accordingly.
Dutch Auction
In the DA participants sequentially receive decreasing offers aj ∈ P starting
with pn. A participant who receives an offer can either accept or reject it.
In case of acceptance the auction ends immediately. If the participant who
receives the offer pk first rejects, the other participant will also receive the
offer pk. If the other participant rejects pk, too, the new offer will be pk−1.
Which participant receives the offer pk−1 first is randomly determined. This
modeling approach is also used by Bose and Daripa (2009).
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Every time the bidder receives an offer he has the choice between accept-
ing or waiting for a lower offer. Let Hk be the probability that the bidder
will receive an offer pk−1 given that he rejects offer pk. The probability Hk
can be split in two parts. First, ρk denotes the probability that the price
step pk−1 is reached, i.e. the probability that the good is not sold at pk.
Second, φk denotes the probability that the bidder receives an offer pk−1
given that the price step pk−1 is reached. Consequently, Hk = ρk · φk.
COMPUTATION OF ρK In order to derive the probability ρk of reaching
the next price step pk−1 we first determine how likely it is that the bidder
receives the first offer at pk given that he receives an offer pk. First, denote
by #ik ∈ {1, 2} the position of the bidder in period k. Second, denote by
Ak the event that the bidder receives the offer pk.
Pr{#k = 1|Ak} =
Pr{#k = 1} · Pr{Ak|#k = 1}
Pr{#k = 1} · Pr{Ak|#k = 1}+ Pr{#k = 2} · Pr{Ak|#k = 2}
(4.6.12)
=
1
2
1
2
+ 1
2
· F (pk)
F (pk+1)
(4.6.13)
=
F (pk+1)
F (pk+1) + F (pk)
. (4.6.14)
Consequently, the probability that the bidder is asked second at pk given
that he is asked at pk is given by
Pr{#k = 2|Ak} =1− Pr{#k = 1|Ak} (4.6.15)
=
F (pk)
F (pk+1) + F (pk)
. (4.6.16)
Given that the bidder is asked second, #k = 2|Ak, his rejection of the offer
pk directly implies that the price step pk−1 is reached. However, if the
bidder is asked first, #k = 1|Ak, his rejection only implies that the price
step pk−1 is reached if the competitor also rejects pk given that she already
rejected pk+1, which happens with probability F (pk)/F (pk+1). Hence, the
probability ρk that price step pk−1 will be reached given that the bidder
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rejects the offer pk is given by
ρk =Pr{#k = 2|Ak} · 1 + Pr{#k = 1|Ak} ·
F (pk)
F (pk+1)
(4.6.17)
=
2 · F (pk)
F (pk+1) + F (pk)
. (4.6.18)
COMPUTATION OF φK Given that the price step pk−1 is reached the
probability of being asked first is one half. In this case the bidder receives an
offer with certainty. If the opponent is asked first, which also happens with
a probability of one half, the bidder receives the item only if the competitor
refuses the offer pk−1. The probability that the competitor refuses the
offer pk−1 given that she refused pk is given by F (pk−1)/F (pk). Hence, the
probability of receiving an offer pk−1 given that price step pk−1 is reached
is given by
φk =
1
2
+
1
2
·
F (pk−1)
F (pk)
. (4.6.19)
COMPUTATION OF HK Combining the probability ρk of reaching the
next price step pk−1 with the probability φk of receiving an offer given
that the price step pk−1 is reached, gives us the probability Hk of receiving
another offer when rejecting pk.
Hk =ρk · φk (4.6.20)
=
F (pk) + F (pk−1)
F (pk) + F (pk+1)
. (4.6.21)
BIDDING Let R (pj|pk) denote the probability that the bidder will be
receive (or has received) an offer pj given that he is currently offered pk,
R (pj|pk) :=


F (pj)+F (pj+1)
F (pk)+F (pk+1)
j ≤ k
1 j > k.
(4.6.22)
Note that for some a < b < c,
R (a|b) R (b|c) = R (a|c) .
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The expected profit of a bidder with valuation v planning to accept offer pj
who is currently offered pk ≥ pj is given by
Π(pj, v|pk) = R (pj|pk) · (v − pj). (4.6.23)
A bidder with KR preferences conceives a plan at the beginning of the
auction, namely accepting the offer r ∈ {p1, ..., pm} and evaluates his profit
compared to a reference outcome determined by his plan. The utility of such
a bidder with valuation v who planned to accept offer r from accepting the
current offer pk is given by
uk = v − pk + (1− R (r|pk)) · µ (v − pk) + R (r|pk) · µ (r − pk) . (4.6.24)
Defining
u(x, r|y) = v − x+ (1− R (r|y)) · µ (v − x) + R (r|y) · µ (r − x) , (4.6.25)
We now analyze two cases:
1. pj < r < pk:
Then, the expected utility from waiting for an offer pj is given by,
U(pj, v, r|pk) = R(r|pk)
[
(1− R(pj|r))[µ(r − v)] +R(pj|r) [v − pj + µ(r − pj)]
]
.
(4.6.26)
2. r < pj < pk:
Then, the expected utility from waiting for an offer pj is given by,
U(pj, v, r|pk) = R(pj|pk)
[
(1− R(r|pj))[v − pj + µ(v − pj)] +R(r|pj) [v − pj + µ(r − pj)]
]
.
(4.6.27)
The bidder prefers to accept now over waiting if and only if
uk,r ≥ max
pj<pk
{U(pj, v, r|pk)} (4.6.28)
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Determining the indifference values vk,r gives us the bidding function,
βr(v) =


0 if v ∈ [0, v1]
pk if v ∈ (vk, vk+1],
(4.6.29)
with vm+1 = 1.
These strategies define best responses to the distribution of competitor’s
bids F (x). It is easy to see that bidding strategies depend on the reference
point r, i.e. the bidders plan when to accept an offer. As a consequence
multiple personal equilibria are possible.
First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction vs. Dutch Auction
For subjects with KR preferences it is not possible to make a general state-
ment about the revenue ranking of the FPSBA and the Dutch auction. In
the following we provide examples that prove this statement.
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium bids in Dutch auctions and FPSBA
Minimum PEs
Maximum PEs
FPSBA
v
bids
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b6
Notes: This figure shows the lowest and the highest personal equilibrium bids in the DA
and the unique equilibrium bidding strategy in the FPSBA for λ = 2.5 and η = 0.5. The
revenue ranking of the two auction format depends on the equilibrium selection in the
DA.
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4.6.3 INSTRUCTIONS
This section provides the instruction in German (original) and English
(translated) separated by parts 1 and 2. Each part consists of part A and
part B. Part B was always distributed after part A had been conducted.
Experiment 1 was identical for each participant. Experiment 2 was coun-
terbalanced, i.e., half of the participants received the first-price sealed-bid
auction in part A followed by the Dutch auction in part B. The other half
faced the reversed order. We present the instructions for the full-DSS treat-
ment where subjects had full information. The instructions for the other
treatments are the same and only exclude parts of the decision support
which is reported in parentheses within the instructions.
  1 
Übersicht  
Dieser Teil des Experiments besteht aus 18 Runden, die  jeweils die gleiche Abfolge an Entscheidungen 
haben. Am Ende wird eine der 18 Runden zufällig durch den Computer ausgewählt und ausgezahlt. Alle 
Runden haben dabei die gleiche Wahrscheinlichkeit ausgewählt zu werden.  
 
Erstpreisauktion 
Sie  nehmen  an  einer  Erstpreisauktion  teil,  in  der  Sie  ein  Produkt  erwerben  können.  Zu  Beginn  jeder 
Runde erfahren Sie, welchen Wert das Produkt für Sie hat. Dieser Wert wird aus der Menge   
{ 6 €, 10 €, 14 €, 18 €, 22 €, 26 €, 30 €, 34 €, 38 € } 
gezogen. Jeder Wert kommt genau zweimal vor. Die Reihenfolge ist jedoch zufällig bestimmt. 
Sie befinden sich in einer Gruppe mit einem anderen Bieter. Der andere Bieter ist ein Bietroboter.  
In der Auktion kann ein ganzzahliges Gebot zwischen 0 € und 21 € abgegeben werden. Der andere Bieter 
wählt sein Gebot zufällig zwischen 0 € und 21 €. Jedes Gebot ist dabei gleich wahrscheinlich. 
Der Bieter, der das höchste Gebot abgegeben hat, gewinnt die Auktion und erhält das Produkt. Der Preis 
des  Produkts  entspricht  diesem  höchsten  Gebot.  Falls  Sie  und  der  andere  Bieter  das  gleiche  Gebot 
abgeben, erhalten Sie das Produkt mit 50% Wahrscheinlichkeit. 
Falls Sie die Auktion gewinnen, ist Ihr Gewinn gegeben durch: 
Gewinn = Wert – Gebot. 
Falls Sie die Auktion nicht gewinnen,  beträgt Ihr Gewinn 0.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  2 
Entscheidungshilfe 
Bevor  Sie  Ihr  echtes  Gebot  eingeben,  können  Sie  verschiedene  Gebote  testen,  wofür  Ihnen  ein 
Testbereich zur Verfügung steht.  
Im Testbereich sehen Sie: 
[Treatments: No DSS, Medium DSS, Full DSS] 
• Gewinn, falls Gebot erfolgreich 
Der Gewinn, falls das aktuelle Testgebot erfolgreich wäre. Dieser wird wie folgt berechnet: 
Gewinn = Wert – Gebot. 
[Treatments: Medium DSS, Full DSS] 
• Gewinnwahrscheinlichkeit  
Die  Wahrscheinlichkeit,  dass  Sie  mit  einem  Gebot  in  Höhe  des  Testgebots  die  Auktion 
gewinnen.  
[Treatments: Full DSS] 
• Erwarteter Gewinn 
Durchschnittlicher  Gewinn,  den  Sie  mit  dem  Gebot  erwarten  können.  Dieser  wird  wie  folgt 
berechnet: 
Erwarteter Gewinn = (Gewinnwahrscheinlichkeit) x (Gewinn, falls Gebot erfolgreich). 
 
Gebotsabgabe  
• Um Ihr  finales Gebot abzugeben,  tippen Sie eine Zahl aus der erlaubten Menge der Gebote  in 
das vorgesehene Feld ein. Anschließend klicken Sie auf „Gebot abgeben“. 
• Sie haben in jeder Runde 60 Sekunden Zeit, Ihr finales Gebot abzugeben. Sollten Sie kein Gebot 
in den 60 Sekunden abgeben haben, nehmen Sie in dieser Runde nicht an der Auktion teil. 
 
Hinweis 
Eine  Runde  dauert  immer  60  Sekunden,  unabhängig  davon  zu  welchem  Zeitpunkt  Sie  Ihr  Gebot 
abgegeben  haben.  Nachdem  Sie  und  der  andere  Bieter  ein  finales  Gebot  abgegeben  haben,  ist  die 
Auktion zwar beendet, aber die Runde endet erst, wenn die 60 Sekunden abgelaufen sind. 
 
Ergebnis 
  1 
Übersicht  
Dieser Teil des Experiments besteht aus 18 Runden, die  jeweils die gleiche Abfolge an Entscheidungen 
haben. Am Ende wird eine der 18 Runden zufällig durch den Computer ausgewählt und ausgezahlt. Alle 
Runden haben dabei die gleiche Wahrscheinlichkeit ausgewählt zu werden.  
 
Tickerauktion 
Sie nehmen an einer Tickerauktion teil, in der Sie ein Produkt erwerben können. Zu Beginn jeder Runde 
erfahren Sie, welchen Wert das Produkt für Sie hat. Dieser Wert wird aus der Menge   
{ 6 €, 10 €, 14 €, 18 €, 22 €, 26 €, 30 €, 34 €, 38 € } 
gezogen. Jeder Wert kommt genau zweimal vor. Die Reihenfolge ist jedoch zufällig bestimmt. 
Sie befinden sich in einer Gruppe mit einem anderen Bieter. Der andere Bieter ist ein Bietroboter.  
In der Auktion startet der Preis bei 21 € und wird alle 10 Sekunden um 1 € gesenkt. Bei  jedem neuen 
Preis  wird  zufällig  einer  der  Bieter  zuerst  gefragt,  ob  er  diesen  Preis  annehmen möchte.  Nimmt  der 
gefragte  Bieter  den  Preis  an,  so  endet  damit  die  Auktion.  Lehnt  der  gefragte  Bieter  ab,  so  wird  der 
gleiche Preis dem verbleibenden Bieter  angeboten. Beide Bieter haben die  gleiche Wahrscheinlichkeit 
zuerst gefragt zu werden.  
Der andere Bieter wählt  zufällig einen Preis  zwischen 0 € und 21 € aus,  zu dem er annehmen würde. 
Jeder mögliche Preis hat dabei die gleiche Wahrscheinlichkeit ausgewählt zu werden. 
Sie  gewinnen  die  Auktion  und  erhalten  das  Produkt,  falls  Sie  vor  dem  anderen  Bieter  einen  Preis 
annehmen.  
Falls Sie die Auktion gewinnen, ist Ihr Gewinn gegeben durch: 
Gewinn = Wert – Preis. 
Falls Sie die Auktion nicht gewinnen,  beträgt Ihr Gewinn 0.  
 
 
 
   
  2 
Entscheidungshilfe 
Sie sehen auf dem Bildschirm den aktuellen Preis, den nächsten Preis sowie die Zeit bis zum nächsten 
Preis.  
Zusätzlich sehen Sie: 
[Treatments: No DSS, Medium DSS, Full DSS] 
• Gewinn bei gegebenem Preis 
Der Gewinn, falls Sie den Preis annehmen würden. Dieser wird wie folgt berechnet: 
Gewinn bei gegebenem Preis  = Wert – Preis. 
[Treatments: Medium DSS, Full DSS] 
• Wahrscheinlichkeit, Preis angeboten zu bekommen 
Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass Sie den jeweiligen Preis annehmen können. 
[Treatments: Full DSS] 
• Erwarteter Gewinn 
Durchschnittlicher  Gewinn,  den  Sie  erwarten  können,  wenn  Sie  sich  jetzt  entscheiden  den 
jeweiligen Preis anzunehmen. Dieser wird wie folgt berechnet: 
Erwarteter  Gewinn  =  (Wahrscheinlichkeit,  Preis  angeboten  zu  bekommen)  x     
                                         (Gewinn, bei gegebenem Preis). 
 
Hinweis 
Eine Runde dauert immer 220 Sekunden, unabhängig davon welchen Preis Sie annehmen. Nachdem Sie 
oder der andere Bieter einen Preis angenommen haben,  ist die Auktion zwar beendet, aber die Runde 
endet erst, wenn die 220 Sekunden abgelaufen sind. 
 
Ergebnis 
Nach  jeder  Runde  sehen  Sie  das  Ergebnis  der  Runde. Hier  erfahren  Sie  den Preis,  ob  Sie  das  Produkt 
erhalten haben und wie hoch Ihr Gewinn ist.  
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Overview 
This part of the experiment consists of 18 rounds which have the same course of decisions. At the end, 
one of the 18 rounds will be randomly selected by the computer and paid out. All rounds have the same 
probability to be selected.  
 
First‐Price Auction 
You will participate in a first‐price auction in which you can acquire a product. At the beginning of each 
round, you will learn which value this product has for you. The value will be drawn from the set  
{6 €, 10 €, 14 €, 18 €, 22 €, 26 €, 30 €, 34 €, 38 €}. 
Each value occurs exactly twice. The order, however, is random. 
You are in a group with one other bidder. This other bidder is a bidding robot. 
In the auction, you can enter an integer bid between 0 € and 21 €. The other bidder will choose his bid 
randomly between 0 € and 21 €. Every bid is equally likely. 
The bidder with the highest bid wins the auction and receives the product. The price of the product  is 
given by this highest bid.  If you and the other bidder submit the same bid, you have a 50% chance to  
receive the product. 
If you win the auction, your profit is given by: 
  Profit = Value – Bid. 
If you do not win the auction, your profit is 0. 
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Decision Support 
Before you enter your actual bid, you can test different bids for which a testing area is provided for you. 
In the testing area, you will see: 
[Treatments: No DSS, Medium DSS, Full DSS] 
• Profit if bid was successful 
The profit if the actual profit was successful. It is calculated as follows: 
Profit = Value – Bid. 
[Treatments: Medium DSS, Full DSS] 
• Winning Probability 
The probability that you win the auction with a bid equal to the test bid. 
[Treatments: Full DSS] 
• Expected Profit 
Average profit that you can expect with the bid. It is calculated as follows: 
Expected Profit = (Winning Probability) x (Profit if bid is successful). 
 
Bid Submission  
• To submit your final bid, type in a number out of the feasible set of bids into the respective field. 
Then, click on “submit bid”. 
• In each round, you have 60 seconds to submit your final bid. If you do not submit a bid within 
these 60 seconds, you will not participate in the auction in this round. 
 
Note 
One round always lasts for 60 seconds, independently of when you submit your bid. After you and the 
other bidder submitted a final bid, the auction end but the round will only end after the 60 seconds have 
elapsed. 
Result 
After each  round, you will  see  the  result of  that  round. Here you  learn  the price, whether or not you 
received the product, and how large your profit is. 
 
  
  1 
Overview 
This part of the experiment consists of 18 rounds which have the same course of decisions. At the end, 
one of the 18 rounds will be randomly selected by the computer and paid out. All rounds have the same 
probability to be selected.  
 
Ticker Auction 
You will  participate  in  a  ticker  auction  in which  you  can  acquire  a  product.  At  the  beginning  of  each 
round, you will learn which value this product has for you. The value will be drawn from the set  
{6 €, 10 €, 14 €, 18 €, 22 €, 26 €, 30 €, 34 €, 38 €}. 
Each value occurs exactly twice. The order, however, is random. 
You are in a group with one other bidder. This other bidder is a bidding robot. 
In the auction, the price starts at 21 € and will decrease by 1 € every 10 seconds. At every new price, one 
of the bidders is randomly asked whether or not he wants to accept the price. If the bidder accepts the 
price, the auction ends. If the bidder rejects the price, the same price is offered to the remaining bidder. 
Both bidders have the same probability to be asked first. 
The other bidder will  randomly choose a price a price between 0   € and 21 € which he would accept. 
Each feasible price has the same probability to be chosen. 
You will win the auction and receive the product if you accept a price before the other bidder does. 
If you win the auction, your profit is given by: 
  Profit = Value – Bid. 
If you do not win the auction, your profit is 0. 
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Decision Support 
On your screen, you see the current price, the next price, and the time until the next price is shown. 
In addition, you will see: 
[Treatments: No DSS, Medium DSS, Full DSS] 
• Profit at given price 
The profit if you accepted the current price. It is calculated as follows: 
Profit at given price = Value – price. 
[Treatments: Medium DSS, Full DSS] 
• Probability to be offered the given price 
The probability that you can accept the respective price.  
[Treatments: Full DSS] 
• Expected Profit 
Average  profit  that  you  can  expect  if  you  decide  now  to  accept  the  respective  price.  It  is 
calculated as follows: 
Expected Profit = (Probability to be offered this price) x (Profit at given price). 
 
Note 
One round always  lasts 220 seconds,  independently of which price you accept. After you or  the other 
bidder  accepted  a  price,  the  auction  ends  but  the  round  will  only  end  after  the  220  seconds  have 
elapsed. 
 
Result 
After each  round, you will  see  the  result of  that  round. Here you  learn  the price, whether or not you 
received the product, and how large your profit is. 
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4.6.4 SCREENS IN THE LAB EXPERIMENT
Notes: Depicted is the computer interface used in the first-price
sealed-bid auction. The individual valuation is depicted at the
very top. Participants have a test button Test-Gebot (Test bid)
that allows to enter a bid. Depending on the decision support, the
following information is calculated from the test bid: Profit falls
Test-Gebot erfolgreich (Profit if bid was successful) (No, Medium,
and Full DSS), Gewinnwahrscheinlichkeit (Winning probability)
(Medium and Full DSS), and Erwarteter Profit (Expected profit)
(Full DSS). A timer displays the remaining time to submit a real
bid that can be entered in the text field in the lower right corner
and submitted by pressing the button Gebot abgeben (Submit bid).
Figure 4.3: Computer Interface: FPSBA.
4. PREFERENCES AND DECISION SUPPORT IN COMPETITIVE
BIDDING 127
Notes: Depicted is the computer interface used in the Dutch auc-
tion. The individual valuation is depicted at the very top. The
screen shows the current price, the time until the next price,
and the next price. Depending on the decision support, the
following information is calculated automatically: Gewinn bei
gegebenem Preis (Profit at given price) (No, Medium, and Full
DSS), Wahrscheinlichkeit, Preis angeboten zu bekommen (Proba-
bility to be offered the given price) (Medium and Full DSS), and
Erwarteter Gewinn (Expected profit) (Full DSS). The current price
can be accepted by pressing the button Preis annehmen (Accept
price).
Figure 4.4: Computer Interface: DA.
chapter 5
EXPLOITING UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE NUMBER
OF COMPETITORS IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
Abstract
In procurement practice first-price auctions are used if the num-
ber of potential suppliers is small and second-price auctions if it is
large. This observation cannot easily be explained by standard eco-
nomic theory as suppliers should anticipate little competition when-
ever they participate in a first-price auction. We test this setup
experimentally and find that buyers employ this strategy. Suppli-
ers on average interpret the buyer’s selection of a first-price auc-
tion as a signal of low competition. However, most suppliers still
overestimate the degree of competition in first-price auctions. As a
consequence, they bid too aggressive in first-price auctions, which
rationalizes buyer’s format choice.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The number of suppliers in procurement seems to have a strong influence
on the design of procurement mechanisms. In his book on procurement
auctions and negotiations Subramanian (2010, pp. 60–61) recommends: “a
sealed-bid auction makes sense when the number of potential bidders is
fewer than five or six. The non-transparency of the process invites the pos-
sibility that bidders will bid against themselves.” And “[...] an open-outcry
auction makes sense when you expect several potential bidders to show up.”
We collected some empirical evidence which hints in the direction that this
advice is followed in practice. Our data from an e-auction company, de-
picted in Figure 5.1, shows that the clients of this company tend to use a
Dutch or first-price sealed-bid auction if the number of qualified suppliers
is small, whereas an English auction is used if the number is large.
128
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Buyers have information about the number of suppliers, because they
make request-for-quotes (RFQ) before they design the auction. Such an
RFQ, in which buyers ask potential suppliers to express their interest in
the tender, are part of nearly all structured procurement projects and give
buyers an overview of qualified suppliers. Motivated by this fact we analyze
theoretically and experimentally under which conditions a buyer can exploit
her private information about the number of suppliers in a procurement
auction.
Figure 5.1: Share of English auctions in the field.
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(Data: German Procurement Platform)
Notes: Displayed is the share of English and second-price auctions
on a German procurement platform as compared to first-price for-
mats depending on the number of suppliers.
A naive reasoning behind Subramanian’s advice would go as follows:
the price in an English procurement auction is a result of the competition
between the two strongest suppliers. When the number of suppliers is small,
there is a high risk that the second strongest supplier is relatively weak.
Then the price in the English procurement auction would be high. The
opposite holds true if the number of participants is large. Then the strongest
suppliers compete fiercely and drive down the price in the English auction.
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In contrast to that, suppliers in a first-price auction are uncertain about
the strength of their competitors and cannot react to competitors’ behavior.
The uncertainty is even more pronounced if they do not observe how many
suppliers are participating in the auction. As a consequence, bidding in
first-price formats is mainly driven by suppliers’ beliefs about competitors
and it does not depend on the actual number of competitors. Thus, a first
price auction might be optimal if the actual number of bidders is smaller
than suppliers expect. However, this line of reasoning does not take into
account that suppliers should (in equilibrium) update their beliefs about
the actual number of bidders whenever they observe a first-price auction.
Our experimental observations show that using a FPA (SPA) whenever
the number of suppliers is small (large) is profitable for buyers in the lab-
oratory. We find that the vast majority of suppliers update their beliefs
about the level of competition insufficiently after observing the buyer’s for-
mat choice. In line with their biased beliefs they bid overly aggressive in
FPAs. Hence, buyers can exploit suppliers’ uncertainty about the number
of competitors.
Theoretical reasoning based on rational behavior cannot easily account
for this. Choosing a particular auction format provides information to sup-
pliers, i.e. they should anticipate that the number of competitors is small
if they participate in a first-price auction (FPA). As a consequence, the use
of a FPA in order to trick suppliers into believing that they have many
competitors does not work. We show below that with rational risk-neutral
suppliers, there will be complete unraveling in the sense that a FPA will
only be used – if at all – for the lowest possible number of competitors
and suppliers are aware of this. In all other cases, the buyer will use a
second-price auction (SPA).
We identify two possible explanations that rationalize the advice to use
FPAs if the number of suppliers is small and SPAs if the number of sup-
pliers is large. The first explanation is based on underbidding in FPAs.
Underbidding is a robust finding of the extensive experimental literature
on FPAs involving independent private values. It describes the observation
that subjects in a FPA bid significantly more aggressive than in the risk-
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neutral Nash-equilibrium (RNNE). As a consequence, FPAs result in lower
prices than SPAs and revenue equivalence between the auction formats no
longer holds if the number of suppliers is common knowledge. If the num-
ber of competitors is unknown to suppliers, the buyer might in equilibrium
use a threshold strategy, such that a FPA is employed whenever the actual
number of suppliers is smaller or equal to a certain threshold and a SPA if
the actual number is larger. If the actual number of suppliers is equal to
the threshold, the buyer faces a trade-off. Choosing a FPA signals a low
level of competition which implies that suppliers underestimate the actual
number of suppliers and hence place larger bids. However, underbidding
makes the FPA attractive and might overcompensate the first effect. Note
that in this case suppliers’ beliefs are not distorted.
The second explanation is based on cursed equilibrium reasoning (Eyster
and Rabin, 2005). The basic assumption is that subjects have correct ex-
pectations about their opponents’ actions but underestimate the correlation
between their opponents’ private information and their actions. As a con-
sequence, suppliers have systematically biased beliefs about the number of
competitors. In a fully cursed equilibrium subjects completely neglect the
correlation between opponents’ private information and their actions. In
a χ-cursed equilibrium subjects belief that with probability χ there is no
correlation between opponents’ private information and anticipate the cor-
rect correlation with probability 1−χ. Applied to our procurement setting
a χ ∈ (0, 1) implies that suppliers do not interpret buyer’s format choice
correctly. These suppliers expect less than average competition in FPAs,
but still overestimate the actual level of competition.
We can use our treatment variation, in that the auction format is ran-
domly determined, rather than making it a choice of the buyer, to test for
underbidding separately. We find some support for underbidding in FPAs.
However, it cannot explain suppliers’ bidding behavior on its own. Thus,
cursed equilibrium reasoning is the better explanation for our observations.
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5.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Auction research that considers uncertainty about the number of suppli-
ers concentrates on FPAs and investigates the question whether or not the
buyer should reveal information about the number of competitors to sup-
pliers. The literature distinguishes between a setting in which the buyer
decides to reveal or conceal information before observing the actual num-
ber of suppliers, i.e. unconditionally, and a setting in which she can decide
to reveal information after observing the actual number of suppliers, i.e.
conditionally on the actual number of suppliers.
In the first setting the buyer is indifferent between revealing and con-
cealing information if suppliers are risk neutral. However, if suppliers are
risk or ambiguity averse it is profitable for the buyer to conceal her informa-
tion. This result is derived theoretically by McAfee and McMillan (1987);
Matthews (1987); Harstad et al. (1990); Levin and Ozdenoren (2004). Fur-
thermore, Dyer et al. (1989) provide experimental evidence.
The second setting in which the buyer makes her decision after observing
the actual number of competitors to suppliers is analyzed by Bag (2003).
He finds that it is profitable for the buyer to fully reveal all the information
about the number of suppliers irrespective of their risk attitudes. I contrast
to that literature, we concentrate on the choice of auction format rather
than the choice of whether to disclose information or not.
Kagel and Levin (1993) experimentally compare FPAs and SPAs and
vary the number of suppliers in a setting in which suppliers observe the
number of competitors. They find that with a small number of suppliers
FPAs generate significantly more revenue than second-price auctions, which
is in line with underbidding. However, for a large number of suppliers this
difference becomes insignificant. In contrast to this, we analyze the case in
which the actual number of bidders is unknown to the suppliers.
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5.3 MODEL
We consider a game with n+1 players, one buyer and n ≥ 1 suppliers. The
buyer needs one unit of an indivisible good. The number of qualified sup-
pliers n is known to be randomly drawn from a finite set N = {n, · · · , n}.
Let pm ∈ [0, 1) be the commonly known probability ofm qualified suppliers
with
∑n
m=n pm = 1. It is common knowledge that suppliers’ costs are iden-
tically and independently distributed according to a distribution function
F : [c, c] → [0, 1]. The individual cost realizations ci are suppliers’ private
information and the actual number of qualified suppliers n is buyer’s private
information. Being qualified reveals no information about the number of
qualified suppliers.
The buyer observes the number of qualified suppliers and then decides
whether she wants to procure the good via a first-price (FPA) or second-
price auction (SPA). Her strategy is a mapping from the number of suppliers
to the auction format, i.e. σB : {n, · · · , n} → {FPA, SPA}. Suppliers
observe their own cost realization and buyer’s format choice and then place
a bid. Hence a supplier’s strategy determines which bid to place depending
on cost and the auction format, i.e. σS : [c, c]× {FPA, SPA} → R
+.
Suppliers’ ex-ante beliefs µm correspond to the commonly known ex-
ante probabilities pm and are updated according to the buyer’s strategy
using Bayes’ rule if possible. Let µm(FPA) and µm(SPA) denote updated
beliefs in a FPA and SPA respectively.
5.3.1 ANALYSIS
Suppose that subjects are fully rational and risk neutral. If the buyer
can condition her format choice on the number of suppliers, she will never
conduct a FPA if the actual number of suppliers is larger than the lowest
possible number of suppliers and suppliers anticipate this.
Proposition 9. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium the buyer uses a SPA
whenever the number of qualified suppliers is larger than n. If the number
of qualified suppliers is n the buyer is indifferent between a FPA and a
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SPA. Suppliers expect to face the minimum number of competitors if they
participate in a FPA.
Proof. Suppose that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the
buyer uses a FPA if the number of qualified suppliers is smaller or equal to
some nˆST > n and a SPA if there are more than nˆST suppliers. Given this
strategy, suppliers know that they face at most nˆST − 1 competitors in a
FPA.
McAfee and McMillan (1987) show that in this case an equilibrium
bidding strategy in the FPA exists and that the expected price for the
buyer in the FPA is given by
1∑nˆST
j=n pj
·
nˆST∑
j=n
pj · E
[
c
(j)
2
]
. (5.3.1)
Here c
(j)
2 is the second lowest of j cost realizations and equals c if j = 1.
The expected price in the FPA is equal to the expected price in a SPA with
the same stochastic number of bidders.
Now consider the case with exactly n = nˆST suppliers. In this case, the
expected price in a SPA is given by
E
[
c
(nˆST)
2
]
, (5.3.2)
which is strictly larger than (5.3.1) for nˆST > n and equal to it if nˆST = n.
This implies that the buyer strictly prefers the SPA whenever n > n and
is indifferent for n = n if suppliers expect a threshold strategy. Therefore,
any strategy that uses a FPA for some n > n, is not credible and cannot
constitute an equilibrium strategy. The reasoning is similar to the analysis
by Bag (2003) who examines the buyer’s incentive to reveal the number of
suppliers in a FPA.
It remains to be shown that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists in
which the buyer employs a SPA whenever n > n and suppliers are sure to
face minimum competition if they participate in a FPA. We have already
shown that suppliers cannot expect more than minimum competition in the
FPA. Hence, the buyer is indifferent between a FPA and a SPA if n = n
and strictly prefers the SPA if n > n.
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Corollary 2. If the lowest possible number of suppliers n is equal to one,
it is optimal for suppliers to bid the reserve price in a FPA independent of
their costs.
If the buyer was not informed about the actual number of competi-
tors the revenue equivalence theorem would hold and the buyer would be
indifferent between the two auction formats.
Proposition 10. If the buyer does not know the actual number of suppliers
she is indifferent between a FPA and a SPA (McAfee and McMillan, 1987;
Matthews, 1987; Harstad et al., 1990).
Harstad et al. (1990) shows that in this case the optimal bidding strategy
βu of an uncertain supplier in the FPA is given by
βu(c) =
n∑
m=n
pm ·Gm(c)
G(c)
· βm(c). (5.3.3)
Here Gm(c) denotes the probability that the supplier’s cost c are lower than
the costs of the m − 1 competitors and G(c) the probability that the sup-
plier’s cost c are lower than the costs of the competitors not conditioned on
their actual number. Furthermore, βm(c) denotes the equilibrium bidding
strategy for the case that the actual number of suppliers is known to be m.
Combining Propositions 9 and 10 implies that the buyer cannot exploit
her private information about the actual number of suppliers and cannot
trick suppliers into overestimating the number of competitors in a FPA. This
means the practitioners’ advice cannot be explained in our simple procure-
ment setting with independent private cost if subjects are risk neutral and
fully rational.
5.4 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We analyze a situation in which one buyer procures one unit of an indivisible
good. Her valuation for the good is v = 130 ECU. She faces either one or
four qualified suppliers. The probability of facing only one supplier is 4/5
and the probability of facing four suppliers is 1/5. After observing the
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number of suppliers, she can decide whether she wants to use a FPA or a
SPA to procure the good. The FPA is conducted in form of a first-price
sealed-bid auction. The SPA in form of an English-ticker auction. In case
of one supplier the SPA immediately stops at the starting price of 100 ECU.
For this reason, selecting a SPA if n = 1 is a weakly dominated strategy for
the buyer.
Suppliers’ costs are independently and identically distributed between
0 and 100 ECU, each integer is equally likely. They do not observe the
number of competitors but know that the probability of facing competition
is one half from suppliers’ perspective. After observing the buyer’s format
choice and before bidding, a supplier is asked to estimate the probability of
facing competition in this auction. At the end of each auction participants
see the profit they earned in that auction. The buyer’s profit is given by
the difference between her valuation and the price. The selected supplier
earns the difference between the price and his cost. A losing supplier earns
zero.
In addition to the just described buyer’s choice treatment, we also have
the random choice treatment as a control. The random choice treatment
differs from the buyer’s choice treatment in two aspects. First, the auction
format is randomly determined. Independent of the number of suppliers,
both auction formats are conducted with a probability of one half each.
Second, suppliers are not asked to estimate the probability of facing com-
petition after observing the auction format.1
In the experiments we have a total of 156 participants and use a between-
subjects design. We have six independent cohorts for each treatment. Each
cohort includes 13 participants, five buyers and eight suppliers. These roles
stay fixed during the experiment. In each experimental session two cohorts,
one of each treatment, are in the lab at the same time to avoid selection
effects.2 Each subject participates only one time and earning cash is the only
incentive offered. All experimental sessions are conducted in the Cologne
1Suppliers know that the probability of facing competition is one half independent
of the auction format.
2Participants are randomly assigned to one of the two treatments. To make this
possible we always conduct two treatments at the same time in two neighboring rooms.
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Laboratory for Economic Research at the University of Cologne. We recruit
participants using the on-line recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
Upon arrival at the laboratory, the participants are seated at computer
terminals. We hand out written instructions to them and they read the
instructions on their own. When all participants finished reading, they
all have to answer control questions at their computer, in order to ensure
understanding of the rules of the game. After all subjects have answered
all questions correctly, we start the actual game. In each session, each
participant takes part in a sequence of 25 procurement interactions. We
use random matching and the participants have no possibility to identify
each other. At the beginning of each round, the 13 participants in a cohort
are divided into five groups. Four of these groups consist of one buyer
and one supplier. The fifth group consists of one buyer and four suppliers.
Hence, the probability of a buyer to face four suppliers is one fifth and
the probability of a supplier to face competition is one half. We program
the experimental interface using the zTree system (Fischbacher, 2007a). We
compute cash earnings for each participant by multiplying the total earnings
from all rounds by a predetermined exchange rate of 75 ECU per Euro and
adding it to a show-up fee of 4.00 Euro. Participants are paid their earnings
in private and cash at the end of the session. One session lasts about 60
minutes.
5.5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we report our experimental results. We start our analysis by
examining buyer’s format choice and prices. Then we turn to the supplier
side and analyze their beliefs and their bidding behavior. We consider each
cohort as one independent observation. We test for differences of distribu-
tions with non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank (SR) and non-parametric
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) tests. We complement these tests with
Hence, participants are invited for the same session and a random draw upon arrival
determines in which treatment a subject takes part.
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regressions, because underlying costs and other characteristics are similar
but not identical.
5.5.1 FORMAT CHOICE
Figure 5.2: Buyer’s format choice.
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Notes: Displayed is the format choice in the buyer’s choice treat-
ment depending on the number of suppliers. Reported shares cor-
respond to the mean of the average shares of each cohort.
Result 13. Buyers conduct FPAs more frequently than SPAs if n = 1 and
SPAs more frequently than FPAs if n = 4.
In absence of competition the share of FPAs is 88 percent whereas in
presence of competition the share of SPAs is 76 percent as depicted in Fig-
ure 5.2. Looking at the session level we find that in each session the FPA is
employed more frequently than the SPA if n = 1, with frequencies ranging
from 71 to 97 percent. For n = 4 we observe some variation. In five out of
six sessions buyers conduct the SPA more frequently than the SPA, with
frequencies ranging from 68 to 96 percent. In one session buyers conduct a
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FPA with a probability of 52 percent in case of competition. As a conse-
quence of buyers’ format choice suppliers’ probability of facing competition
in a FPA is on average 20 percent in the buyer’s choice treatment. This
probability varies between 4 and 41 percent in the different sessions.
Comparing our experimental observations to our field data we observe a
similar pattern. If the number of suppliers is small, buyers tend to conduct
a FPA and if they face many suppliers they prefer a SPA. This trend is
also in line with our theory, which predicts that the buyer should use a
SPA if n = 4. However, the observed frequency is substantially lower than
predicted.
5.5.2 PRICES
Figure 5.3: Prices.
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cohort.
5. EXPLOITING UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE NUMBER OF
COMPETITORS IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS 140
Figure 5.3 illustrates prices depending on the number of suppliers, the
auction mechanism and the treatment. We first examine the buyer’s choice
treatment and then turn to the random choice treatment.
Result 14. The FPA generates prices that are on average 13.8 ECU lower
than in the SPA if n = 1 in the buyer’s choice treatment (SR test: p =
0.0277).
Result 15. The SPA generates prices that are on average 18.5 ECU lower
than in the FPA if n = 4 in the buyer’s choice treatment (SR test, p =
0.0464, Table 5.3: p = 0.037).
In contrast to theory, which predicts that suppliers in the buyer’s choice
treatment always place the highest possible bid of 100 ECU in a FPA, sup-
pliers in our experiment submit substantially smaller bids. This observation
directly implies that suppliers expect, again in contrast to theory, competi-
tion in a FPA with strictly positive probability. At this point, however, it
is not clear whether suppliers anticipate that buyers do not always conduct
SPAs if n = 4 and react optimally to this deviation or if suppliers do not
consider the correlation between the buyer’s private information about the
number of suppliers and her format choice.
Result 16. In the random choice treatment the FPA generates prices that
are on average 13.8 ECU lower than in the SPA (SR test: p = 0.0277, Table
5.4: p < 0.001).
Result 17. If n = 4 prices in the SPA are on average 4.1 ECU smaller than
in the FPA in the random choice treatment. However, the price difference
is not significant (SR test: p = 0.6002, Table 5.5: p = 0.413).
While the revenue equivalence principle states that in the random choice
treatment the average price in a FPA does not differ from the average
price in a SPA, our experimental findings show that prices in a FPA are
substantially smaller than in a SPA. This observation provides evidence for
underbidding. Notably, underbidding is so pronounced that even if n = 4
a SPA does not yield prices that are significantly smaller than prices in a
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FPA, in which suppliers expect competition only with a probability of one
half.
Result 18. Prices in the buyer’s choice treatment are on average 2.5 ECU
higher than in the random choice treatment (MWW test: p = 0.2623, Table
5.6: p = 0.006).
Result 19. Prices in FPAs in the random choice treatment are 4.6 ECU
lower than the average price in the buyer’s choice treatment (MWW test:
p = 0.1093, Table 5.7: p = 0.062).
If suppliers are fully rational and risk neutral, the expected price in the
buyer’s choice treatment is the same as in the random choice treatment.
In contrast to that we find that prices in the buyer’s choice treatment are
smaller than in the random choice treatment, which implies that the buyer
benefits from her ability to determine the auction format. However, we
also observe that a buyer who is uninformed about the actual number of
suppliers and always conducts a FPA yields lower prices than buyers in the
buyer’s choice treatment.
These observations might indicate two things. First, buyers in the
buyer’s choice treatment can trick suppliers to some extend such that they
are overestimating competition in a FPA, which implies that average prices
in the buyer’s choice treatment are smaller than in the random choice treat-
ment. Second, suppliers are aware that the chance of facing competition
in a FPA is substantially higher in the random choice treatment, which in
combination with (strong) underbidding makes it attractive for buyers to
conduct FPAs unconditional of the number of suppliers. However, a buyer
in the buyer’s choice treatment cannot do so due to a commitment problem.
This would imply that a buyer can trick suppliers but cannot exploit her
private information about the number of suppliers in our setting.
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Figure 5.4: Suppliers’ beliefs.
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5.5.3 SUPPLIERS’ BELIEFS ABOUT THE NUMBER OF
COMPETITORS
We start our analysis of suppliers’ behavior by examining their beliefs about
the number of competitors after observing the buyer’s format choice. Sup-
pliers in our experiment estimate the probability of facing three competitors
after observing the buyer’s format choice in each period. Eliciting suppliers’
beliefs in each period has two consequences. First, we can check for learn-
ing. Second, Hoffmann (2015) finds evidence that the elicitation of beliefs
makes subjects think (more) carefully about the presented situation, which
implies that biased beliefs should be less likely. Furthermore, the fact that
choosing a SPA if n = 1 is a weakly dominated strategy for buyers should
facilitate correct belief updating for suppliers.
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Result 20. On average suppliers interpret the buyer’s format choice into
the right direction, i.e. they expect less competition in the FPA than in
the SPA (SR test, p = 0.0277). They overestimate the level of competition
in FPAs (SR test, p = 0.0277) and underestimate it in SPAs (SR test,
p = 0.0277).
Figure 5.4 illustrates suppliers’ beliefs about the probability of facing
competition and the actual probability of facing competition depending on
the auction format over time. Regressions analyzing suppliers’ beliefs are
presented in Table 5.8. They show that the selection of a SPA lets suppliers
anticipate more competition than in a FPA. The differences between the
expectations becomes larger over time, which indicates learning. However,
even in the last periods there is a substantial difference between the actual
level of competition and the anticipated level of competition in both auction
formats.
Looking at the individual average beliefs, we find that 46 percent of
the suppliers estimate the probability of facing competition in a FPA to be
smaller than 50 percent, 29 percent estimate it to be exactly 50 percent, and
another 25 percent estimate it to be larger than 50 percent. The average
estimate of the probability of facing competition in the FPA is 42.2 percent,
whereas the actual probability of facing competition in the FPA in the
buyer’s choice treatment is only 19.9 percent. This indicates that suppliers
on average have biased beliefs.
In order to identify different types of suppliers, we classify suppliers
according to their beliefs about facing competition in a FPA. In a first step
we perform SR tests to determine if a supplier’s individual belief about
facing competition in a FPA differs significantly from the ex-ante probability
of 50 percent. We say that a supplier expects less than average competition,
i.e. updates his beliefs into the right direction, if the SR test results in
a z value below -1.645. Those suppliers with a z value above 1.645 are
considered to expect more than average competition in the FPA and those
with a z value between -1.645 and 1.645 are said to stick to their initial
belief about competition.
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Result 21. According to our classification 35 percent of the suppliers expect
less than average competition in the FPA, 50 percent do not update their
beliefs, and another 15 percent expect more than average competition in the
FPA.
In a second step we determine if their beliefs about facing competition
in a FPA differs from the actual level of competition they face in a FPA
in their session. We use the same method as before and compare their
estimate in a period to the average level of competition in FPAs in their
session.
Result 22. According to our classification 75 percent of the suppliers over-
estimate the probability of facing competition in a FPA. 23 percent of the
suppliers have correct estimates and 2 percent underestimate the probability
of facing competition in a FPA.
This implies that a large fraction of suppliers has difficulties in inter-
preting the buyer’s format choice correctly. Suppliers’ beliefs are biased
towards the ex-ante probabilities. Hence, buyers can trick suppliers into
overestimating the level of competition in FPAs.
5.5.4 BIDDING BEHAVIOR
While a supplier’s optimal bidding strategy in a SPA is not affected by his
beliefs about the number of competitors, his optimal bidding strategy de-
pends on his beliefs about the number of competitors in a FPA. From (5.3.3)
it follows that with fully rational and risk neutral subjects the equilibrium
bidding strategy in our experimental setting is given by
β(c) =
100 · p1
p1 + p4(1− c/100)3
+
[25 + 3c/4] · p4(1− c/100)
3
p1 + p4(1− c/100)3
. (5.5.1)
The smaller the probability of facing competition in a FPA the higher
the optimal bid. This implies that bids in the buyer’s choice treatment
should be higher than bids in the random choice treatment, because suppli-
ers interpret the buyer’s selection of a FPA as a signal of low competition.
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Table 5.1: Tobit panel regression of suppliers’ bids in FPAs.
Bid
(1) (2) (3)
Cost 0.489∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗
(0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0192)
Buyer’s choice 9.601∗ 7.871∗ 8.293∗
(3.929) (3.714) (3.764)
Belief -0.272∗∗∗ -0.221∗∗∗
(0.0489) (0.0477)
Period 0.649∗∗∗
(0.0738)
Constant 61.07∗∗∗ 74.55∗∗∗ 62.98∗∗∗
(2.924) (3.678) (3.859)
σu Constant 18.33
∗∗∗ 17.18∗∗∗ 17.50∗∗∗
(1.573) (1.489) (1.501)
σe Constant 17.22
∗∗∗ 17.07∗∗∗ 16.33∗∗∗
(0.450) (0.446) (0.426)
Observations 1253 1253 1253
Censored observations 417 417 417
Suppliers 96 96 96
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
Notes: Reported are Tobit panel regression of suppliers’ bids in
FPAs. Buyer’s choice is a dummy variable that is equal to one
in the buyer’s choice treatment and zero in the random choice
treatment. Belief is a variable between 0 and 100 that represents
the supplier’s estimate about facing competition in the FPA. Since
suppliers in the random choice treatment know that the probability
of facing competition is 50 percent, the variable Belief is 50 for all
suppliers in the random choice treatment. 417 observations equal
the highest possible bid of 100.
Result 23. The average bid in the buyer’s choice treatment is 5.8 ECU
higher than in the random choice treatment (MWW test: p = 0.0547, Table
5.1: p = 0.015).
In both treatments suppliers’ bids do not differ significantly from the
risk-neutral Nash-equilibrium predictions given their beliefs (SR tests, p =
0.1159). However, we find that winning bids in the FPA in the ran-
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Figure 5.5: Bidding in FPAs.
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ior in the random choice treatment (RC). The green line depicts
the bidding behavior of those suppliers in the buyer’s choice treat-
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classification (BC Belief>=50). The red line illustrates bidding
behavior of those suppliers, who update their belief correctly (BC
Belief<50). Markers represent the average bids for costs between
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dom choice treatment are significantly smaller than the risk-neutral Nash-
equilibrium prediction (SR test, p = 0.0277). This shows that also in
the random choice treatment, in which suppliers beliefs about competition
cannot differ, individual bidding is quite heterogeneous. Furthermore, it
indicates that the small price differences between the FPA and the SPA in
the random choice treatment with four suppliers must also be due to higher
than predicted prices in the SPA.
Table 5.1 presents the result of Tobit panel regressions examining the
driving forces behind bidding behavior in FPAs. It shows that suppliers
place higher bids in the buyer’s choice treatment and increase their bids
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Figure 5.6: Distribution of bids in the FPA.
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Notes: Displayed are suppliers bids in the random choice and in the
buyer’s choice treatment. In both treatments about one third of
the bids in the FPA are equal to the maximum bid of 100 ECU. In
the random choice treatment the median bid is 89 (average 80.7)
ECU. Similarly, those suppliers that do not update their beliefs
correctly in the buyer’s choice treatment place a median bid of 90
(average 82) ECU. In contrast to that suppliers who update their
beliefs correctly in the buyer’s choice treatment place median bids
of 99 (average 94) ECU.
over time. Looking at suppliers’ beliefs about competition, we find that
those suppliers who expect more competition place significantly smaller
bids in order to increase their winning probability. The strong influence of
a supplier’s belief on his bidding behavior suggests that those bidders who
update their beliefs after observing the buyer’s format choice place sub-
stantially larger bids than those suppliers that do not update their beliefs,
which is depicted in Figure 5.5. As indicated by the regressions we find
substantial heterogeneity in bidding behavior that is due to heterogeneity
in beliefs.
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Figure 5.7: Bidding behavior in the SPA.
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Notes: Displayed is suppliers’ bidding behavior in the SPA for both
treatments. Most of the losers’ drop-out prices are close to costs,
but many are substantially larger.
Result 24. Bids of suppliers who do not update their beliefs correctly in
the buyer’s choice treatment do not differ from the bids of suppliers in the
random choice treatment (MWW test: p = 0.6310, Table 5.9: p = 0.639).
Result 25. Bids of suppliers who update their beliefs correctly and bids of
suppliers in the random choice treatment differ significantly (MWW test:
p = 0.0062, Table 5.9: p < 0.001).
The same is true for the comparison of bids of suppliers who correctly
update their beliefs with bids of suppliers who do not update their beliefs
correctly in the buyer’s choice treatment (MWW test: p = 0.0431, Table
5.9: p < 0.001).
The distribution of bids in the FPA is displayed in Figure 5.6. The
variance of bids in the FPA has interesting consequences for the optimal
bidding behavior. Examining the empirical bid distribution of the random
choice treatment reveals that the optimal bid of a supplier with cost of zero
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Table 5.2: Random-effects panel regression of bidding behavior in SPAs.
Drop-out price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cost 0.690∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗
(0.0427) (0.0421) (0.0419) (0.0420)
Period -0.385∗∗∗ -0.385∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗
(0.0827) (0.0828) (0.105)
Buyer’s choice 0.0339 1.070
(1.987) (3.063)
Buyer’s choice×Period -0.0771
(0.161)
Constant 26.92∗∗∗ 32.12∗∗∗ 32.10∗∗∗ 31.47∗∗∗
(3.407) (3.671) (3.447) (3.718)
Observations 571 571 571 571
Suppliers 96 96 96 96
R2 (overall) 0.5492 0.5605 0.5605 0.5607
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
Notes: Displayed are random-effect panel regressions of suppliers’
drop-out prices. Buyer’s choice is a dummy variable that is equal
to one in the buyer’s choice treatment and zero in the random
choice treatment.
ECU is 98 ECU, which is substantially higher than RNNE prediction of 62.5
ECU. The fact that some suppliers place low bids in the FPA implies that
it is profitable for other bidders to concentrate on the case in which there is
no competition and place a high bid. Trying to compete is not profitable,
because the necessary bids are too low to compensate the higher winning
probability. We observe a similar picture in the buyer’s choice treatment.
However, due to the smaller probability of competition the optimal bids
are slightly higher. While smart buyers profit from other buyers that do
not select the optimal auction format and thereby distort the signal, smart
suppliers suffer from competitors that do not interpret the buyer’s format
choice correctly if the buyer selects the wrong format.
In the SPA it is optimal to stay in the auction until the displayed price
equals cost. We find that in both treatments suppliers drop out early. This
makes the SPA less attractive for buyers. In the random choice treatment
suppliers leave the auction when the price is 8.3 ECU above their costs
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(median difference 1 ECU) and suppliers in the buyer’s choice treatment on
average leave the auction when the displayed price is 10 ECU above their
costs (median difference 1 ECU).
Result 26. In both treatments the bidding behavior differs significantly from
the optimal bidding behavior (SR tests, p = 0.0277), but in line with theory
we find no significant difference between the bidding behavior in the two
treatments (MWW test, p = 0.2971).
Applying the same classification method as before, we observe that 52
percent of the suppliers tend to place too high bids, 46 percent bid optimal,
and another 2 percent place too small bids. The distribution of types does
not differ between treatments (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.228) and is not
correlated with belief types in the buyer’s choice treatment (Fisher’s exact
test, p = 0.363). Bidding behavior in the SPA is depicted in Figure 5.7.
The regressions in Table 5.2 show that markups decrease over time, i.e. the
difference between observed and optimal bidding behavior becomes smaller
over time.
The fact that suppliers often drop out before the price reaches their costs
makes SPA less attractive for buyers. This implies that our observation
that an uninformed buyer that always conducts a FPA is better of than an
informed buyer is only partly driven by suppliers underbidding in FPAs.
5.6 EXPLANATIONS
Looking at our experimental results we find similarities to our field data.
Buyers prefer a FPA if the actual number of suppliers is small and a SPA if
the actual number is large. We now provide two explanations, underbidding
and cursed beliefs, that can rationalize buyers’ behavior and test if their
predictions for suppliers’ behavior are in line with our experimental findings.
5.6.1 UNDERBIDDING
Underbidding relative to the risk-neutral Nash-equilibrium (RNNE) in a
reverse FPA is a robust (experimental) finding. It implies that whenever a
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supplier’s bid influences his winning probability, the FPA yields lower ex-
pected prices than the SPA. There are several competing explanations for
underbidding in reverse auctions in the literature. For example, risk aver-
sion (e.g. Cox et al., 1982b), non-linear probability weighting (e.g. Goeree
et al., 2002), and regret (e.g. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2008).
We use risk aversion to model underbidding and focus on the implica-
tions of underbidding rather than its reasons. When evaluating his bidding
strategy a supplier in a FPA faces a trade-off between increasing his win-
ning probability and decreasing his profit in case of winning by placing a
lower bid. In comparison to a risk-neutral supplier a risk-averse supplier
puts more weight on the increased winning probability than on the profit in
case of winning. This implies that he places lower bids than a risk-neutral
supplier if the outcome is risky and is hence underbidding. Risk aversion
has no influence on bidding behavior in the SPA. In a SPA it is always
optimal to stay in the auction until the price equals cost.
In contrast to the case of risk-neutral suppliers, underbidding can ex-
plain the existence of equilibria in which the buyer conducts a FPA even if
the actual number of suppliers is larger than the lowest possible number of
suppliers. In such an equilibrium the buyer employs a threshold strategy
and conducts a FPA if the actual number of suppliers is smaller or equal
some nˆ and a SPA if it is larger. Suppose the buyer follows such a threshold
strategy. If the actual number of suppliers is nˆ she faces a trade-off. On
the one hand, suppliers will underestimate the number of competitors if she
employs the FPA, because they expect at most nˆ − 1 competitors. This
makes the FPA less attractive. On the other hand, sufficient underbidding
in the FPA can overcompensate this effect. Note that for a given degree of
underbidding there need not exist a unique equilibrium threshold nˆ.
Applied to our random choice treatment underbidding directly implies
that prices in the FPA are smaller than in the SPA. This prediction is in
line with our experimental observations.
If suppliers are underbidding two types of equilibria are possible in our
buyer’s choice treatment. Equilibria of the first type are equivalent to the
equilibria in the setting with risk neutral suppliers. These equilibria share
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the feature that the FPA is at most employed if n = 1. As a consequence,
suppliers are sure to face no competition in a FPA. Hence, it is optimal
for them to place the maximum bid of 100 ECU independent of their risk
aversion. The existence of these equilibria does not depend on the extend of
suppliers’ underbidding and if suppliers’ overbidding is at most moderate no
other types of equilibria exist. Since we frequently observe prices substan-
tially below 100 ECU in FPAs in our experiment, moderate underbidding
cannot explain suppliers’ behavior.
Our result that the FPA and the SPA yield similar prices if n = 4 in the
random choice treatment indicates strong underbidding. In case of strong
underbidding a second type of equilibria exists. In such an equilibrium
the buyer always employs the FPA independent of the actual number of
suppliers. Hence, suppliers in a FPA in the buyer’s choice treatment place
the same bids as in the random choice treatment. However, in the buyer’s
choice treatment we find that in case of competition the SPA yields lower
prices than the FPA and that buyers frequently conduct SPAs in the buyer’s
choice treatment. Both observations contradict our equilibrium predictions.
We conclude that underbidding can explain our observations in the ran-
dom choice treatment but it cannot explain our experimental findings in
the buyer’s choice treatment on its own.
5.6.2 CURSED EQUILIBRIUM
The former sections have in common that they consider perfectly rational
subjects. Now we turn to an explanation based on boundedly rational sub-
jects. In a cursed equilibrium subjects have correct expectations about their
opponents’ average actions but do not fully grasp the correlation between
opponents’ actions and their private information.
Applying this concept to our experimental setting does not change pre-
dictions for our random choice treatment. Cursed beliefs also have no con-
sequences for buyers in our buyer’s choice treatment in the sense that they
prefer to conduct a FPA if they face one supplier and a SPA if they face four
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suppliers. However, cursed equilibrium reasoning affects suppliers’ beliefs
and thereby their bidding behavior in the buyer’s choice treatment.
In a fully cursed equilibrium suppliers completely neglect the correla-
tion between the buyer’s information about the number of suppliers and her
format choice. Hence, such suppliers belief that the probability of facing
competition in a FPA is equal to the ex-ante probability of competition of
one half. A look at our experimental results reveals that about 50 percent of
our suppliers state such beliefs. Theory further predicts that these suppliers
employ the same bidding strategy as suppliers in the random choice treat-
ment which is also in line with our observations. This makes it attractive
for buyers to conduct a FPA if the number of suppliers is small.
The basic result still holds true if we relax our assumption about the
cursedness of suppliers’ beliefs. In a χ-cursed equilibrium suppliers assume
that with probability χ the buyer’s format choice is uncorrelated with her
information about the number of suppliers. Hence, suppliers expect com-
petition in a FPA with probability χ · 1/2 + (1 − χ) · 0 = χ/2 and in a
SPA with probability χ · 1/2 + (1− χ) · 1 = 1− χ/2. This means suppliers
beliefs are biased towards the ex-ante probabilities, which implies that they
overestimate competition in the FPA and underestimate it in the SPA for
all χ ∈ (0, 1]. In our experiment we observe that about 75 percent of the
suppliers overestimate the level of competition in the FPA. Even a small
bias implies that a FPA yields lower prices than a SPA if the number of
suppliers is small and can explain our experimental result that bids in the
FPA are smaller than 100 ECU.
Summing up, we find that cursed equilibrium reasoning can explain that
buyers in the field employ FPAs if the number of suppliers is small and SPAs
if it is large. Furthermore, its predictions are in line with suppliers’ beliefs
and their bidding behavior in our experiment.
5.7 CONCLUSION
Our study is set up to better understand the phenomenon that in procure-
ment practice first-price auctions are used when the number of suppliers is
5. EXPLOITING UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE NUMBER OF
COMPETITORS IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS 154
small and second-price auctions if this number is large. An observation that
cannot be explained if subjects are rational and risk neutral. We conduct a
laboratory experiment and observe that, similar to the field, buyers employ
a first-price auction if they face few suppliers and a second-price auction if
they face many.
We present two possible explanations (i) underbidding and (ii) cursed
equilibrium reasoning that can rationalize buyer’s behavior in the field and
examine if their predictions are in line with our experimental data. We find
strong evidence for cursed beliefs. Cursed beliefs describe that suppliers
underestimate the correlation between the buyer’s format choice and her
information about the number of suppliers. This means suppliers cannot
interpret the buyer’s format choice correctly, which implies that suppliers’
beliefs are biased towards the ex-ante probabilities. We observe that sup-
pliers differ substantially with regard to their ability to interpret buyer’s
format choice correctly. Our data also provides some support for underbid-
ding. However, underbidding on its own cannot explain our observations.
Observing strong belief distortions is interesting because our experiment
is designed to facilitate belief formation. We explicitly ask suppliers for their
expectations about the probability of facing competition after observing the
buyer’s format choice in each period, which should make them think (more)
carefully about the informational content of the buyer’s format choice. Fur-
thermore, conducting a second-price auction in absence of competition is
a weakly dominated strategy for the buyer, which should further facilitate
correct belief updating for suppliers. Nonetheless, we observe that most
suppliers substantially overestimate the probability of facing competition
in first-price auctions and underestimate it in second-price auctions.
Since suppliers’ beliefs are biased buyers can exploit their private infor-
mation about the number of suppliers and benefit from suppliers’ uncer-
tainty about the number of competitors. However, we find that a buyer
who can commit to conduct a FPA independent of the actual number of
suppliers yields even lower prices on average.
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5.8 APPENDICES
5.8.1 REGRESSIONS
Table 5.3: Random-effects panel regressions of the influence of the auction
format on prices in the buyer’s choice treatment in case of competition.
Price
(1) (2) (3)
SPA -16.39∗∗ -13.86∗∗ -11.66∗
(4.994) (5.054) (5.581)
Lowest cost 0.680∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗
(0.106) (0.0979)
2nd lowest cost 0.470∗∗∗
(0.113)
Constant 65.58∗∗∗ 47.88∗∗∗ 35.21∗∗∗
(4.582) (6.731) (8.136)
Observations 150 150 150
Sessions 6 6 6
R2 0.0915 0.3648 0.4433
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
Notes: Reported are random-effects panel regressions clustered on
session level. SPA is a dummy variable that is equal to 0 in the
FPA and equal to 1 in the SPA.
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Table 5.4: Tobit regressions clustered on session level of the influence of the
format choice on prices in the random choice treatment.
Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SPA 42.66∗∗∗ 40.79∗∗∗ 40.16∗∗∗ 39.50∗∗∗
(4.093) (3.445) (3.188) (3.363)
Competition -64.34∗∗∗ -51.16∗∗∗ -57.03∗∗∗
(4.649) (5.033) (6.395)
Lowest cost 0.416∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗
(0.0340) (0.0436)
Competition×Lowest cost 0.256
(0.137)
Constant 83.69∗∗∗ 94.72∗∗∗ 73.14∗∗∗ 74.72∗∗∗
(4.660) (4.445) (4.971) (5.488)
σ Constant 42.11∗∗∗ 27.73∗∗∗ 24.61∗∗∗ 24.36∗∗∗
(3.010) (0.846) (0.981) (0.927)
Observations 750 750 750 750
Censored observations 409 409 409 409
Sessions 6 6 6 6
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
Notes: Reported are Tobit regressions with an upper limit of 100
clustered on session level. SPA is a dummy variable that is 0 in the
FPA and 1 in the SPA. Competition is a dummy variable that is
equal to 0 if n = 1 and equal to 1 if n = 4. Lowest cost corresponds
to the costs of the most efficient supplier in the auction.
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Table 5.5: OLS regressions clustered on session level of the influence of the
format choice on prices in the random choice treatment in case of competi-
tion.
Price
(1) (2) (3)
SPA -4.294 -4.718 -4.991
(5.787) (5.549) (5.594)
Lowest cost 0.662∗∗∗ 0.337∗
(0.0376) (0.0914)
2nd lowest cost 0.405∗∗
(0.0775)
Constant 53.16∗∗∗ 39.50∗∗∗ 29.85∗∗∗
(3.539) (3.348) (4.319)
Observations 150 150 150
R2 0.011 0.316 0.412
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
Notes: Reported are Tobit regressions with an upper limit of 100
clustered on session level. SPA is a dummy variable that is 0 in the
FPA and 1 in the SPA. Competition is a dummy variable that is
equal to 0 if n = 1 and equal to 1 if n = 4. Lowest cost corresponds
to the costs of the most efficient supplier in the auction.
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Table 5.6: Tobit regression of the influence of the treatment on prices clus-
tered on session level.
Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Buyer’s choice -10.22∗∗ -9.210∗∗ -8.707∗∗ -8.785∗∗
(3.605) (3.274) (3.170) (3.163)
Lowest cost 0.618∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗
(0.0345) (0.0393) (0.0402)
Competition -40.55∗∗∗ -49.59∗∗∗
(4.415) (4.532)
Competition×Lowest cost 0.375∗∗∗
(0.0586)
Constant 99.63∗∗∗ 71.74∗∗∗ 88.87∗∗∗ 90.59∗∗∗
(2.967) (2.130) (3.892) (3.926)
σ Constant 37.60∗∗∗ 31.95∗∗∗ 26.31∗∗∗ 25.93∗∗∗
(2.650) (2.380) (1.495) (1.511)
Observations 1500 1500 1500 1500
Censored observations 653 653 653 653
Sessions 12 12 12 12
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
Notes: Reported are Tobit regressions with an upper limit of 100
clustered on session level. Buyer’s choice is a dummy variable that
is equal to 0 in the random choice treatment and equal to 1 in the
buyer’s choice treatment. Competition is a dummy variable that is
equal to 0 if n = 1 and equal to 1 if n = 4. Lowest cost corresponds
to the costs of the most efficient supplier in the auction.
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Table 5.7: Tobit panel regressions comparing prices of FPAs in the random
choice treatment with prices in the buyer’s choice treatment.
Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Buyer’s choice 6.372 7.535∗ 6.980 6.772
(4.295) (3.677) (3.609) (3.629)
Lowest cost 0.598∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗
(0.0380) (0.0462) (0.0489)
Competition -27.94∗∗∗ -33.67∗∗∗
(4.050) (4.999)
Competition× Lowest cost 0.232∗∗
(0.0776)
Constant 81.41∗∗∗ 54.14∗∗∗ 66.68∗∗∗ 67.90∗∗∗
(3.519) (3.147) (4.310) (4.448)
σ Constant 31.85∗∗∗ 26.01∗∗∗ 23.18∗∗∗ 23.02∗∗∗
(1.965) (1.926) (1.367) (1.358)
Observations 1111 1111 1111 1111
Censored observations 340 340 340 340
Sessions 12 12 12 12
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
Notes: Reported are random-effects panel regressions clustered on
session level. Buyer’s choice is a dummy variable that is equal to
0 in the random choice treatment and equal to 1 in the buyer’s
choice treatment. Competition is a dummy variable that is equal
to zero if n = 1 and equal to one if n = 4. The significance level
of the treatment effect in regression (4) corresponds to a p-value
of 0.062.
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Table 5.8: Fixed-effects panel regression of suppliers’ beliefs about the prob-
ability of facing competition in the buyer’s choice treatment.
Belief
(1) (2) (3)
SPA 27.14∗∗∗ 27.17∗∗∗ 17.30∗∗
(5.501) (5.489) (5.034)
Period -0.163 -0.495∗∗
(0.0990) (0.148)
SPA×Period 0.750∗∗
(0.250)
Constant 42.93∗∗∗ 45.03∗∗∗ 49.34∗∗∗
(2.430) (2.389) (2.163)
Observations 1200 1200 1200
Suppliers 48 48 48
R2 0.2175 0.2191 0.2285
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
Notes: Reported are fixed-effects panel regressions of suppliers’ be-
liefs about the probability of facing competition. SPA is a dummy
variable that is zero if the supplier participates in a FPA and one
if he participates in a SPA.
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Table 5.9: Tobit panel regression of bidding behavior in FPAs of suppliers
in the random choice treatment and those suppliers in the buyer’s choice
treatment that do not update their beliefs correctly.
Bid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Buyer’ choice 1.771 1.932 24.58∗∗∗ 24.55∗∗∗ - -
(4.065) (4.113) (5.113) (5.122)
Updating supplier - - - - 22.26∗∗∗ 21.83∗∗∗
(5.444) (5.430)
Cost 0.539∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗
(0.0221) (0.0214) (0.0248) (0.0242) (0.0271) (0.0254)
Period 0.675∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗
(0.0812) (0.0950) (0.0946)
Constant 58.67∗∗∗ 49.15∗∗∗ 61.37∗∗∗ 52.30∗∗∗ 65.94∗∗∗ 55.95∗∗∗
(2.759) (2.994) (2.786) (3.079) (3.376) (3.553)
σu Constant 16.79
∗∗∗ 17.07∗∗∗ 16.60∗∗∗ 16.68∗∗∗ 16.72∗∗∗ 16.76∗∗∗
(1.547) (1.556) (1.814) (1.803) (2.089) (2.065)
σe Constant 17.38
∗∗∗ 16.58∗∗∗ 17.33∗∗∗ 16.69∗∗∗ 16.53∗∗∗ 15.42∗∗∗
(0.494) (0.471) (0.579) (0.556) (0.584) (0.545)
Observations 1020 1020 816 816 670 670
Censored observations 308 308 302 302 224 224
Suppliers 79 79 65 65 48 48
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
Notes: Reported are Tobit panel regressions with an upper limit
of 100. In regressions (1) and (2) we excluded those suppliers
in the buyer’s choice treatment that update their beliefs about
facing competition in the FPA correctly according to our classi-
fication introduced in section 5.5. In regressions (3) and (4) we
excluded those suppliers in the buyer’s choice treatment that did
not update their beliefs about facing competition in the FPA cor-
rectly. In regressions (5) and (6) we compare those suppliers in the
buyer’s choice treatment that update their beliefs to those who do
not. Buyer’s choice is a dummy variable that is equal to one in the
buyer’s choice treatment and zero in the random choice treatment.
Updating supplier is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the
supplier updates his beliefs correctly in the buyer’s choice treat-
ment according to our classification and is zero for those suppliers
in the buyer’s choice treatment, that do not update their beliefs
correctly.
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5.8.2 INSTRUCTIONS
This section provides the instructions in German (original) and English
(translated).
		
ANLEITUNG ZUM EXPERIMENT 
Herzlich willkommen und vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme am Experiment. Bitte 
sprechen Sie ab sofort und bis zum Ende des Experiments nicht mehr mit anderen 
Teilnehmern. Wir bitten Sie, die Instruktionen sorgfältig zu lesen. Sollten Sie nach dem 
Lesen Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte Ihre Hand. Einer der Experimentatoren wird dann zu 
Ihnen kommen und Ihre Frage beantworten.  
Dieses Experiment besteht aus 25 Runden, die jeweils die gleiche Abfolge an 
Entscheidungen haben. Die Abfolge der Entscheidungen wird unten ausführlich erklärt. 
Es gibt in diesem Experiment zwei Rollen: Käufer und Zulieferer. Zu Beginn des 
Experiments bekommen Sie eine dieser Rollen zufällig zugelost und behalten diese Rolle 
für das gesamte Experiment. 
Ablauf einer Runde 
Zu Beginn jeder Runde werden zufällig neue Gruppen gebildet. In jeder Gruppe befinden 
sich ein Käufer und entweder ein oder vier Zulieferer. Aus Sicht der Zulieferer sind 
Gruppen mit einem oder vier Zulieferern gleich wahrscheinlich. Das bedeutet für einen 
Zulieferer liegt die Wahrscheinlichkeit, keinen bzw. drei Konkurrenten zu haben bei 
jeweils 50 Prozent. 
Der Käufer beobachtet die Anzahl der Zulieferer in seiner Gruppe.                        
[Treatment 1: „Anschließend wählt er das Auktionsformat.“]  
[Treatment 2: „Anschließend gibt er an, welches Auktionsformat er wählen würde. Das 
Auktionsformat wird jedoch zufällig vom Computer bestimmt, beide Formate sind dabei 
gleich wahrscheinlich.“]  
Die beiden möglichen Auktionsformate werden weiter unten ausführlich erklärt. 
   
Nachdem das Auktionsformat bestimmt wurde, beobachten die Zulieferer, an welchem 
Format sie teilnehmen. Die Zulieferer beobachten die Anzahl der übrigen Zulieferer in 
ihrer Gruppe nicht.  
[Treatment 1: „Bevor die Auktion beginnt, schätzt jeder Zulieferer die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit ein, in dieser Auktion mit insgesamt drei weiteren Zulieferern zu 
konkurrieren.“] 
 
Schließlich nehmen die Zulieferer an der ausgewählten Auktion teil. Dabei geben sie 
Preisangebote ab, zu denen sie bereit sind das Produkt zu verkaufen.  
Zulieferer 
Die Bereitstellung des Produktes ist für Zulieferer mit Kosten verbunden. Die Kosten, die 
den Zulieferern entstehen, wenn sie das Produkt verkaufen, werden in jeder Runde 
zufällig und unabhängig für jeden Zulieferer ermittelt. Alle ganzzahligen Kosten 
zwischen 0 und 100 ECU sind dabei gleich wahrscheinlich. Der Gewinn des 
ausgewählten Zulieferers ist  
Gewinn = Preis – Kosten. 
Nicht ausgewählte Zulieferer machen einen Gewinn von 0 ECU.  
		
 
Käufer 
Die Wertschätzung des Käufers für das Produkt ist 130 ECU. Sein Gewinn ist gegeben 
als 
Gewinn = 130 – Preis. 
Ablauf einer Erstpreisauktion 
In einer Erstpreisauktion gibt jeder Zulieferer ein verdecktes Gebot ab. Jede ganze Zahl 
zwischen 0 und 100 ECU kann als Gebot gewählt werden. Der Zulieferer, der das 
niedrigste Gebot abgibt, gewinnt die Auktion und wird ausgewählt. Sollten mehrere 
Zulieferer das niedrigste Gebot abgegeben, wird zufällig einer dieser Zulieferer 
ausgewählt. Der Preis ist gleich dem niedrigsten Gebot. Sollte nur ein Zulieferer an der 
Erstpreisauktion teilnehmen, gewinnt dieser unabhängig von seinem Gebot und der Preis 
entspricht diesem Gebot.  
 
Ablauf einer Tickerauktion 
In einer Tickerauktion startet die Angebotsanzeige bei 100 ECU. In jeder Sekunde fällt 
die Anzeige um 1 ECU. Zulieferer können durch klicken die Auktion verlassen. Die 
Tickerauktion endet, sobald nur noch ein Zulieferer die Auktion nicht verlassen hat. Es 
gewinnt der Zulieferer, der die Auktion nicht verlassen hat. Der Preis ist gleich dem 
Wert, den die Angebotsanzeige hatte, als die Auktion endete. Sollte nur ein Zulieferer an 
der Tickerauktion teilnehmen, endet diese automatisch zu einem Preis von 100 ECU.  
 
Auszahlung 
Am Ende des Experiments wird der Computer Ihre Auszahlung angeben und in Euro 
umrechnen. Dabei entsprechen 75 ECU einem Euro. Zusätzlich erhalten Sie für Ihr 
Erscheinen 4 Euro. Bitte warten Sie auch nach Ablauf des Experiments ruhig an Ihrem 
Platz, bis Sie der Experimentator für die Auszahlung aufruft. 
	
	
Hinweis 
Bitte beachten Sie, dass Sie Verluste riskieren, falls Sie sich dazu entscheiden, 
Gebote unterhalb Ihrer Kosten abzugeben bzw. die Tickerauktion noch nicht 
verlassen haben, wenn der angezeigte Preis unterhalb Ihrer Kosten liegt.  
 
		
Instructions 
Welcome and thank you for your participation. Please do not talk to other participants 
during the experiment. Please read the instructions carefully. If you have any question 
please raise your hand. You of the experimenters will come to you and answer your 
question.  
This experiment consists of 25 rounds. You are in the same situation in each of these 
rounds. The situation will be explained in detail. There are two roles in this experiment: 
Buyer and Supplier. At the beginning of the experiment one of these roles is randomly 
assigned to you and you keep the role during the experiment. 
Timing within a round 
At the beginning of each round new groups are randomly determined. In each group is 
one buyer and either one or four suppliers. From a supplier’s point of view it is equally 
likely to be in a group with one or four suppliers. This means for a supplier the chances 
of meeting no or three competitors are 50%. 
The buyer observes the number of suppliers in his group.                                   
[Treatment 1: „Then he determines the auction format.“]  
[Treatment 2: „The he expresses which auction format he would determine. The auction 
format is randomly determined by the computer, each format is equally likely. “]  
Both auction formats will be explained in detail. 
   
After the auction format is determined, suppliers observe in which auction format they 
participate. Suppliers do not observe the number of competitors in their group.  
[Treatment 1: „Before the auction starts, each supplier estimate the probability of facing 
three competitors in this auction. “] 
 
Finally, suppliers participate in the auction. They place bids at which they are willing to 
sell the good.  
Suppliers 
Providing the good is costly for suppliers. These costs, which only occur if they sell the 
good are randomly and independently drawn for each supplier in each round. Each 
integer between 0 and 100 ECU is equally likely. The profit of the selected supplier is 
given by  
Profit= Price – Cost. 
Non-selected suppliers make a profit of 0 ECU.  
Buyer 
The buyer’s valuation for the good is 130 ECU. His profit is given by 
 
Profit = 130 – Price. 
 
		
Timing of a first-price auction 
In a first-price auction each supplier places a sealed-bid. Each integer between 0 and 100 
ECU can be placed as a bid. The supplier who places the lowest bid wins the auction and 
is selected. If several suppliers place the same lowest bid, one of them is randomly 
selected. The price equals the lowest bid. If only one supplier participates in a first-price 
auction, he wins independent of his bid and the price is equal to his bid. 
 
Timing of a ticker auction 
In a ticker auction the price clock starts at 100 ECU. Each second the price is reduced by 
1 ECU. Suppliers can click to drop out of the auction. The ticker auction ends as soon as 
only one supplier has not dropped out. The supplier who did not drop out wins the 
auction. The price is equal to the price that was displayed when the auction ended. If only 
one supplier participates in a ticker auction, this auction automatically ends at a price of 
100 ECU.  
 
Payment 
At the end of the experiment the experiment the computer will display your profit. 75 
ECU are equal to 1 Euro. Additionally you receive 4 Euro for your participation. Please 
wait quietly at your seat until you are called for your payment. 
	
	
Remark 
Please have in mind that you risk losses if you decide to place bids below your costs 
or stay in the ticker auction when the displayed price is below your costs.  
 
chapter 6
BONUSES AND HANDICAPS IN PROCUREMENT
AUCTIONS
Abstract
Quality scores make price offers of different suppliers comparable
and play an important role in almost every procurement auction. In
this paper, we examine how the framing of these scores as bonuses
or handicaps influences suppliers’ beliefs about the strength of their
competitors and thereby affects their bidding behavior in first-price
reverse auctions. Our main finding is that suppliers who receive a
bonus (handicap) underestimate (overestimate) the strength of their
competitors. As a consequence, procurement auctions with non-price
differences framed as handicaps result in lower prices than auctions
in which scores are expressed as bonuses.
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In contrast to selling auctions in which revenue maximization is equiva-
lent to maximizing the expected price, the considerations of a buyer in a
procurement auction are more complex. Most of the times suppliers do not
offer homogeneous goods or services. This implies that a purely price-based
auction that does not take into account supplier specific differences yields
inefficient outcomes, i.e. a selection purely based on prices may lead to the
wrong supplier being selected. Furthermore, purely price-based auctions
are suboptimal for the buyer as they do not maximize her expected revenue
(e.g. Naegelen, 2002).
Consider, for example, a car manufacturer that needs to procure seats
for a new series of models. This manufacturer is not only interested in the
price it has to pay per seat but also in non-price attributes. Such attributes
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can be characteristics of the product like the availability of options like
seat heating or the touch and feel of the product but also characteristics
of the contract offered like time of delivery, warranty, or the option to
adjust the quantity. Obviously, all these attributes can be important for
the manufacturer and hence need to be considered when selecting an offer.
One commonly used procurement mechanism that takes into account
non-price attributes is a scoring auction. In a scoring auction the buyer1
determines a scoring rule which assigns monetary values to non-price at-
tributes before the auction starts. This score in combination with a sup-
plier’s bid provides a one-dimensional measure the quality-adjusted bid.
Thereby, it allows the buyer to set up a binding procurement auction in
which suppliers compete on quality-adjusted bids. The bidder who places
the lowest quality-adjusted bid wins the auction. One commonly used way
to setup a scoring auction is to express a supplier’s score as a bonus or as
a handicap.
In this paper, we investigate whether it makes a difference if suppliers’
quality scores in a first-price procurement auction are framed as bonuses or
handicaps. In order to do so we set up an experiment which captures two
key aspects of procurement practice. First, the buyer can express her pref-
erences either as bonuses or handicaps. Second, suppliers only learn their
own score but not their opponents’ scores. Our results show that suppliers
place lower bids in case the scores are framed as handicaps compared to
the case in which they are framed as bonuses. Furthermore, we find that
they overestimate the quality score of their competitors if they receive a
handicap and underestimate it if they receive a bonus.
The literature has so far concentrated on the optimal scoring rule, as we
discuss below. However, the optimal scoring rule is not uniquely determined
– in particular suppliers’ scores can be expressed as bonuses or handicaps,
or a combination of both. Consider the following example in which a buyer
faces two potential suppliers A and B. She wants to buy the good of
1In practice, the actual buyer is often only a representative of the procuring company
who aggregates the preferences of the company’s different departments. Throughout the
paper the term buyer’s preferences denotes the aggregated preferences of the different
departments of the procuring company.
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supplier A if this is less than 5.000 Dollar more expensive than the good of
supplier B and vice versa the good of supplier B if it is more than 5.000
Dollar cheaper than the good of supplier A. The buyer can express her
preferences in many ways. She can assign bonuses to both suppliers, e.g. a
bonus of 8.000 Dollar to supplier A and a bonus of 3.000 Dollar to supplier
B. She can assign handicaps to both suppliers, e.g. a handicap of 2.000
Dollar to supplier A and a handicap of 7.000 Dollar to supplier B. And
she can also assign a bonus to supplier A and a handicap to supplier B,
e.g. a bonus of 1.000 Dollar to supplier A and a handicap of 4.000 Dollar
to supplier B. All three – and many more – pairs of scores induce the same
procurement decision if bids stay unchanged. This implies that only the
difference between a supplier’s own score and his competitors’ scores, i.e. a
relative measure, is important but not its absolute value.
Even though it is the relative score which is crucial for a supplier to inter-
pret his own position and to place his bid, suppliers are often only informed
about their own score in practice. In this case, the quality-adjustment is
still likely to improve allocative efficiency, but it also induces uncertainty
about the supplier’s own position relative to his competitor. As a conse-
quence, bidding behavior depends crucially on the interpretation of the own
quality adjustment or score.
In the next section we review the literature. Section 6.3 presents our ex-
perimental design and our hypotheses. In section 6.4 we report our results.
Finally, section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 LITERATURE
An optimal scoring auction balances the consideration of price and non-price
attributes. On the one hand, non-price attributes have to be considered in
order to increase efficiency. On the other hand, the consideration of non-
price attributes can induce an asymmetry between suppliers, which reduces
price competition, and might therefore have a negative influence on buyer’s
profit.
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Economic literature about scoring auctions distinguishes between situ-
ations in which suppliers’ non-price attributes are fixed and those in which
suppliers can adjust them. Naegelen (2002) analyzes the design of optimal
scoring rules in a setting in which suppliers non-price attributes are fixed.
She shows that a buyer who can commit herself to a scoring rule before the
auction starts maximizes her expected profit by under-rewarding non-price
attributes in her scoring rule. This way she reduces the asymmetry between
suppliers and thereby intensifies price-competition. One drawback is that
such a scoring auction is not efficient. Furthermore, the buyer might be
forced to select an offer that is not ex-post optimal for her, which is why
she needs commitment power when designing the auction.
Che (1993) shows that a scoring auction which under-rewards non-price
attributes is also optimal in a setting in which suppliers can adjust their
non-price attributes prior to the auction. Putting less weight on non-price
attributes reduces suppliers’ incentives to provide high quality. Conse-
quently, it decreases the information rent the buyer has to pay suppliers
due to their private information about their quality improvement costs,
but also leads to inefficiently low quality provision. Asker and Cantillon
(2008) analyze a procurement situation with multiple non-price attributes.
They first prove that these attributes can be represented by a single score
and then they show that scoring auctions dominate alternatives like buyer-
determined auctions and menu auctions, in which suppliers place various
offers. Branco (1997) generalizes the model of Che (1993) by allowing for
correlated costs. He shows that in this case the optimal procurement mech-
anism can be implemented as a two-stage mechanism in which suppliers
first take part in a scoring auction and the winner then negotiates with the
buyer about the adjustment of non-price attributes based on all the bids,
i.e. the information elicited in the scoring auction.
In practice buyer’s exact preferences are (ex-ante) not public informa-
tion and suppliers are often able to adjust the characteristics of the good to
be provided. This is taken up by Dini et al. (2006) who provide an overview
of important aspects of scoring rules from a practitioner’s perspective. They
focus on situations in which suppliers can adjust their non-price attributes
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to the scoring rule and recommend simple and predictable scoring rules,
which set the right incentives for suppliers to make efficient offers. Here
efficiency means that suppliers invest in non-price attributes as long as the
marginal costs are smaller than buyer’s marginal valuation for the quality
improvement. In this context Strecker (2010) argues that the buyer faces a
trade-off with regard to the revelation of her preferences towards suppliers.
On the one hand suppliers need information about buyer’s preferences to
make efficient offers, but on the other hand they might exploit this addi-
tional information later on. In contrast to that, we focus on a procurement
situation in which suppliers’ qualities are already determined and the scores
can only affect suppliers’ bidding behavior but not their quality choice.
Another way to take non-price attributes into account is to conduct
a buyer-determined procurement auction in which the buyer assesses the
different attributes after suppliers made their offers. In buyer-determined
procurement auctions, which are also known as beauty contests, suppliers
make offers specifying price and non-price attributes. When all offers are
placed the buyer selects the offer that maximizes her utility, which need not
be the lowest bid. This way she has the last say in a buyer-determined pro-
curement auction. One advantage of a buyer-determined auction is that it is
easy to conduct. The buyer needs not screen all suppliers and does not have
to specify her exact preferences beforehand, which might be very complex.
However, Fugger et al. (2016) show that buyer-determined procurement
auctions are prone to collusion, i.e. are likely to result in high prices. The
reasoning is as follows: If suppliers are not aware of the buyer’s exact pref-
erences, i.e. her decision rule, they all face a positive winning probability
if their bids are similar. As a consequence, they can share profits in ex-
pectation and might have no incentive to compete. Engelbrecht-Wiggans
et al. (2007) compare BDRAs with price-based reverse auctions and purely
price-based mechanisms and find that BDRAs are more profitable for the
buyer only if the number of suppliers is large. Similar to Fugger et al.
(2016) they observe that price competition is less pronounced in BDRAS.
These results suggest that scoring auctions outperform BDRAs if non-price
attributes can easily be evaluated before the procurement starts.
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6.3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
We analyze a procurement setting in which one buyer faces two potential
suppliers that compete in a first-price sealed-bid scoring auction. One of
the two suppliers provides better quality. In the following we denote the
preferred supplier as supplier A and the other supplier as supplier B. How-
ever, a supplier does neither know if he is the preferred supplier nor the
quality difference. In our experiment the buyer’s valuation for the good
provided by B is vB = 100, whereas she assigns a value of vA = 104 to
the good provided by A. In order to take this into account the buyer em-
ploys a naive scoring rule that reflects her preferences. She assigns scores
(sA, sB) = (s + 4, s) which can either be framed as bonuses or handicaps.
Scores are called bonuses if s > 0 and handicaps if s < −4.
In each auction the buyer can choose between two pairs of scores that ex-
press her preferences. One of the pairs consists of positive scores (bonuses)
and the other pair consists of negative scores (handicaps). Bonuses are in-
tegers between 2 and 16 and handicaps integers between -2 and -16. There
is a total of 12 bonus and handicap pairs that are all equally likely to be
presented to the buyer. The two pairs of scores that the buyer can choose
from before the auction starts are symmetric in the sense that if the buyer
can assign the k-th highest bonus she can also choose to assign the k-th
highest handicap. For example, the buyer might choose between the bonus
pair (2, 6) and the handicap pair (−16,−12). Here 2 is the smallest possible
bonus and -16 the smallest possible handicap.
Suppliers know that their ex-ante probability of being the preferred sup-
plier is one half. After the buyer decided whether she wants to use bonuses
or handicaps, suppliers observe their own costs and their own score. Sup-
pliers’ costs are independently and identically distributed between 0 and
100 and each integer is equally likely. They know that their competitor
also received a bonus (handicap) in case they received a bonus (handicap).
After both suppliers placed their bids the supplier who offered the lower
score-adjusted bid wins the auction and earns the difference between his
bid and his costs. In case of a tie the supplier with the higher quality is
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selected. This means for a given bid the own score affects the winning prob-
ability but not the profit in case of winning. Suppliers only observe whether
they won the auction or not but receive no further information about their
competitor’s bid or score.
As it is common in procurement practice suppliers have limited informa-
tion about their competitor’s score in our experiment. They only know that
their competitor also receives a bonus (handicap) if they receive a bonus
(handicap). Consequently, the framing of the score is only slightly informa-
tive and should hence not affect bidding behavior.2 However, for a supplier
a focal anchoring point for estimating his competitor’s score might be a
score of zero. If the estimate of the competitor’s score is biased towards
this anchoring point, suppliers will on the one hand interpret a positive
score, i.e. a bonus, as good news and will on the other hand perceive a
negative score, i.e. a handicap, as bad news.
Hypothesis 4. [Perception bias]
Suppliers expect to be preferred if they receive a positive score (bonus) and
to have a disadvantage if they receive a negative score (handicap).
Based on the assumption that estimates of the competitors’ scores are
biased towards zero, suppliers who receive a bonus (handicap) believe to
be in a stronger (weaker) position than their competitor. We denote a
supplier as stronger (weaker) if his score-adjusted costs are drawn from a
more (less) favorable distribution than his competitor’s score-adjusted costs.
A well known result in auction theory is that such weakness (strength) leads
to more (less) aggressive bidding behavior, i.e. a bidder that is weaker
(stronger) than his competitor places a lower (higher) bid given the same
cost realization (Krishna, 2010). Given that Hypothesis 4 holds it follows
that suppliers bid more aggressive if they receive a handicap than when
they receive a bonus.
2Since bonuses (handicaps) are always positive (negative) a bonus (handicap) close
to zero implies that it is likely to be in the weaker (stronger) position compared to
the competitor. This suggests that bonus bids should be higher than handicap bids.
However, we observe that suppliers with lower scores place lower bids as depicted in
Figure 6.4.
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Hypothesis 5. [Asymmetry effect]
Suppliers who receive a bonus bid less aggressive, i.e. place higher bids, than
suppliers who receive a handicap.
6.3.1 ORGANIZATION
We conducted the experiment in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Re-
search (CLER). We invited a random sample of the CLER subject pool
using the recruitment software ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Each subject par-
ticipated only one time and earning cash was the only incentive offered. We
programmed the experimental interface using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007a).
In the experiment we had 120 subjects divided into four cohorts of 30 sub-
jects. In each cohort 10 subjects were in the role of buyers and 20 in the
role of suppliers. Roles were fixed during the experiment. Each subject par-
ticipated in a total of 50 reverse auctions. Ten standard reverse auctions
and 40 scoring auctions. In each auction one buyer faced two suppliers.
To make sure that participants fully understood the instructions they
had to answer control questions privately on their computers. The exper-
iment only proceeded when all subjects answered all questions correctly.
Before the main part of the experiment started subjects participated in a
sequence of ten reverse auctions without a scoring rule. This way suppliers
got used to the auction environment. In the main part of the experiment
participant first took part in a sequence of 20 scoring auctions in which
the buyer chose between bonuses and handicaps followed by a sequence of
20 scoring auctions in which the buyer was passive and the framing of the
scores was randomly determined by the computer. To control for order
effects we employed a counter balanced design and the order was reversed
in half of our sessions. Our control treatment in which the framing is ran-
domly determined allows us to examine if suppliers try to reciprocate the
buyer’s framing decision as depicted in Figure 6.1.
At the end of the experiment all suppliers estimate their opponent’s
expected score for the case that the own bonus is 9 ECU and for the case
that the own handicap is -9 ECU. Both estimates were incentivized and half
6. BONUSES AND HANDICAPS IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS 175
of the suppliers were asked in reverse order to control for order effects. A
participant who correctly estimated the competitor’s expected score earned
4 EUR and for each integer the estimate differed from the correct value 30
Cent were deducted. We argue that this incentivized belief elicitation at the
very end of the experiment provides a conservative estimate of suppliers’
perception bias, because suppliers had the opportunity to learn during the
experiment.
Figure 6.1: Observability of the asymmetry and the reciprocity effect in our
treatments.
Asymmetry effect
Observable effect
Reciprocity effect
Asymmetry effect
Observable effect
Buyer‘s choice treatment
Random choice treatment
Notes: Displayed is the observability of the asymmetry and a reci-
procity effect. In the random choice treatment we rule out a reci-
procity effect by randomizing the framing. Hence, we can directly
measure the asymmetry effect. In the buyer’s choice treatment the
observed effect is an aggregate of the asymmetry and a reciprocity
effect.
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6.4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
6.4.1 BELIEFS
The interpretation of a bonus as an advantage and of a handicap as a
disadvantage relies strongly on the beliefs about the competitor’s score.
For that reason we will first analyze if the experimental findings support
Hypothesis 4, which states that beliefs are biased towards zero. In order to
examine if a supplier has biased beliefs we compare each supplier’s estimate
of his competitor’s score to his own median score during the experiment.
We do this separately for bonuses and handicaps.
Our results show systematic differences between beliefs about the com-
petitor’s bonus score and the own median bonus score, as well as between
between beliefs about the competitor’s handicap score and the own median
handicap score. On the one hand, 76 percent of the suppliers underestimate
their competitor’s expected bonus, i.e. believe that they have an advantage
when they receive a bonus. On the other hand, 70 percent overestimate
their competitor’s expected handicap, i.e. believe that they are disadvan-
taged when they receive a handicap. This indicates that most suppliers
interpret the assignment of a bonus as good news and vice versa the as-
signment of a handicap as bad news. Furthermore, we find that for most
subjects the perception bias is symmetric in the sense that the sum of the
individual bonus and the individual handicap estimates is zero. This is
illustrated in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.2 illustrates suppliers’ beliefs about their competitors’ score
and the median of the actual scores. The red bars on the left represent a
supplier’s belief about the competitor’s score given that he himself received
a handicap of -9 ECU and the green bars for the case that the own bonus
was 9 ECU. The median of actual bonuses is 9 (average 8.6) ECU and the
median of the actual handicaps is -9 ECU (average 9.5 ECU). In contrast
to that the median estimate of the competitor’s score in case of a bonus is
5 (average 6.4) ECU and -5 (average -6.9) ECU in case of a handicap.
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Result 27. Suppliers underestimate their competitors’ bonuses (Wilcoxon
signed rank test and t-test, p < 0.001) and overestimate their competitors’
handicaps (Wilcoxon signed rank test and t-test, p < 0.001).
Figure 6.2: Distribution of suppliers’ estimates about competitors’ quality
scores.
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Notes: Displayed are the distributions of suppliers’ estimates about
their competitors’ (expected) scores in case that the own bonus is 9
ECU (green bars) and in case that the own handicap is -9 ECU (red
bars). The orange lines illustrate that the median actual scores of
competitors’ are -9 ECU in case of a handicap and 9 ECU in case
of a bonus.
6.4.2 BIDDING
In this section we analyze suppliers’ bidding behavior. In particular, we
investigate if the framing of the score as a bonus or handicap influences
bidding. We find that suppliers place substantially lower bids when they
receive a handicap compared to the case in which they receive a bonus.
Controlling for suppliers’ costs the average bid in case of a handicap is 4.5
ECU smaller than the average bid in case of a bonus. Taking into account
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that the average bid is 67.7 ECU the influence of the framing is substantial.
Figure 6.3 illustrates the bidding behavior.
Figure 6.3: Bonus and handicap bidding.
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Notes: Displayed are bonus and handicap bidding functions.
Markers illustrate the average bonus and handicap bids given that
the costs are between 0 and 10, 11 and 20, 21 and 30, etc.
Running individual regressions for each supplier we find that 90 per-
cent of the suppliers place lower bids when they are assigned a handicap
compared to the case in which they are assigned a bonus. For 75 percent
of the suppliers this difference is significant on a ten percent level. For
the majority of suppliers average bonus bids are between 3.4 and 7.3 ECU
higher than handicap bids. The distribution of individual bid difference is
depicted in Figure 6.6.
Table 6.1 presents a random-effects panel regression of suppliers’ bid-
ding behavior.3 Here Handicap represents a dummy variable that is one if
the score is framed as a handicap and zero in case of a bonus.4 The vari-
able Buyer is a treatment dummy that is one if the buyer chooses between
3Running fixed-effects regressions leads to the same results as shown in Table 6.3.
4Regressions with the score as explaining variable are reported in Table 6.4.
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bonuses and handicaps and is zero if the score is randomly assigned by the
computer. One feature of our within-subject design is that it inherently
provides a between-subject design which we use to check for consistency.
The results of the between-subjects analysis, which only considers bids in
the first sequence of scoring auctions, are presented in the first two columns
and those of the within-subjects analysis, which takes into account all bids
placed in stage two and three, in the last two columns.
The regressions reported in Table 6.1 confirm the substantial influence
of the framing decision. We further observe that bids become more aggres-
sive over time and find no indication for a reciprocity effect. Even though
the assignment of handicaps is more profitable for the buyers than the as-
signment of bonuses they use bonuses roughly as often as handicaps (48.6%
vs. 51.4%) and do not change their behavior over time. For an illustration
see Figure 6.7.
Result 28. Suppliers bid more aggressive when they have a handicap than
when they have a bonus (Table 6.1, p < 0.001).
An important question especially for practitioners is whether the effect
that handicaps make suppliers bid more aggressive wears off over time.
While Table 6.1 shows that bidding becomes more aggressive over time, we
analyze if the time trend is different for bonuses and handicaps in Table
6.2. When taking into account all 80 rounds of scoring auctions we find
a weakly significant time trend towards lower bids when scores are framed
as bonuses (p = 0.0954) and a highly significant time trend towards lower
bids when scores are framed as handicaps (p = 0.002). However, we find
no indication that the time trends differ. This implies that the effect of the
framing is stable over time.
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Table 6.1: Random-effects panel regressions of bidding behavior.
Bid
Between-subjects design Within-subjects design
(Stage 2) (Stage 2+3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Costs 0.653∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗
(0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0172) (0.0172)
Handicap -4.543∗∗∗ -4.192∗∗∗ -4.767∗∗∗ -4.516∗∗∗
(0.450) (0.654) (0.392) (0.496)
Period -0.119∗ -0.119∗∗ -0.0498∗∗ -0.0501∗∗
(0.0463) (0.0463) (0.0163) (0.0162)
Buyer 0.0462 -0.242
(1.133) (0.396)
Buyer × Handicap -0.706 -0.509
(0.920) (0.572)
Constant 39.25∗∗∗ 39.26∗∗∗ 37.50∗∗∗ 37.63∗∗∗
(1.845) (2.009) (1.448) (1.448)
Observations 1600 1600 3200 3200
Participants 80 80 80 80
R2 0.7995 0.7996 0.8075 0.8076
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
Notes: Reported are random-effects panel regressions. Handicap
is a dummy variable that is equal to zero in case of a positive score
and equal to one in case of a negative score. Buyer is a dummy
variable that is equal to one if the buyer determines the framing
of the scores and equal to zero if it is randomly determined.
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Table 6.2: Random-effects panel regressions of bidding behavior over time.
Bid
Between-subjects design Within-subjects design
(Stage 2) (Stage 2+3)
(1) (2)
Costs 0.653∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗
(0.0176) (0.0172)
Handicap -3.403∗∗∗ -4.151∗∗∗
(0.941) (0.635)
Period -0.0658 -0.0348
(0.0600) (0.0209)
Handicap × Period -0.109 -0.0300
(0.0797) (0.0262)
Constant 37.50∗∗∗ 36.69∗∗∗
(1.620) (1.393)
Observations 1600 3200
Participants 80 80
R2 0.7999 0.8075
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Reported are random-effects panel regressions. Handicap
is a dummy variable that is equal to zero in case of a positive score
and equal to one in case of a negative score.
6.5 CONCLUSION
Quality scores are an essential part of most procurement auctions. These
quality scores, which assign monetary values to non-price attributes, are
necessary to set up binding procurement auctions and influence suppliers’
bids. Even though suppliers’ bidding behavior should only depend on the re-
lation between the own score and the competitor’s score, suppliers typically
only learn their own score, i.e. their own bonus or handicap, in practice.
Since procurement managers every day face the question whether they
should frame their quality scores as bonuses or handicaps when commu-
nicating them to suppliers, we analyze this question experimentally. We
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find that the framing of the scores influences suppliers’ beliefs about their
relative position. A supplier who receives a handicap (bonus) expects to be
in a weaker (stronger) position than his competitor, i.e. he believes that
his competitor has a score closer to zero. As a consequence, suppliers who
receive a handicap bid more aggressive than suppliers who receive a bonus
in order to compensate their disadvantage. We find strong support that
framing the quality score as a handicap increases the profits of the firm
buying the tendered good.
We find no evidence that the profitability of handicaps wears off over
time nor that suppliers receiving a handicap feel treated unfairly and hence
increase their bids. However, one has to take into account that in our
setting participation in the auction is costless for suppliers. Supplier who
receive a handicap expect lower profit from the participation in the auction,
because they expect to be in a weak position and bid more aggressive. This
implies that for a supplier it is less likely to participate in the auction if
he receives a handicap and the participation is costly. Hence, there might
be a trade-off between attracting more bidders and making them bid more
aggressive in some situations.
6.6 APPENDICES
6.6.1 GRAPHS
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Figure 6.4: The influence of quality scores on bids.
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Notes: Displayed are estimates of the average bids given a quality
score. Scores smaller zero are called bonuses and scores larger
zero are called handicaps. The lines represent a linear fits of the
influence of the quality scores on bidding in case of bonuses and
in case of handicaps. Estimates for the average bid given a certain
quality score are obtained by running separate regressions for each
score assuming that a supplier with costs of 100 ECU offers a price
of 100 ECU.
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Figure 6.5: Distribution of the sum of individual bonus and handicap esti-
mates.
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Notes: Displayed is the distribution of the sum of suppliers’ indi-
vidual beliefs about their competitor’s score for the case in which
the own bonus is 9 ECU and for the case in which the own handicap
is -9 ECU.
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Figure 6.6: Distribution of individual differences between bonus and hand-
icap bids.
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Notes: Displayed is the distribution of the difference between in-
dividual bonus and handicap bids. We obtain these differences by
running individual regressions for each supplier. In these regres-
sions the observed bid is explained by the supplier’s cost and a
dummy variable that is one in case of a bonus and zero in case of
a handicap. The coefficient of this dummy variable is an estimate
for the difference between bonus and handicap bids which takes
into account that underlying costs may differ. The distribution of
these coefficients is displayed, the bin size is one.
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Figure 6.7: Buyers’ framing decisions over time.
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Notes: Displayed are buyers’ decisions about using bonuses or
handicaps over time. In the left half of the graph we see the be-
havior of those buyers who started in the active position. In the
right half of the graph we observe the behavior of those buyers who
started in the passive role and could only determine the framing in
period 31 to 50. In both treatments the average share of bonuses
is close to 51 percent.
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Figure 6.8: The influence of the role of the buyer on bonus and handicap
bidding.
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Notes: The left graph illustrates suppliers’ bidding behavior in case
of a handicap and the right graoh their bidding behavior in case of
a bonus. The solid blue lines show suppliers’ bidding behavior for
the case that the buyer determined the framing of the scores and
the dashed gray lines represent the case in which the framing was
randomly assigned. Dots illustrate the average bids given that the
costs are between 0 and 10, 10 and 20, and so on.
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6.6.2 TABLES
Table 6.3: Fixed-effects panel-regression of bidding.
Bid
Between-subjects design Within-subjects design
(Stage 2) (Stage 2+3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Costs 0.653∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗
(0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0172) (0.0172)
Handicap -4.552∗∗∗ -4.181∗∗∗ -4.791∗∗∗ -4.536∗∗∗
(0.457) (0.656) (0.393) (0.495)
Period -0.119∗ -0.120∗ -0.0497∗∗ -0.0501∗∗
(0.0463) (0.0463) (0.0163) (0.0162)
Buyer × Handicap -0.751 -0.516
(0.930) (0.570)
Constant 39.26∗∗∗ 39.29∗∗∗ 37.51∗∗∗ 37.64∗∗∗
(1.505) (1.509) (1.024) (1.021)
Observations 1600 1600 3200 3200
Participants 80 80 80 80
R2 0.847 0.847 0.858 0.858
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Table 6.4: Random-effects panel-regression of bidding.
Between-subjects design Within-subjects design
(Stage 2) (Stage 2+3)
Bid Bid Bid Bid
Costs 0.652∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗
(0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0173) (0.0173)
Score 0.257∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.0247) (0.0341) (0.0220) (0.0279)
Period -0.0934∗ -0.0940∗ -0.0450∗∗ -0.0453∗∗
(0.0458) (0.0459) (0.0162) (0.0162)
Buyer -0.374 -0.538
(1.137) (0.285)
Buyer × Score 0.0381 0.0305
(0.0509) (0.0318)
Constant 36.43∗∗∗ 36.64∗∗∗ 34.94∗∗∗ 35.22∗∗∗
(1.813) (2.030) (1.423) (1.436)
Observations 1600 1600 3200 3200
Participants 80 80 80 80
R2 0.8024 0.8025 0.8096 0.8098
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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6.6.3 INSTRUCTIONS
ANLEITUNG ZUM 1. TEIL 
Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme am Experiment. Bitte sprechen Sie bis zum Ende 
des Experiments nicht  mehr mit anderen Teilnehmern. Dieses Experiment besteht aus 
mehreren Teilen, wobei Ihre Entscheidungen in den einzelnen Teilen keinen Einfluss auf 
die anderen Teile haben. 
Dieser Teil des Experiments besteht aus 10 Runden, die jeweils die gleiche Abfolge an 
Entscheidungen haben. Die Abfolge der Entscheidungen wird unten ausführlich erklärt. 
Es gibt in diesem Experiment 2 Rollen: Käufer und Zulieferer. Zu Beginn des 
Experiments bekommen Sie eine dieser Rollen zufällig zugelost und behalten diese Rolle 
für das gesamte Experiment. Auf dem ersten Bildschirm sehen Sie, welche Rolle Sie 
haben.   
Überblick über die Entscheidungen in einer Runde 
Zu Beginn jeder Runde werden zufällig neue Gruppen bestehend aus einem Käufer und 
zwei Zulieferern gebildet. Im Folgenden findet dann eine Auktion statt, in der die beiden 
Zulieferer ihr Gut anbieten. In der Auktion geben die Zulieferer ein Preisangebot ab, zu 
dem sie bereit sind, das Gut zu verkaufen. Die Bereitstellung des Gutes ist mit Kosten 
verbunden. Die Kosten, die den Zulieferern nur entstehen, wenn sie das Gut verkaufen, 
werden in jeder Runde zufällig und unabhängig für jeden Zulieferer ermittelt. Alle 
ganzzahligen Kosten zwischen 0 und 100 sind dabei gleich wahrscheinlich.  
Ablauf der Auktion 
Zunächst geben beide Zulieferer ein Preisangebot ab. Anschließend wird der Zulieferer 
ausgewählt, der das niedrigere Gebot gemacht hat.  
Die Gewinne der Zulieferer 
Der Gewinn des ausgewählten Zulieferers ist gegeben durch die Differenz zwischen 
seinem Preisangebot und seinen Kosten. Der nicht ausgewählte Zulieferer macht einen 
Gewinn von 0.  
Der Gewinn des Käufers 
Der Gewinn des Käufers ist gegeben durch die Differenz zwischen seiner Wertschätzung 
für das Gut und dem Preis, den er dafür zahlen muss.  
Die Auszahlung 
Wenn alle Teile des Experiments abgeschlossen sind, wird die Summe aus Ihren 
Gewinnen in den einzelnen Teilen gebildet. Anschließend wird dieser Gewinn in Euro 
umgerechnet, dabei entsprechen 100 ECU einem Euro. Zusätzlich erhalten Sie ein Show 
Up Fee in Höhe von 2,50€.   
ANLEITUNG ZUM 2. TEIL 
Dieser Teil des Experiments besteht aus 20 Runden, die jeweils die gleiche Abfolge an 
Entscheidungen haben.  
Überblick über die Entscheidungen in einer Runde 
Weiterhin werden zu Beginn jeder Runde zufällig neue Gruppen bestehend aus einem 
Käufer und zwei Zulieferern gebildet. Im Folgenden findet dann eine Auktion statt, in der 
die beiden Zulieferer ihr Gut anbieten. In der Auktion geben die Zulieferer ein 
Preisangebot ab, zu dem sie bereit sind, das Gut zu verkaufen. Die Bereitstellung des 
Gutes ist mit Kosten verbunden. Die Kosten, die den Zulieferern nur entstehen, wenn sie 
das Gut verkaufen, werden in jeder Runde zufällig und unabhängig für jeden Zulieferer 
ermittelt. Alle ganzzahligen Kosten zwischen 0 und 100 sind dabei gleich 
wahrscheinlich.  
Ablauf der Auktion 
Die Auktion besteht nun aus zwei Stufen. 
Stufe 1: 
In jeder Runde bevorzugt der Käufer das Gut eines der beiden Zulieferer. D.h. der Wert 
dieses Gutes ist für den Käufer größer als der Wert des Gutes des anderen Zulieferers. 
Somit besitzt der Käufer eine höhere Wertschätzung für das bevorzugte Gut und eine 
niedrigere Wertschätzung für das nicht bevorzugte Gut.  
Um dies zu berücksichtigen, vergibt der [Treatment 1: „Käufer“] [Treatment 2: 
„Computer“] entweder einen Bonus oder einen Malus. 
- Bonus: Der [Treatment 1: „Käufer“] [Treatment 2: „Computer“] vergibt an die 
Zulieferer unterschiedlich hohe Boni 
- Malus: Der [Treatment 1: „Käufer“] [Treatment 2: „Computer“] vergibt an die 
Zulieferer unterschiedlich hohe Mali 
Sowohl die Boni als auch die Mali spiegeln die Präferenzen des Käufers wider. Ein 
Bonus sorgt dafür, dass das Preisangebot des Zulieferers attraktiver ist. Ein Malus 
bewirkt das Gegenteil und verringert die Attraktivität des Preisangebots des Zulieferers 
(Details siehe später). 
Falls der [Treatment 1: „Käufer“] [Treatment 2: „Computer“] Boni vergibt, erhalten 
beide Zulieferer einen Bonus, wobei der Zulieferer des bevorzugten Gutes einen höheren 
Bonus als der andere Zulieferer erhält. Bsp: Der bevorzugte Zulieferer erhält einen Bonus 
von 6, der sein angepasstes Preisangebot um 6 Einheiten senkt, also attraktiver macht, 
während der andere Zulieferer einen Bonus von 2 erhält. 
 
Falls der [Treatment 1: „Käufer“] [Treatment 2: „Computer“] Mali vergibt, erhalten beide 
Zulieferer einen Malus, wobei der Zulieferer des bevorzugten Gutes einen niedrigeren 
Malus als der andere Zulieferer erhält.  
Bsp.: Der bevorzugte Zulieferer erhält einen Malus von 2, der sein angepasstes 
Preisangebot um 2 Einheiten erhöht, also verschlechtert, während der andere Zulieferer 
einen Malus von 6 erhält. 
Die Wahrscheinlichkeit der bevorzugte Zulieferer zu sein, ist für beide Zulieferer gleich 
hoch. 
Stufe 2: 
In der zweiten Stufe der Auktion erfährt jeder Zulieferer seine eigenen Kosten sowie den 
Bonus oder Malus, der ihm zugewiesen wurde. Im Anschluss gibt jeder Zulieferer sein 
Preisangebot ab, zu dem er bereit ist, das Gut zur Verfügung zu stellen. Anschließend 
wird der Auktionsgewinner bestimmt.  
Entscheidungsregel 
Welcher Zulieferer die Auktion gewinnt, hängt von den angepassten Preisangeboten ab. 
D.h. nicht nur von den Preisangeboten selbst, sondern auch von den zugeteilten 
Boni/Mali. 
Die Auktion gewinnt der Zulieferer, der das niedrigste angepasste Preisangebot hat. 
Sollten beide Zulieferer gleiche angepasste Preisangebot gemacht haben, so wird der 
bevorzugte Bieter den Zuschlag erhalten. 
angepasstes Preisangebot = Preisangebot 
− Bonus, im Falle eines Bonus
+ Malus, im Falle eines Malus
"
#
$
%$
 
Die Gewinne der Zulieferer 
Der Gewinn des ausgewählten Zulieferers ist gegeben durch die Differenz zwischen 
seinem Preisangebot (nicht angepasstes Preisangebot) und seinen Kosten. Der nicht 
ausgewählte Zulieferer macht einen Gewinn von 0.  
Der Gewinn des Käufers 
Der Gewinn des Käufers ist gegeben durch die Differenz zwischen seiner Wertschätzung 
für das Gut und dem Preis, den er dafür zahlen muss. Die Wertschätzung des Käufers 
hängt davon ab, ob er das erworbene Gut von seinem bevorzugten oder von seinem nicht 
bevorzugten Lieferanten erhält. Wird der  Käufer von seinem bevorzugten (nicht 
bevorzugten) Zulieferer beliefert, so ist seine Wertschätzung größer (kleiner) als seine 
durchschnittliche Wertschätzung. 
 
  
Übersicht über die Entscheidungen 
Stufe 1: [Treatment 1: „Käufer“] [Treatment 2: „Computer“] entscheidet zwischen Bonus 
und Malus 
Stufe 2: Zulieferer geben Gebote ab 
ANLEITUNG ZUM 3. TEIL 
Dieser Teil des Experiments besteht aus 20 Runden, die jeweils die gleiche Abfolge an 
Entscheidungen haben. 
Überblick über die Entscheidungen in einer Runde 
Dieser Teil des Experiments gleicht dem 2. Teil des Experiments bis auf die Tatsache, 
dass nun der [Treatment 1: „Computer“] [Treatment 2: „Käufer“] zwischen der 
Verwendung von Boni oder Mali entscheidet.  
Instructions part 1 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please do not talk to other participants 
during the experiment. This experiment consists of several parts. Your decisions in one 
part of the experiment do not have any influence on other parts of the experiment. 
This part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds. You are in the same situation in each 
of these rounds. A detailed description of the situation follows. There are two roles in this 
experiment: Buyer and Supplier. At the beginning of the experiment one of these roles is 
randomly assigned to you and you keep this role for the entire experiment. The first 
screen shows your role. 
Overview of the decisions in one round 
At the beginning of each round new groups consisting of one buyer and two suppliers are 
randomly determined. Then an auction is conducted in which both suppliers offer a 
good. In the auction both suppliers place a bid at which they are willing to sell their good. 
The provision of the good is costly. These costs that only occur if suppliers sell their 
good are independently and randomly determined for each supplier in each round. Each 
integer between 0 and 100 is equally likely. 
Timing of an auction 
First, both suppliers place a bid. Then the supplier who placed the lower bid is selected. 
  
Suppliers’ profits 
The selected supplier’s profit is given as the difference between the supplier’s bid and the 
supplier’s cost. The non-selected supplier earns 0. 
  
Buyer’s profit 
The buyer’s profit is given as the difference between the buyer’s valuation for the good 
and the price. 
  
Payment 
At the end of the entire experiment we sum up your profits in the different parts of the 
experiment. This profit is converted to Euro, 100 ECU are equivalent to 1 Euro. 
Additionally, you receive a show up fee of 2.50 Euro.   
Instructions part 2 
This part of the experiment consists of 20 rounds. You are in the same situation in each 
of these rounds.  
Overview of the decisions in one round 
Equivalent to the first part of the experiment new groups consisting of one buyer and two 
suppliers are randomly determined at the beginning of each round.  Then an auction is 
conducted in which both suppliers offer their good. In the auction both suppliers place a 
bid at which they are willing to sell their good. The provision of the good is costly. These 
costs that only occur if suppliers sell their good are independently and randomly 
determined for each supplier in each round. Each integer between 0 and 100 is equally 
likely. 
 
Timing of an auction 
The auction now consists of two stages. 
 
Stage 1 
In each round the buyer prefers the good of one of the two suppliers. This means the 
buyer’s valuation for this good is larger than the buyer’s valuation for the good of the 
other supplier. Hence the buyer has a higher valuation for the preferred good and a lower 
valuation for the non-preferred good. 
In order to take this into account the [Treatment 1: „buyer“] [Treatment 2: „computer“] 
assign a bonus or handicap. 
- Bonus: The [Treatment 1: „buyer“] [Treatment 2: „computer“] assigns bonuses of 
different size to both suppliers. 
- Handicap: The [Treatment 1: „buyer“] [Treatment 2: „computer“] assigns 
handicaps of different size to both suppliers. 
Both bonuses and handicaps reflect the buyer’s preferences. A bonus makes a supplier’s 
bid more attractive. A handicap reduces the attractiveness of a supplier’s bid. (details 
follow). 
If the [Treatment 1: „buyer“] [Treatment 2: „computer“] assigns bonuses, both suppliers 
receive a bonus. The bonus of the preferred supplier is larger than the bonus of the other 
supplier. Example: The preferred supplier receives a bonus of 6 that reduces the 
supplier’s score-adjusted bid by 6 units, i.e. it becomes more attractive, whereas the other 
supplier receives a bonus of 2.  
If the [Treatment 1: „buyer“] [Treatment 2: „computer“] assigns handicaps, both 
suppliers receive a handicap. The handicap of the preferred supplier is smaller than the 
handicap of the other supplier. Example: The preferred supplier receives a handicap of 2 
that increases the supplier’s score-adjusted bid by 2 units, i.e. it becomes less attractive, 
whereas the other supplier receives a handicap of 6. 
The probability of being the preferred supplier is the same for both suppliers. 
Stage 2 
In the second stage of the auction each supplier observes his cost and the bonus or 
handicap that is assigned to him. Then each supplier places a bid at which he is willing to 
provide the good. Finally, the winner is determined. 
  
Award criterion 
Score-adjusted bids determine which supplier wins the auction. This means the award 
decision does not only depend on suppliers’ bids but also their bonuses or handicaps. 
 
The supplier who placed the lower score-adjusted bid wins the auction. If both suppliers 
place the same score-adjusted bid the preferred supplier is selected. 
score-adjusted	bid=bid
−bonus,	in	case	of	bonuses
										+handicap,	in	case	of	handicaps
 
Suppliers’ profits 
The profit of the selected supplier is given as the difference between his bid (not score-
adjusted bid) and his cost. The non-selected supplier earns 0. 
 
Buyer’s profit 
The buyer’s profit is given as the difference between his valuation for the good and the 
price he has to pay. The valuation of the good depends on whether the good is provided 
by his preferred supplier or his non-preferred supplier. If the good is provided by the 
preferred (non-preferred) supplier, his valuation is larger (smaller) than his average 
valuation. 
 
Overview 
Stage 1: The [Treatment 1: „buyer“] [Treatment 2: „computer“] chooses between bonuses 
and handicaps. 
Stage 2: Suppliers place bids. 
Instructions part 3 
This part of the experiment consists of 20 rounds. You are in the same situation in each 
of these rounds. 
Overview of the decisions in one round 
This part of the experiment is equivalent to the second part of the experiment with the 
only exception that now the [Treatment 1: „computer“] [Treatment 2: „buyer“] chooses 
between bonuses and handicaps.  
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